

## Progress Since Busan on Inclusive Development

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## Acronyms and abbreviations

ACT Alliance/CIDSE	ACT Alliance & Catholic International Cooperation for Development & Solidarity
BPa	Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (Busan Partnership Agreement)
CIVICUS	CIVICUS World Alliance for Citizen Participation
CPDE	CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness
CSO	Civil society organization
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
GPEDC	Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation
GPMF	Global Partnership Monitoring Framework
HLM	High Level Meeting
HLP	United Nations High Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights
ICNL	International Center for Not-for-profit Law
ITUC	International Trade Union Confederation
ILO	International Labour Organisation
LGBT	Lesbian, gay, bisexual & transgender
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation & Development
OPHRD	Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders
OWG	United Nations Open Working Group
TT	Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness & Enabling Environment
UN	United Nations
UN Special Rapporteur	United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly & of association
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WMD	World Movement for Democracy

## I. Introduction

As a concept, “inclusive development” permeates all of the commitments made in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation document (BPa). However, this concept is not so clearly defined as other core Busan principles such as transparency or management for results. While the principle of inclusivity is widely shared by BPa adherents, its meaning and implications for practice require more attention.

The centrality of inclusion for the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) and the Mexico High Level Meeting (HLM) presents a great opportunity amid growing recognition that inclusion should be at the heart of the Post-2015 development agenda.<sup>1</sup> The time is ripe to raise the profile of inclusive development and the GPEDC is well placed to elaborate on its operational implications.

As a democratic and human rights principle, inclusion is an end in itself. It is also a means to facilitate participation in problem solving and decision making, to foster innovation and opportunity, and to share the benefits of development more broadly. At its core, inclusive development is grounded in the merit of including all development actors in the development process as planners, implementers and beneficiaries, through a whole-of-society approach.

This paper seeks to provide insight into the meaning of inclusive development, using a three-part framework addressing inclusiveness of voice, actions, and results. It points to recent progress, suggests questions for discussion and offers some recommendations for moving forward.<sup>2</sup>

## II. What does the BPa say about Inclusive Development?

The BPa sets the stage for an inclusive approach from the outset in §1, affirming that:

“we are united by a new partnership that is broader and more inclusive than ever before, founded on shared principles, common goals and differential commitments for effective international development.”

From this base, the BPa addresses inclusive development in four ways:

- It includes numerous references to inclusivity (see §1, 11, 12, 14 and 16), notably in commitments to:
  - deepen, extend and operationalize democratic ownership (§12a);
  - embrace the principle of inclusive development partnerships (§11c); and
  - embrace diversity and recognise the distinct roles of all stakeholders (§7).
- It includes clauses on an inclusive range of development stakeholders, including:
  - parliaments and local governments (§21);
  - civil society organizations (CSOs) (§22);
  - providers of South-South and triangular cooperation (§31); and
  - the private sector, including business associations and trade unions (§32).
- It refers to “agreed international commitments on human rights” (§11, 20 and 22a). This implies inclusive development due to the comprehensiveness of the international human

rights framework, and the universality of human rights, which are indivisible and inalienable for all.

- Finally, the BPa includes a commitment to transparency (§23), without which participatory inclusive development could not be operationalized.

### III. What does Inclusive Development in the BPa mean in practice?

This paper proposes a three-part framework to illustrate what it means to operationalize inclusive development. The framework addresses the inclusiveness of voice, action and results, in turn.

#### ***i. Voice***

Inclusive development implies democratic ownership of development processes. Representative democracy, based on a diversity of political parties with a popular base and credible policy platforms is one way to channel constituents' perspectives and priorities into public debate through electoral processes and informed parliamentary debate. Democratic governance requires "responsive government institutions capable of providing basic services and fostering inclusive economic growth".<sup>3</sup>

However, deepening and extending democratic ownership beyond this requires complementary democratic processes and fora allowing a diversity of stakeholder perspectives to be heard in transparent and inclusive ways. While there is a role to be played by ad hoc issue-based consultation and outreach, there are advantages to establishing transparent, predictable and inclusive spaces where the voices of multiple stakeholders such as CSOs, local governments, and private sector actors can be heard at both national and local levels when elaborating, implementing and monitoring development plans and policies.

Bringing in varied and sometimes challenging perspectives together in these ways offers a number of advantages:

- It can enhance the effectiveness of policy and programs by tapping into the voice of actors with relevant day-to-day experience of the policy and programs in question;
- It can draw attention to issues that politicians, partisan political organs and governments might otherwise ignore;<sup>4</sup>
- It can help find creative solutions to complex issues through the meeting of ideas and expertise;<sup>5</sup> and
- It is essential for building shared understanding and ownership of agendas for action that are politically and economically feasible, and locally relevant.<sup>6</sup>

Such mechanisms of multi-stakeholder dialogue can be complemented by various types of social accountability mechanisms allowing all people, including the poor, vulnerable and marginalized,<sup>7</sup> to publically voice their priorities and concerns, using tracking surveys, community score cards or e-governance information and communication technologies.<sup>8</sup>

## **ii. Action**

Inclusive development implies that there is space, not just for voice, but also for leadership of development initiatives by a range of development actors. Inclusion in action recognizes and enables the complementary roles that can be played by all levels of government, the private sector and civil society, thus operationalizing the democratic ownership principle.

