



외교부  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs



Seoul Policy Centre

***SEOUL INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP:  
on the  
Global Partnership for Effective  
Development Co-operation***

***Implementation Strategies for Effective  
Development Co-operation at Country Level***

**18-19 November 2013  
Seoul, Republic of Korea**

**Meeting Report**

## 1) Overview

The 'Seoul International Workshop: Implementation strategies for effective development co-operation' was hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea and the UNDP Seoul Policy Centre, with significant substantive and financial support from the UNDP-OECD Global Partnership Joint Support team.

Representatives from approximately thirty governments, civil society and international organizations met in Seoul on 18-19 November 2013 to share experiences and challenges in implementing the Global Partnership principles of effective development co-operation in their countries. It was agreed that the meeting will evolve into an annual platform that adds value by promoting quality in global partnerships for stronger effectiveness in development cooperation.

Participants included five Global Partnership Steering Committee members, three Ministers (from Honduras, Republic of Korea and South-Sudan) and a range of decision makers from line Ministries in developing countries, traditional and 'emerging' donors, multilateral development banks, international organisations, private sector and civil society organisations.

With two years since the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness and less than six months to the first High Level Meeting of the Global Partnership to be held in Mexico in April 2014, the workshop provided a useful opportunity to take stock of how development co-operation is changing at country level and served as a significant landmark on the road to Mexico.

Plenary sessions and breakout groups over the two days covered progress and challenges in implementing the Busan commitments at the country-level, links to a post-2015 global development framework, provider responses and actions in implementing the Busan commitments and emerging issues for the first High Level Meeting of the Global Partnership.

The objectives of the workshop were to:

- Take stock of progress made by developing countries in implementing the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC);
- Review progress and assess challenges for development partners and other stakeholders to build-up GPEDC's niche and business model for stronger results;
- Identify specific linkages between the GPEDC and implementation of the post-2015 development agenda ahead of time.

## 2) Discussion Highlights

### **Progress and challenges of the GPEDC implementation**

There was broad consensus that the GPEDC agenda assisted governments to coordinate their international aid better, which has encouraged changes in behavior and informed partnership strategies and policies.

#### *GPEDC influenced country-level partnership frameworks*

These commitments were reflected in a number of policy documents adopted by a number of countries in the past two years. For example, Cambodia is developing a national strategy for development cooperation and partnership. The strategy combines the elements of the "unfinished business" from the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action with focus on inclusive partnership and use of new opportunities such as better engagement of the private sector. In Afghanistan the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework endorsed in 2012 became an important national instrument that changed the nature of partnership between the Government and its partners. As one of the first outcomes, the Aid Management Policy was approved this year. As an addition a guidance note on "On-budget financing"

was developed in collaboration with a number of donors to ensure better reflection of development assistance in the national budget. Partners committed to ensure 50% of their aid is on budget. Somalia piloted the New Deal on fragile countries, as their overarching framework for development cooperation. The Somali Compact endorsed by the Government and the development partners this year is largely based on the New Deal principles. At the same time, South Sudan reported challenges in the implementation of the New Deal, stating among other things, the reluctance of the partners to use country systems and adhering to country priorities. The representative of the South Sudan, nevertheless highlighted the usefulness of the fragility assessments.

#### *GPEDC Monitoring Process helped promoting dialogue and revealing challenges*

Countries also highlighted that the GPEDC monitoring process has also helped in promoting dialogue on Busan commitments at the country level. The “country focused and global light” framework was piloted this year with the final report expected to be released before the High Level Meeting in Mexico. 50 countries opted to participate in this voluntary exercise. In Peru the monitoring process was managed by the Peruvian Agency of International Cooperation. Its representative described the methodology as “inclusive, participatory, in some cases implementing the agreements by consensus; self-evaluation, self-declaration and analysis”. The monitoring was also an opportunity for an inclusive dialogue with different development stakeholders. It was noted that while there is much evidence that the GPEDC really matters, there is a need to keep focus on the unfinished business from the Paris Declaration. Similarly, the point was raised that while whole the aid effectiveness process had run for ten years, the inclusive partnership approach is only two-years old and thus should be given time to settle.