Diverse development actors – including private enterprise, CSOs, foundations, social impact investors, trade unions, youth groups, women’s rights organizations and local governments amongst others – all have roles to play, based on each actor’s distinct priorities, plans and approaches. Inclusiveness of actions taps into this diversity to draw on the comparative advantage and energies of each,<sup>9</sup> which can be particularly effective when efforts are made to coordinate among actors to avoid duplication and build synergies.

Underlying this perspective is recognition that government cannot be the sole agent of development under the umbrella of a single development blueprint. National governments are responsible for regulation and standard setting and play a central role in confronting macro-level issues requiring a planned, government-led approach. This includes taking responsibility for economic policy and the provision of minimum services and standards in core areas such as health, education or public infrastructure. Even in these areas, governments are well served by engaging other development actors in design and standard-setting, and may also choose to engage these actors in “multi-actor partnerships” when it comes to implementation.<sup>10</sup>

The important role of development actors outside of the state apparatus comes to the fore most strongly when creativity, innovation, risk-taking and leadership are needed to address more specialized, cutting-edge or localized development, to pilot new solutions that might ultimately be scaled up, or where financial resources, whether private capital or philanthropic contributions, are needed. CSOs are often first in addressing initially “unpopular” or cutting-edge issues,<sup>11</sup> such as gender equality, LGBT rights, or environmental sustainability. Private sector actors are appropriate leaders in designing business models that can contribute to financial inclusion and maximize the social impact of private investment. Local governments meanwhile, as the closest public authorities to people, combined with their on-the-ground presence, are well placed to work with societies to identify and implement solutions to acute challenges experienced at local levels, such as rapid urbanization, migration, public safety or infrastructure.<sup>12</sup>

## **iii. Results**

Inclusive results are those that benefit all segments of society, which requires particular effort to ensure that the poorest and most marginalized populations also reap the benefits of results. The imperative of inclusive results is obvious in discussions of development cooperation, which is in essence aimed at poverty reduction and equality.

As Cook and Lee (2014) put it, an inclusive approach “does not imply simply targeted interventions: inclusion requires that policies ensure universal access to essential services, non-discrimination, as well as consideration of the solidarity and social cohesion effects of universal and appropriate redistributive policies”.<sup>13</sup>

Examples of inclusive results can be found in the proposals put forward as focus areas for the post-2015 agenda by the United Nations (UN) Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals (OWG) in March 2014.<sup>14</sup> These include:

- poverty eradication (focus area #1);
- gender equality and women's empowerment (#5);
- sustained and inclusive economic growth (#8);
- employment and decent work for all (#11); and
- promoting equality (#12).

Human rights will be the cornerstone of collective effort to achieve inclusive development through the Post-2015 goals. As stated by the UN Secretary General (2013): "... no person anywhere should be left behind. No person should go hungry, lack shelter or clean water and sanitation, face social and economic exclusion or live without access to basic health services and education. These are human rights, and form the foundations for a decent life".<sup>15</sup>

Achieving inclusive development results as embodied in the Post-2015 goals and the human rights standards that underlie them, can be aided by the adoption of a human rights-based approach to development. The principles of a human rights-based approach are, in fact, very similar to those of inclusive development. They include:

- participation and inclusion;
- equality and non-discrimination;
- accountability and transparency; and
- the indivisibility and interdependence of rights.

A human rights-based approach sees the realization of human rights as both a goal and a means to inclusive development in that it helps to address the underlying causes of poverty and marginalization. A human rights-based approach identifies rights holders (citizens, members of society) and their entitlements and corresponding duty-bearers (states) and their obligations, and works towards strengthening the capacities of rights-holders to make their claims and of duty-bearers to meet their obligations.

Inclusive results require development practices to be inclusive first in terms of voice and of action in keeping with the spirit of democratic ownership. For instance, inclusive growth that results in productive, well-paid jobs and is conducive to employment and decent work (OWG focus areas #3 & #11) will be more readily achieved if private sector and trade union voices and actions are part and parcel of policy and program design early in the process. To eradicate poverty (#1) the voice of marginalized or vulnerable populations must be heard to help ensure they benefit from direct effects of growth efforts, as well as from the distribution of wider growth effects. Inclusive results can also emerge from locally appropriate services that are championed by local governments as ambassadors for their constituents or by constituents themselves as clients of those services. Inclusive results can be achieved by including CSO actions, because CSOs can be particularly effective at reaching the poor and socially excluded due to "their connections with marginalised populations or segments of the population that experience systemic discrimination in development processes, such as women, indigenous peoples or landless people".<sup>16</sup>

#### **iv. Enabling factors**

The three manifestations of inclusive development identified here – voice, action and results – require certain enabling factors to be in place for their advancement.

First of these is **transparency**, a key prerequisite for accountability in inclusive development, whereby adequate, high-quality information on the financial flows, policies and programs of all development cooperation actors is made available. Transparency is critical to inform dialogue, to enhance coordination and seek synergies, and to jointly monitor whether development results are reaching those most in need.

An **enabling policy, legal and regulatory environment** is a further prerequisite, enabling stakeholders of various types to organize and articulate their voices, and to implement initiatives aligned with the priorities of the people they serve or represent. For example:

- A sound legal, policy and regulatory environment for the private sector could promote inclusion by encouraging investment that achieves shared development, as well as business objectives, and by regulating business practices to help ensure significant economic windfalls (profits, taxes) remain in country.
- If decentralization schemes exist, local governments require legal and regulatory instruments that allow them a sufficient level of autonomy to execute their roles and responsibilities, including the use of public resources in line with their constitutional mandates.
- For civil society, an enabling environment in law, policy and practice consistent with internationally agreed rights is required to promote and protect the rights to freedom of association, of peaceful assembly, and of expression, amongst others, to maximize civil society's contribution to development.<sup>17</sup>

As with these and all BPa commitments, the **political will** of all development actors to improve development policy and practice is a prerequisite for moving forward. Hopefully, this paper and the ensuing dialogue can help foster the political will that is required.

#### **IV. Progress and challenges**

What can be said about progress since Busan in achieving the commitment to inclusive development?<sup>18</sup> There is no indicator specific to inclusive development in the Global Partnership Monitoring Framework (GPMF). This is understandable given the imperative to continue to monitor key Paris indicators, the desire to establish only a light monitoring framework at the global level, and the challenge of assessing progress against such a broad concept as inclusive development.

Four of the indicators added after Busan can be said to be especially relevant for monitoring inclusive development:<sup>19</sup>

- *Indicator 2*: Civil society operates within an environment that maximises its engagement in and contribution to development;
- *Indicator 3*: Engagement and contribution of the private sector to development;
- *Indicator 4*: Transparency: information on development cooperation is publicly available; and
- *Indicator 8*: Gender equality and empowerment of women.

It is not possible to provide a comprehensive assessment of progress on inclusive development at this stage.<sup>20</sup> Future assessments would benefit from joint elaboration of appropriate inclusive development indicators, and dedicated joint efforts to collect and analyse data over a longer timeframe.

### ***i. Progress on Inclusive Voice***

The GPEDC's country monitoring points to strengthened engagement of development actors such as CSOs and the private sector in "national accountability processes", but that there is need for improvement.<sup>21</sup> Development of an indicator on the quality of public-private dialogue has proven challenging and the GPEDC indicator is still being tested. Existing evidence points to successes where there is strong secretariat support for institutionalized dialogue and where there is strong local demand. Conversely, success is impeded in contexts where sound support structures and stakeholder commitment are lacking.<sup>22</sup>

As noted in the GPEDC 2014 progress report, the BPa notion of democratic ownership "opens up scope for CSOs to demand to be fully involved in development processes".<sup>23</sup> As regards inclusion of civil society voice, recent examples of country-level institutionalized multi-stakeholder dialogue and accountability fora involving CSOs are available from a number of countries ranging from Malawi to Kyrgyzstan,<sup>24</sup> as are examples at the regional and international levels.<sup>25</sup> However, consultations with civil society tend to remain episodic and at the discretion of governments and have been judged insufficiently strategic, useful, meaningful and transparent.<sup>26</sup>

While inclusiveness of voice is increasing in some quarters, in other quarters it is becoming more difficult for civil society to raise its voice. Manifestations of this include the following:

- a growing number of targeted restrictions whereby civil society activities such as those related to the promotion of government or private sector accountability, democracy or human rights are undermined or shut down, or where regulatory definitions of allowable activities are left vague and open to arbitrary interpretation;<sup>27</sup>
- increasing restrictions on foreign funding of such civil society activities, among others;<sup>28</sup>
- controls over the use of electronic communications through measures such as internet blackouts, defamation and sedition laws applying to internet expression, or state monitoring and interception of electronic communications; and<sup>29</sup>
- incidences of harassment, intimidation, imprisonment or worse, especially against human rights defenders.<sup>30</sup>

These restrictions are occurring despite the protection accorded to the rights to freedom of expression and association under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which protects the right of associations to:

- express their views – even minority or dissenting views;
- carry out their statutory activities; and
- seek, secure and utilize resources from domestic, foreign, and international sources.<sup>31</sup>

There seems therefore to be a divide between the BPa commitment to democratic ownership and practical measures to advance the inclusiveness of voice that is a necessary part of that.

Additional evidence on the degree to which inclusiveness of voice is being pursued could help to identify bottlenecks, identify good practice and develop practical recommendations. Additional efforts could be envisaged on this front, by:

- revisiting the optional module on “assessing inclusive ownership” developed for the 2011 round of Paris Declaration monitoring<sup>32</sup> to ensure greater country participation;<sup>33</sup>
- collaborating with leaders in social accountability on how to directly engage people ; and
- integrating findings and good practice recommendations from existing global monitoring efforts such as the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Reviews<sup>34</sup> and reports from Special Rapporteurs and Representatives, which could help to put the issue of inclusive voice in country context.