The challenges highlighted by the country representatives included aid predictability, the use of country systems, coordination among donors and coherence between assistance received from traditional donors and the providers of South-South cooperation.

#### *Development partners are committed to GPEDC but the pace of change is slow*

On behalf of the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), Asian Development Bank reiterated MDBs’ commitment to the GPEDC agenda and their involvement on the themes of private sector, middle income countries, and knowledge sharing in preparation to the High Level Meeting in Mexico. DFID shared details of the Busan implementation report that they are preparing for the High Level Meeting. EC proposed a report on five priorities for their post-Busan action plan including: (i) reducing fragmentation; (ii) reducing transaction costs; (iii) measuring results; (iv) addressing fragility; and (v) improving transparency. KOICA informed that it is focusing on promoting use of partner country systems and aid predictability in their future assistance.

A shift in attitude towards transparency has been observed by most of the development partners. At the same time, the broad recognition of importance of transparency still needs to trickle down to the country level and be translated into regular and accurate reporting. The boost of transparency came from the donor countries’ internal constituencies. Financial austerity and reducing aid budgets strengthened the scrutiny of development assistance highlighting the need to show spending and results.

Some donors noted that capacity constraints from their side should also be taken into account. It is difficult to communicate the broad commitments of the GPEDC to the staff and make necessary adjustments in business processes. The reforms are often complicated and require broad consensus between different ministries.

Partner countries noted that at the country level there seems to be donors’ disengagement from the aid effectiveness agenda and there is limited awareness of Busan and the GPEDC among donor agencies’ staff at the country level.

#### *Implementation is more inclusive but stronger involvement of CSOs is needed*

Despite strong GPEDC focus on inclusiveness, it was highlighted that there is a need for stronger involvement of CSOs in national planning, budgeting and oversight processes. There are examples where

involvement of CSOs in different processes leads to greater effectiveness and better accountability. These include the use of CSOs as public watchdogs at district level in Kyrgyzstan or involvement of the CSOs in a reform of public implementation systems (Cameroun, Kenya, Zambia and Mali). Even though there are some positive examples, the overall experience of CSO inclusion has been mixed so far with inclusiveness being at the discretion of governments.

CPDE stated that “Inclusive development should focus on empowerment, access to information, participation of constituencies and be human rights based”.

### **Country ownership, effective institutions and use of country systems**

#### *Use of country systems is not correlated to their improvement*

There is recognition that country systems are central to effective institutions. For this reason, since 2005 Paris Declaration, the aid effectiveness agenda included commitments for the partner countries to strengthen and for donors to use country systems. Use of country systems is about accountability, transparency and predictability. The research conducted by the Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative showed gradual growth in the use of country systems. Nevertheless, the improvement in use of the country systems is often unrelated to the improvement of the quality of these systems. In some instances the joint assessments advocated by the Busan agenda result in increased use of country systems. For example, according to some participants, the improvement of the CPIA score may result in development partners’ decisions to increase proportion of budget support that automatically enhances the use of country systems. The countries that are most aid dependent had the least increases in the use of country systems.

Whereas the fiduciary risks associated with the use of country systems are well known, there is also mounting evidence that bypassing country systems can lead to negative outcomes. Participants agreed that the use of country systems is not an end in itself. The importance of country systems for domestic accountability in partner countries was also highlighted during the discussion.

#### *The Busan spirit of “country heavy, global light” can be applied to the assessment of the country systems*

Joint assessment of the country systems is an important outcome agreed upon in Busan. However, it is also important to agree on how to conduct assessment of the quality of the country systems. The CABRI study used the World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) methodology in its study. In some cases improvement in CPIA score showed the increasing support for budget support and hence the increased use of country systems. However, some participants highlighted the subjective nature of the CPIA methodology and highlighted that the assessment criteria ultimately need to be customized to the country circumstances. The partner countries’ own policies and negotiations conducted at the country level should have influence on the use of country system.

Defining the criteria for assessment at national level also allows addressing some country-specific qualitative features of the country systems. Some participants highlighted the importance to look at *how* the systems are being used. This needs to be done at the country level, as the data collected globally has significant limitations for qualitative analysis of this kind.