### *Critical Areas Requiring Additional Effort*

We see three critical areas requiring additional effort under the heading of inclusive voice. First off there is the need for all participants to implement a higher standard of **transparency**. There are three aspects to this. All actors must be prepared to:

- make available information on their policies and programs, as a way toward recognizing commonality of high-level objectives and fostering trust;
- make meetings more timely and predictable and documentation available sufficiently in advance;
- make the selection of stakeholder representatives transparent and inclusive; and
- establish feedback mechanisms on how stakeholder contributions have been taken into consideration.

A second challenge is how to **manage the diversity of voices** in multi-stakeholder fora. There is a need for realism in addressing inclusiveness of voice, because genuine participation takes considerable time and resources. It is not realistic to pursue multi-stakeholder dialogue or other forms of participation with all segments of society on every development policy or program, so priorities need to be established on appropriate topics and mechanisms. Where representative fora are involved, the diversity of voices can partly be addressed by allowing transparent nomination of representatives by their stakeholder groups.

Mechanisms for direct engagement on an individual basis, as has been done globally through the Post-2015 online consultations, or through social accountability mechanisms, involve challenges of their own, including:

- accessibility issues arise for the most marginalized, possibly illiterate or technology-deprived segments of the population;
- the practicalities of distilling a vast body of individual inputs; and
- susceptibility to manipulation of outcomes.

A third challenge is how to raise **capacity to engage effectively** in dialogue. Resources need to be made available to strengthen capacities of all stakeholders to engage effectively in dialogue with other stakeholder groups, building on national, regional and international good practice. For example, capacity support for independent CSOs representing the most marginalized populations can help them to participate effectively and credibly in multi-stakeholder policy

processes. Executive and non-executive members of national and local governments could also benefit from capacity development on how to implement meaningful and inclusive dialogue and accountability processes.

And finally, a fourth challenge is to address the growing **restrictions on civil society's voice**. Broad civic participation, including through CSOs, is severely affected when the space for their engagement is reduced, and thus so too is inclusive development and democratic ownership.

## **ii. Progress on Inclusive Action**

A hallmark of the BPa is that it embraces diversity and recognises that diverse actors have distinct development roles to play. The BPa also sees traditional aid as a potential catalyst to leverage development cooperation contributions from other sources (see BPa §10). Official Development Assistance flows to developing countries are now surpassed by non-official flows. From 1995 to 2011, for example, the ratio of net foreign direct investment to net official aid flows to low and lower-middle income countries increased more than threefold.<sup>35</sup> Development cooperation contributions from sources such as South-South cooperation, philanthropic foundations, CSOs, innovative financing mechanisms, and remittances, are also on the rise.<sup>36</sup>

However, the GPEDC's 2014 country monitoring suggests that there is room for progress in recognizing the development contributions of actors outside of the state apparatus, the authors noting that more time is needed to move beyond the traditional government-centred, North-South model.<sup>37</sup>

In this last observation lies a tension between the BPa principle of inclusiveness and the Paris Declaration principles of ownership and alignment. This tension is evident in GPMF indicator 1 and its target that *all* providers of development co-operation use country results frameworks. By assuming that country results frameworks corresponding to a government's development plan ought to encompass all development actors' activities, this indicator is out of sync with the whole-of-society approach envisioned in the BPa.

There is a risk that requiring such alignment could stifle the legitimate development actions of varied development actors, rather than enabling them to initiate development programming that is "consistent with the needs and priorities of the people they serve or represent".<sup>38</sup> In contrast, the notion of inclusive development action recognizes that there are multiple entry points for democratic ownership beyond adherence to a single national results framework, facilitating the type of demand-driven approach that is the true essence of the ownership principle.

However, it seems that a trend continues today in which the concept of ownership is conflated with that of alignment in ways that can undermine inclusive development. As argued by the World Movement for Democracy (WMD) and International Center for Not-for-profit Law (ICNL), requiring all development actors to align with national development plans "limits the ability of CSOs to pursue activities not pre-defined by governments.... and may limit the ability of CSOs to play a critical watchdog role".<sup>39</sup> It also infringes upon the right to freedom of association, whereas the right to associate for any legal purpose is an essential component of democracy and assumes a pluralism of views.<sup>40</sup>

The tendency to restrict the activities of varied development actors by requiring them to align with pre-defined plans often goes hand-in-hand with restrictions on access to funding. As noted in the Voice section above, restrictions on funding flows to CSOs are increasing.<sup>41</sup> Such restrictions are not solely regulatory in nature. In some instances CSOs receiving foreign funds have been labelled pejoratively as ‘terrorists’ or ‘foreign agents,’ subjected to disproportionate approval and reporting requirements, or exposed to harsh penalties for infractions.<sup>42</sup>

Yet, as argued by the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, freedom of association requires governments to “allow access by NGOs to foreign funding as a part of international cooperation to which civil society is entitled, to the same extent as Governments”.<sup>43</sup> He adds that restrictions on CSO activities and access to varied funding sources are legitimate only if “necessary in a democratic society” and “proportional” to the perceived risk the restrictions purport to address.<sup>44</sup>