In the same spirit, some participants questioned the standard definition of “country systems” referring exclusively to state institutions, suggesting that the definition may also include civil society and the private sector. This may include a broader number of national actors (and thus national systems) beyond the government.

### **Predictability of development funding**

#### *Continuous use of aid management tools makes aid more predictable*

The link between predictability and transparency in aid relationships was highlighted during the discussion of the working group. Participants shared that the common way to improve aid predictability and facilitate putting aid on budget was to collect data on aid data (including indicative projections). A

number of countries adopted various aid management tools. For example, Tajikistan has an online Aid Information Management System that provides access to comprehensive aid data online. The data has been collected since 2002 and it migrated to an online platform in 2011. The online system simplified data collection. The country is now working on predictability of donor funding, working with strategic documents for donors. It is difficult to collect full information on donor commitments in future years, but comprehensive project level analysis makes the process easier.

Similarly, Morocco shared its experience of the 'SIG-CDM' - an automated information management system designed to improve efficiency and coordination of donor activities in Morocco. The system established with help and finance from the UNDP is a system to know the allocation of development assistance by sector and by region.

Some countries put forth their spending plans and ask their partners to feed financial predictions for the next years. This allows the government planners to measure the predictability in the mid-term. Participants observed that over the years data is becoming more precise and more coherent. Nevertheless, the projections for future years continue to be relatively low.

#### *Fragile states experience lower levels of predictability*

Participants also discussed the challenge of predictability in the context of the fragile states. Some countries described that the lack of predictability made it difficult to design and cost national plans. In one such case government took action by planning the next budget based on previous level of disbursement for each DP, analyzing the trends of disbursement in each period and making projections. Some innovative practices include the case of Burundi that has established a taskforce including the Government and private sector. In case a project does not receive funding, the taskforce produces a follow up report aiming at mobilizing resources for a project. This mechanism helps address predictability in a systematic way.

#### *Aid predictability depends on the nature of partnership*

Some countries reported despite obvious commitment expressed by the HQ, the bottlenecks were identified at the level of the country offices that often don't know about corporate efforts on transparency/predictability and relevant international commitments.

In addition, some countries reported challenges with predictability of assistance from providers of South-South cooperation, although other countries highlighted that there are some good practices in this respect as well.

### **Strengthening results orientation and mutual accountability**

*There is a tradeoff between indicators that are easy to measure and the indicators that measure the right issues*

Bangladesh made a presentation on the basis of its results based mutual accountability framework. It indicated that it had had to make tradeoffs between indicators that are easy to measure and indicators that measure the right issues. It was discussed that results frameworks must not lose sight of the end objectives of our work, the actual development impact, even when it is not easy to capture in measurable indicators.

*Countries also face institutional issues and coordination challenges in managing their results and mutual accountability frameworks*

Various participants highlighted that the leadership of central ministries (such as Ministries of Finance or Ministries of Planning or other central ministries responsible for development) is important in creating and managing results and accountability frameworks. At the same time participants also highlighted difficulties in engaging line ministries around the same agenda. This issue applies to partner countries as well as donor countries.

Coordination can also be a challenge as different categories of partners require different approaches. Bangladesh counts China among the members of the “Local Consultative Group”, its aid coordination mechanism. China attends meetings and shares information to a certain extent. The representative from China underlined that, whereas China cannot be expected to have the same working methods as a traditional donor, it is willing to engage in a constructive dialogue on effective development.

It is important that the mutual accountability frameworks open dialogue to different national stakeholders. Participants highlighted the need for CSO involvement in the accountability processes. Bangladesh promotes such engagement CSOs in the aid coordination forum where possible. The upcoming launch of an AIMS in Bangladesh will also make it easier for CSOs to fulfill their oversight role, as they will have easy access to aid information. Switzerland highlighted that they have a CSO advisory committee to parliament, which helps the civil society to fulfill its oversight role in matters of development cooperation.

#### *Lacking “enforceability” in global mutual accountability*

It was highlighted that mutual accountability is defined as a combination of “responsiveness”, “accountability” and “enforceability”. It was noted that in the current global development effectiveness debate the enforceability is missing.

In this regards, participants discussed that even the hardest issues such as corruption could only be addressed through “soft” means of dialogue.