Local governments also face legal, regulatory and institutional restrictions that can limit their autonomy and their ability to develop the necessary capacities to fulfil the roles demanded of them, especially in contexts of decentralisation. Local authorities need to be empowered to develop and implement local policies and plans. Such empowerment involves “the transfer of a range of political authority and powers including revenue-raising, responsibilities in service delivery and financial, human and administrative resources from higher levels in the political system to public authorities at lower level”.<sup>45</sup> A recent assessment of the enabling environment provided by the institutional and legal frameworks governing city and local government action across Africa points to a number of areas that need strengthening, in particular in relation to financial transfers from central to local government; the degree of local government control over revenue generation; the existence of legislation for citizen participation; and the existence of urban strategies.<sup>46</sup>

The private sector too needs an enabling policy, legal, regulatory and administrative environment to allow for more private investment in productive, growth-oriented activities such as infrastructure development, as well as in the provision of public services, which is a growing area of private sector engagement.<sup>47</sup> Private sector actors have a growing role in development cooperation and an enabling environment can encourage investment that clearly meets shared inclusive development objectives rather than simply profit-seeking objectives, including through partnerships between international and local private sector players to help strengthen the domestic private sector in the long term. Regulatory and policy coherence is also essential so that enabling the private sector does not work counter to broad development goals, for example through deregulation of labour markets, low corporate taxes, or below par environmental and social standards governing private sector investment.<sup>48</sup>

### *Critical Areas Requiring Additional Effort*

The tension between inclusive action by a diversity of development actors and the expectation of alignment with a national set of development priorities cannot be fully reconciled. A more realistic quest would be to seek an **appropriate balance** between the ‘right of initiative’ of development actors beyond state actors, and the complementary need for alignment with national plans. Diversity is an essential aspect of democratic ownership and will by definition

come with some fragmentation; it can be ‘managed’ as called for in §25 of the BPd, but cannot fully be managed away.

Greater clarity on this point would constitute real progress in our understanding of what makes for effective development. In parallel, efforts to achieve greater **transparency**, information sharing and institutionalized multi-stakeholder dialogue could help to improve coordination among development actors to avoid duplication of effort and encourage synergies across different initiatives.

The promotion and protection of an **enabling environment** for various development actors in keeping with international rights and norms would be another way to promote inclusive action<sup>49</sup> and help ensure the balance is not overly tipped in favour of alignment. GPEDC monitoring is currently challenged to capture country level progress in this area. There is room to explore decentralized, locally-owned and embedded monitoring means, perhaps in collaboration with national human rights institutions such as ombudsman offices. This could be addressed within countries’ existing accountability frameworks,<sup>50</sup> drawing from existing global and regional monitoring and linking to the GPEDC monitoring framework and guidelines.

Some global instruments that could contribute to monitoring the enabling environment for civil society include for example Special Rapporteur or Representative reporting, or the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Reviews, both of which may be enhanced since the United Nations General Assembly (2013) *Resolution on Civil Society Space: Creating and maintaining in law and in practice, a safe and enabling environment*. Regional human rights mechanisms such as those of the Organization of American States, the African Union, the European Court of Human Rights, or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations can also be drawn from.

Global monitoring of private sector adherence to agreed principles, such as found in the United Nations *Global Compact*, or the *Voluntary principles on security and human rights*, are also worth drawing from, as is the The World Bank’s *Doing Business* reporting on regulatory environments for the private sector.<sup>51</sup>

### **iii. Progress on Inclusive Results**

Busan and its precedents have been about the ‘how’ of development cooperation, whereas inclusiveness of results is about the ‘what’ and the ‘who.’ For this reason, assessing progress on inclusiveness of results has not been addressed by GPEDC monitoring to date.<sup>52</sup> Detailed analysis of progress on the achievement of the MDGs and other indicators might prove fruitful in this regard, but is beyond the scope of this paper.

Suffice it here to refer to the UN Secretary General’s High Level Panel (HLP), which stated that “unprecedented progress” has been achieved “driven by a combination of economic growth, government policies, civil society engagement and the global commitment to the MDGs”.<sup>53</sup>

Yet the HLP also notes that this progress has not been as inclusive as it could be. Across countries, low-income and conflict-affected countries have not sufficiently shared in the progress achieved, and within countries, countless poor and marginalized people and communities are being left behind.

### *Critical Areas Requiring Additional Effort*

On the whole, the inclusiveness of results is the biggest challenge for the development cooperation community. Though the imperative of inclusive results is obvious, there are numerous and varied perspectives on how best to achieve it. This is not surprising in light of the diversity of actors involved, their different levels of engagement in combating poverty and inequality (local, national, regional or global), and their closeness or distance from the people that development cooperation is meant to reach.

Within this diversity, each actor purporting to contribute to development cooperation must ask whether their initiative contributes to reducing poverty and inequality and improving conditions for poor and marginalized populations. How can it be assured that the development policies and programs of any actor are going to contribute to inclusive results?

Again, **transparency**, information-sharing and institutionalized multi-stakeholder engagement have a role to play to ensure that development actors are able to mutually monitor each other's goals and approaches against good practice. No actor should be allowed to claim that by dint of contributing to development cooperation alone they are contributing to inclusive development.

As noted earlier, inclusiveness of voice and action are essential to the achievement of inclusive results down the line. Including multiple stakeholder voices in the design, implementation and monitoring of development policies and plans can help to ensure that these are appropriately inclusive with respect to the populations most in need. Inclusiveness in action ensures that when there are gaps in government policy, programs, capacity, or will, other stakeholders will be enabled to contribute, based on their distinct roles and comparative advantages.

Addressing the **enabling environment** would provide a useful counterweight to exclusionary tendencies, as can be appreciated from the UN Special Rapporteur's criticism of restrictions on foreign funding for CSOs.<sup>54</sup> As he argues, inasmuch as restrictions on foreign funding inhibit the enjoyment of human rights by those benefitting from the work of the organization in question, funding restrictions "also undermine civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights as a whole".<sup>55</sup>

Adoption of a **human rights-based approach** could also advance inclusive results. However, a human rights-based approach has yet to be adopted by the full community of development cooperation actors, and even among those that have adopted it, there is only "mixed evidence for how the approach translates onto the ground".<sup>56</sup> Such an approach could usefully contribute to the BPa's emphasis on inclusion and could help to resolve some of the tensions described elsewhere in this paper.

## **V. What's to be done?**

Despite some worrisome trends and challenges, the emphasis of the BPa on inclusion holds great promise as a guiding principle for effective development cooperation. However, this principle needs to be better understood, and deserves a higher degree of commitment and concerted attention than it has received to date. It deserves also to be monitored more systematically.

As a partnership of all stakeholders, the GPEDC must demonstrate that it is itself inclusive, not just in terms of participation in global Steering Committees and HLMs, but also in how they advocate for and implement a truly transformative and people-centred Post-2015 agenda that leaves no one behind and advances people's universal human rights as called for by the HLP<sup>57</sup>, through inclusivity of voice, actions, and results.

With this end in mind, the following questions are offered to spur dialogue on creative ways to accelerate the promise of Busan on inclusive development. A selection of recommendations for moving forward on this agenda follows these questions.

### ***i. Questions for discussion***

- 1) How can GPEDC actors better emulate its own inclusive multi-stakeholder format at regional and country levels in development cooperation partner countries? Can the GPEDC suggest criteria for operationalizing democratic ownership at the country level?
- 2) What is our understanding of what constitutes an appropriate balance between inclusivity of action and the need to manage fragmentation? How can the achievement of this balance be encouraged?
- 3) What are practical ways to share good practice, and monitor the degree to which development cooperation policies and initiatives of varied actors are genuinely addressing the priorities of the poorest, most vulnerable and marginalized people?
- 4) What are practical ways to address the deteriorating legal, regulatory and policy environment for civil society to better enable inclusiveness of voice, actions and results? Can the GPEDC develop and agree on a framework for an enabling environment for civil society with guidelines for its implementation?
- 5) How can progress toward inclusive development be better monitored? Is there room in the Global Partnership Monitoring Framework for additional or more specific indicators of inclusive development?

### ***ii. Recommendations***

A tentative selection of concrete steps for the GPEDC and its stakeholders toward compliance with the promise of Busan on inclusive development is proposed below.

#### **A. Regarding inclusive voice:**

- a. Undertake a review of fora for multi-stakeholder dialogue in development cooperation partner countries.
- b. Develop good practice guidance on establishing and sustaining such fora.
- c. Based on a. and b. above, establish a new GPMF indicator on inclusiveness of voice.

#### **B. Regarding inclusive actions (and voice):**

- a. Develop an enabling environment framework and guidelines, agreed to and promoted by all stakeholders, to help advance the democratic ownership of development processes, based on existing international human rights agreements.

- b. Establish multi-stakeholder learning fora and partnerships on implementing the guidance.
  - c. Based on a. and b. above, and the GPEDC 2014 progress report recommendation for further thinking on measurement,<sup>58</sup> elaborate the GPMF indicator 2 on the enabling environment for civil society, to better capture progress.
- C. Regarding inclusive results:
- a. Encourage all GPEDC stakeholders to explicitly and systematically consider the degree to which development initiatives: 1) address the underlying causes and conditions of poverty, marginalization and inequality; 2) take account the perspective of poor or otherwise marginalized people; and 3) reflect the principles of a human rights-based approach and human rights commitments.
  - b. Engage with the UN process on the Post-2015 goals to develop indicators reflecting inclusive results.

## VI. Conclusion

As the GPEDC claims, the Busan High Level Forum “helped make multi-stakeholder partnership models.... the norm”.<sup>59</sup> The presence of a widening range of stakeholders in the GPEDC’s decision-making body, its Steering Committee, reflects this, as does the inclusive nature of the HLM. Yet the concept of inclusive development remains a nebulous one, and a broader and deeper common understanding of its meaning and the implications for practice is needed. Never has it been more timely than it is now for inclusiveness in voice, actions and results together to help the global community progress toward what the UN Secretary General has called “a life of dignity for all”.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> United Nations Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals (OWG). (2014b). *Technical Support Team issues brief: Conflict prevention, post-conflict peacebuilding and the promotion of durable peace, rule of law and governance*, p. 7.