### **Strengthening Inclusiveness in Partnership Dialogue**

#### *There is a mixed picture on civil society engagement*

Some countries, such as the Philippines shared their experience of institutionalized mechanisms of engagement of the civil society in the public sector management through the Philippines Development Forum. At the same time it was also noted that not all governments want to see CSOs involved and civil society see increasingly shrinking space for its participation. It was emphasized that inclusiveness should be part of the wider development context. Even though the mechanisms have been in place for many years, the momentum for implementation has been given recently. Fundamentally, Busan gave an impetus for broader engagement at national level.

Participants also noted that the CSOs have proven their worth as development partners – but development partners and governments at the national level must be able to see them like that. Civil society brings important evidence on development impact that it essential for discussing development issues. These inputs are important to inform the policy choices. Participants noted that legal framework for CSO participation can foster its effective involvement.

#### *Business associations are important partners for private sector engagement*

In order for the private sector to be effectively engaged in the dialogue on development cooperation, it also needed to be organized. Tanzania Private Sector Foundation is as examples of such association that the government uses for discussing most policy issues. It was noted that in Tanzania, after the Busan Forum, the Government paid particular attention to engagement of the private sector, for example, in development of its revenue policy. Challenges involve trust and transparency – as the public trust in the private sector is usually lacking.

Similarly an example of partnership between the parliament and the private sector was given. In the past in Tanzania, the Parliament would create fiscal policy without addressing the private sector, under assumption of what is right for the private sector and what is right for the government. Currently a mechanism has been established for consultations on next year’s fiscal policy.

## **Perspectives of Providers of Development Cooperation**

*Evidence shows active reform of providers of development cooperation post-Busan*

Representatives of the EU, KOICA and Finland presented various reforms undertaken at headquarters level to implement Busan principles. DFID focused on the corporate priorities for the High Level Meeting of the Global Partnership in Mexico.

Some of the presenters highlighted that importance of capacity from the side of providers of development cooperation. The reform is often burdening, takes time and ministries have limited capacity to carry them out. It is not easy to create consensus around the need for these reforms.

Busan with its focus on whole-of-Government approach made it clear that these reforms need to be there for the long haul. Priorities that came forward for reform included results management, ownership, inclusiveness, predictability, country systems, programme based approaches and transparency. Some development partners highlighted that the reforms were driven by internal agenda (e.g. the drive for transparency was focused on donor country IT systems) rather than compliance with demands of the partner countries.

*But reforms influenced by domestic considerations more than demands by partner countries*

The discussants confirmed that the reforms at HQ level often do not seem to trickle down to the country level. At country level, the trend is increasing disengagement of the donor agencies from the aid and development effectiveness agenda and local offices have limited awareness of Busan requirements. Information sharing, transparency, timeliness, predictability, pooled funding and sector wide approaches are particularly challenging. In Nigeria, for instance, donors also continue to bypass the central government by negotiating directly with states.

While recipient countries exerted efforts to strengthen country systems, attempts to make donors use them have so far been unsuccessful in many cases. It is still unclear what recipient countries must do for donors to use their systems.

However, it was also noted that there are elements of the Busan agenda that are making significant difference at country level. The New Deal proved a useful roadmap in Somalia to move from total fragmentation and absence of government ownership to a Compact with the donors on priorities, financing mechanism, localized aid effectiveness principles and aid coordination mechanism. Now theory needs to be put into practice and that will no doubt be challenging. Discussions on the governance structure of the financing and coordination mechanism, for example, have been ongoing for months.

### **Implications for the Low Income Countries**

*Development Finance and Aid Assessment methodology could be useful to put aid into context*

UNDP Asia Pacific Regional presented its experience conducting a Development Finance and Aid Assessment (DFAA) in Papua New Guinea. In terms of development finance Papua New Guinea considered four key policy shifts: a shift from a development cooperation focus to economic cooperation; reduction of reliance on aid; becoming a development cooperation provider in the long-term; making the Development Finance and Aid Policy a tool for PNG's foreign policy.

The DFAA provided useful analysis of potential development finance sources to inform the multi-year budgeting to start from 2014 along with the Annual Budget Strategy Paper. PNG was seeking a high level of country ownership and Development Finance and Aid Assessment gave the government a new way of looking at funding its resource gap, through diversification of its development partnership base using its Development Finance and Aid Policy.

In general, it will be critical for LICs to have a better understanding of the scope of development finance in their countries and in their regions, how such flows are managed, the governance arrangements, and their short, medium, and long-term development policy implications.

The participants appreciated that other developing countries could learn direction from this, and noted that the private sector gave a concrete way to development financing. Busan encouraged aid for commerce and trade –and it was asked how we can we reinforce the national private sector and also investment from other countries. There were calls for further guidance on how aid can be used as a catalyst for the private sector in different context, particularly in the low income countries. It was particularly emphasized that the national private sector should also be a stakeholder, along with the providers of the foreign direct investment.

### **Implications for the Middle Income Countries**

*The category of “middle income country” is inadequate*

Participants agreed that the category of the “middle income country” does not do justice to a variety of circumstances within this category –regarding size, poverty level etc. In the absence of consensus on the alternatives, it was suggested to make wider use of the sub-categories of lower MICs and higher MICs.

One alternative suggestion was to categorize countries according to the level of their aid dependency – low aid dependent countries vs. highly aid dependent. Another consideration suggested during the discussion was that one single indicator should not be used for country categorization. It is better to use an index that takes into account income, institutions, human and natural resources. Participants also discussed the role of development cooperation in supporting countries addressing the “middle income trap”. It was highlighted that further research was needed in this area.

It was also recommended to consider an institutional perspective of “effective state” – whether MICs are more capable to deliver development.

Some participants also recommended considering opportunity costs, because the MICs as category can be used to justify more aid for the LICs. The discussion on the MICs is evolving due to perception that it brings about imbalance. Concerning re-categorization, it was suggested to look beyond the High Level Meeting.

### **Partnership for Effective Inclusive Development in Post 2015**

*Revisiting MDG8*

Participants highlighted that the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) completely changed the way development cooperation coalesced around a globally shared development agenda. MDGs provided the first overarching global framework that achieved political consensus and incentivized funds. Acceptance of the global goal 8 on development partnership came over time and picked up stronger traction after 2005 when MDGs started getting better mainstreamed. It was therefore noted that the implementation has been relatively limited. In contrast, for post-2015 many partners are getting coordinated. This is a big improvement and opportunity. They also want to be ready ahead of time. E.g., AsDB is undertaking a mid-term review of its corporate strategy which includes thinking on post-2015. It has also undertaken an assessment of perspectives from the region on development challenges and future priorities in partnership with the ESCAP and UNDP (the Regional MDG Report 2012/13 “Asia Pacific Aspirations: Perspectives for a Post-2015 Development Agenda”).

Participants emphasized the need to concentrate efforts of different development partners for post-2015 through coordination and collaboration rather than competition. Partners can progressively coordinate planning and programming cycles. Concentration of efforts could change macro indicators like mortality, learning achievements or jobs.

The meeting was fundamentally about re-visiting MDG 8 – global partnership for development – and thinking in advance about its post-2015 successor. In contrast with MDGs 1 – 7, MDG 8 was vaguely articulated and incompletely monitored. The GP will aim to change this for post-2015.

## *Country categorization will be important for the new partnership framework*

The new framework will need to address the issue of country categorization that appears to be highly inadequate. Currently, both groups, MICs and LICs, feel excluded from ODA dialogue but are impacted by their being so classified. Such classifications are partial and do not take into account deprivations that persist despite average income. Categorizing by ODA to GDP ratios reveals the extent of influence and the materiality of applying traditional Paris principles.

## *The world has money; how can it be harnessed better towards development?*

A big question asked by the participants is how to harness available funds towards development? The Global Partnership has a niche through its focus on collaborations and effectiveness.

Governments can benefit from ways to mobilize more domestic fiscal revenues and seek additional funding from innovative sources, while many continue to press for ODA. Concrete support for domestic resource mobilization under parliamentary scrutiny will improve accountability and ease aid dependency.

Some of the funds can come from philanthropy and private capital apart from development banks – major pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, insurance funds, remittances, private corporations, and investors from middle-income countries.