<sup>2</sup> This paper seeks to address inclusive development from a broad perspective as a contribution to the HLM discussion. Effort has been made to address inclusive development as pertains to the diversity of development actors mentioned in the BPa. However, the focus of this paper toward BPa commitments in relation to civil society organizations (CSOs) is acknowledged. This focus reflects in part the concern of the Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment, as a key contributor to the paper, with shrinking space for civil society voice and action in many countries. It also reflects the nature of the HLM where each thematic session will be focused on specific issues. Integration of all issues and actors into each theme is difficult to achieve given space constraints in each background paper, and time constraints at the HLM itself.

<sup>3</sup> United States Agency for International Development (USAID). (2013). *USAID strategy on democracy, human rights and governance*, p. 4.

<sup>4</sup> Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2010). *Civil society and aid effectiveness: Findings, recommendations and good practice*, p. 27.

<sup>5</sup> Levi-Faur, D. (Ed.) (2012). *Oxford Handbook of Governance*.

<sup>6</sup> Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment (TT) (2014a). *Key messages - Promote inclusive development and democratic ownership in development cooperation at the 2014 Mexico High Level Meeting*, p. 1.

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<sup>7</sup> Persons or groups that are considered poor, vulnerable, or otherwise marginalized will vary by context and may include women; youth; the elderly; rural people; ethnic, linguistic, or religious minorities; people with disabilities; displaced people; lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people; and indigenous peoples, amongst others.

<sup>8</sup> United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2010). *Fostering social accountability: From principle to practice*, p. 12.

<sup>9</sup> TT (2014b). *Review of evidence of progress on civil society-related commitments of the Busan High Level Forum*, p. 4.

<sup>10</sup> European Commission (EC) (2012). *The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe's engagement with civil society in external relations. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (COM(2012) 492 final)*, p. 6.

<sup>11</sup> United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association (UN Special Rapporteur) (2013), *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai (A/HRC/23/39)*, para. 14.

<sup>12</sup> EC (2013). *Empowering Local Authorities in partner countries for enhanced governance and more effective development: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (COM(2013) 280 final)*, p. 3.

<sup>13</sup> Cook, S. & Lee, D. (2014). E-discussion summary: Sustaining development gains through inclusive development, para. 4.

<sup>14</sup> OWG (2014b). *Focus Areas*.

<sup>15</sup> United Nations Secretary General (UN Secretary General) (2013). *A life of dignity for all: Accelerating progress towards the Millennium Development Goals and advancing the United Nations development agenda beyond 2015 (A/68/202)*, para. 11.

<sup>16</sup> OECD (2010). *Ibid*, p. 27.

<sup>17</sup> Refer to the Task Team's *Key Messages* for the April 2014 HLM for elaboration of the critical elements of an enabling environment for civil society consistent with internationally agreed rights. Refer also to the GPEDC *Making Development Cooperation More Effective: 2014 Progress Report* for a working framework of what an enabling environment for civil society in keeping with internationally agreed rights requires.

<sup>18</sup> Note that the Plenary 1 paper on democratic ownership also delves into progress on inclusiveness.

<sup>19</sup> The full set of indicators can be found in the GPEDC 2014 progress report. Indicator 7 on countries conducting inclusive mutual assessment reviews also touches on inclusivity.

<sup>20</sup> Indications of progress from the GPEDC 2014 progress report are mentioned here, with emphasis on indicator 2. This paper provides minimal coverage of progress as it relates to the private sector or South-South and triangular cooperation, given space constraints and that the HLM will be host to dedicated plenaries and focus sessions specific to these actors.

<sup>21</sup> GPEDC (2014b). *Making development cooperation more effective: 2014 progress report*, p. 16.

<sup>22</sup> GPEDC (2014b). *Ibid*, pp. 65-66.

<sup>23</sup> GPEDC (2014b), *Ibid*, p. 62.

<sup>24</sup> More information on a selection of country cases is available from the Task Team (2014b) *Review of Evidence* and the CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness (CPDE) (2013), *An Enabling Environment for Civil Society Organizations: A synthesis of evidence of progress since Busan*.

<sup>25</sup> The long-standing International Labour Organization (ILO)-led social dialogue framework that brings together governments, employers and workers' organizations in global, national and local-level dialogue and decision-making offers an international example. Regionally, the European Union's Policy Forum on Development is a more recent example that brings together a comprehensive set of stakeholders to dialogue on European Union development policy.

<sup>26</sup> CPDE (2013). *Ibid*, p. 16; OECD (2012). *Partnering with civil society: 12 lessons from DAC peer reviews*, p. 23.

<sup>27</sup> TT (2014b). *Ibid*, pp. 13-14; CPDE (2013). *Ibid*, pp. 10-11.

<sup>28</sup> TT (2014b). *Ibid*, pp. 11-12; CPDE (2013). *Ibid*, pp. 10-11.

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- <sup>29</sup> International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) (2013). The legal and regulatory environment for civil society: Global trends in 2012-2013. *Global trends in NGO law*, 4(2).
- <sup>30</sup> ICNL (2013). *Ibid*; CIVICUS (2013). *Global trends in civil society restrictions - Mounting restrictions on civil society: The gap between rhetoric and reality*; ACT Alliance & Catholic International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity (CIDSE) (2013). *Strategies for enabling civil society organizations (draft)*; International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) (2013). *Countries at risk: Violations of trade union rights*.
- <sup>31</sup> UN Special Rapporteur (2013). *Ibid*, paras. 32, 16 & 8.
- <sup>32</sup> OECD (2011a). *Optional module: Assessing inclusive ownership*.
- <sup>33</sup> The OECD's (2011b) *What can we learn from the optional module on inclusive ownership and what is the way forward?* (p.1) notes that 14 of the 78 countries participating in the 2011 Paris monitoring survey chose to complete this module. This suggests there is room for improving the indicators and for giving more importance to this module such as by making it compulsory.
- <sup>34</sup> See <http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/upr/pages/uprmain.aspx>
- <sup>35</sup> The World Bank (2013). *World development indicators*.
- <sup>36</sup> UNDP (2011). *Toward human resilience: Sustaining MDG progress in an age of economic uncertainty*. pp. 146-183.
- <sup>37</sup> GPEDC (2014b), *Ibid*, p. 25.
- <sup>38</sup> TT (2014b). *Ibid*, p. 7.
- <sup>39</sup> World Movement for Democracy (WMD) & ICNL (2012). *Defending civil society report*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, p. 17.
- <sup>40</sup> UN Special Rapporteur (2013). *Ibid*, para. 14.
- <sup>41</sup> UN Special Rapporteur (2013). *Ibid*, paras. 12, 14 & 41; ICNL (2013). *Ibid*; CIVICUS (2013). *Ibid*; CPDE (2013). *Ibid*; & The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights (OPHR). (2013) *Violations of the rights of NGOs to funding: From harassment to criminalisation*.
- <sup>42</sup> ICNL (2013), *Ibid*, p. 3.
- <sup>43</sup> UN Special Rapporteur (2013). *Ibid*, para. 34, citing the UN Special Representative on Human Rights Defenders, 2004, para. 82.
- <sup>44</sup> UN Special Rapporteur (2013). *Ibid*, para. 23.
- <sup>45</sup> EC (2013). *Ibid*, p. 5.
- <sup>46</sup> United Cities and Local Governments of Africa (UCLGA) & The Cities Alliance (2013). *Assessing the institutional environment of local governments in Africa*.
- <sup>47</sup> International Finance Corporation (IFC) (2013). *IFC annual report: The power of partnerships*, p. 35.
- <sup>48</sup> Küblöck, K. & Staritz, C. (2013). Theoretical approaches, concepts and critical analysis of private sector development. In *Private sector development - Business plan or development strategy?*
- <sup>49</sup> While the emphasis in this paper is on growing restrictions in civil society space and the impact on inclusive voice and action, it need be noted that there are also examples of positive progress, as highlighted in the GPEDC 2014 progress report (p. 61). Also noteworthy is the growing attention being paid to strengthening the enabling environment for civil society by the traditional donor community. For example, USAID has long- established programming in this area, including their CSO Sustainability Index, the Global Civil Society Strengthening Program, the NGO Legal Enabling Environment Program, and the Information Safety and Capacity Project, all implemented in collaboration with CSO partners (see <http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/democracy-human-rights-and-governance/supporting-vibrant-civil-society-independent-media>). The Community of Democracies' Canadian-chaired Working Group on Enabling and Protecting Civil Society is a another initiative that, using a quiet diplomacy approach, aims to counter the current trend toward constraining civil society (see <http://www.community-democracies.org/Working-for-Democracy/Initiatives/Governmental-Bodies/Working-Group-on-Enabling-and-Protecting-Civil-Soc>)
- <sup>50</sup> As suggested in the GPEDC 2014 progress report (p. 69).
- <sup>51</sup> See <http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html>; <http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/what-are-the-voluntary-principles/>; and [http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/\\_media/GIAWB/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB14-Full-Report.pdf](http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/_media/GIAWB/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB14-Full-Report.pdf).

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<sup>52</sup> At first glance, indicator 8 on gender equality and women’s empowerment appears to be an exception, however the target of having systems in place that track allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment remains a ‘how’ proxy for gender equality. The GPEDC 2014 progress report states that one third of participating countries have monitoring systems in place with others committed to more systematic tracking of gender allocations (p. 26).

<sup>53</sup> United Nations High Level Panel of Eminent Persons (HLP) (2013a). *A new global partnership: Eradicate poverty and transform economies through sustainable development*, p. 1.

<sup>54</sup> Noteworthy is that when it comes to restrictions on foreign funding flows the Special Rapporteur calls for “sectoral equity” between the treatment of CSOs and private sector actors rather than the disproportionate targeting of CSOs that is currently seen (UN Special Rapporteur (2013). *Ibid*, para. 24).

<sup>55</sup> UN Special Rapporteur (2013). *Ibid*, para. 9.

<sup>56</sup> Watson, S. et al (2012). *Pre-study for the evaluation of the strategy for Danish support to civil society*, p. 44.

<sup>57</sup> UN HLP (2013b). *Communiqué: Meeting of the High Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda in Bali, Indonesia*.

<sup>58</sup> GPEDC (2014b). *Ibid*, p. 69.

<sup>59</sup> GPEDC (2014a). *First High-Level Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation: Building toward the Post-2015 development agenda*, p. 1.

<sup>60</sup> UN Secretary General (2013), *Ibid*, p. 1.

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