At present much of this takes the form of stand-alone interventions, some even of high quality, but not well-integrated with national development – which needs to change.

Financial instruments will need to be designed and assessed from a development lens to could convert disparate funds with different maturities / durations for longer-term development (guarantees, bonds, broking, leverage).

Facilitating such flows towards development and reducing transactions costs could translate to higher development results.

Management of all resources should be improved for development results.

It is important to engage meaningfully with the private sector and address the quality of growth by supporting open dialogue between the private sector and governments. The potential of the for-profit sector has been inadequately tapped and businesses (unlike CSOs) have been on the sidelines so far. Structured dialogue with private sector can reveal opportunities, including how growth can be done differently through incentives/disincentives for inclusion and environment.

Specific private sector skills can be applied to development – logistics expertise of DHL in disaster management. Efficiency gains in health services by private health providers participating in national health schemes; this can relieve overstretched public providers who can concentrate their efforts on the poorest and those excluded from such schemes. Coordinating environmental regulation across borders to provide a level playing field – oil companies. More inclusive and jobs-rich growth reduces the size of the development challenges by enabling individuals to gain more access to education and health opportunities; more incomes in people's hands strengthens domestic demand which will further support growth. More revenue-generating growth reduces aid dependency and provides resources to expand basic services, invest in social and economic infrastructure and finance social protection. More environmentally responsible growth protects natural resources and delivers a spectrum of benefits like health, food security.

**Questions for further discussion on post-2015 development agenda:**

How to engage with new partners on an equal basis?

How to establish differentiated responsibilities for shared global aims?

On finance, while the world had money, how could wider sources be tapped and channeled to development – private, public, including thematic funds like climate finance?

Fragility – credible tools for fragility assessment.

To improve monitoring, how can lessons from the MDG experience (weak monitoring of Goal 8) feed into improved indicators and data?

Knowledge and experience sharing – how can this be improved and documented better?

How can the GP support post-2015 processes, by complementing UN's work where there might be hesitation in the formal processes (e.g., better indicators for ODA, new finance sources including climate finance, technology transfer, market access, debt sustainability).

Providers of development cooperation (OECD, MDBs) – what can they identify take into account in reviewing their strategies for post-2015?

### 3) Conclusions/recommendations

Workshop provided timely opportunity to formulate the messages on implementation of GPEDC. “Informed impatience”; “need to rekindle”; would be fair characteristics of the general mood. All in all the glass seems “half full” (confidence building through dialogue, data collection, exchange of practices, recognizing ‘unfinished business’). Government of Korea’s pledge to organize annual stocktaking welcomed to keep commitment and momentum.

#### **1. Alignment with other processes.**

Busan should continue to focus on the “how to”: effectiveness, transparency, accountability as keys for any development interaction, two way street. For transparency reasons a map of related processes would be helpful to avoid duplication and to recognize potential synergies. MDG 8 stocktaking should inform Busan and vice-versa.

#### **2. Busan indicators should be quantified where possible.**

Process commitment requires keeping track as the basis for an action plan to address bottlenecks, gaps and inconsistencies. This is not about naming and shaming, this is about taking the two way commitment serious and building confidence.

#### **3. Data collection and statistical capacity building should get more attention.**

These technical processes are underway, yet not sufficiently recognized as an essential precondition for progress, both on process and on substance.

#### **4. Strengthening country systems remains of overarching importance.**

This has a technical side (capacity building) and a political side (true ownership and accountability at the recipient’s side and trust in transferring resources for results at the donor’s side).

Encouraging a practice of joint assessments of fiduciary risks and related action to address weaknesses is key as a complement to joint programming.

This should accelerate transfer of funds through regular budgets, with regular parliamentary oversight, strengthening the involvement of parliaments. This is essential for capacity building and for strengthening the basis for domestic resource mobilization that by definition will have to rely on sound financial management systems.

Yet there is concern that the indicators are not specific enough to recognize potential tension between development results in the short run and country system capacity in the longer run. This may in particular apply to fragile countries. The “fragility assessment” should provide flexibility for immediate action and at the same provide direction for reducing dependency.

**5. Fragmentation is negatively affecting the Busan principles.**

A minimum level of scale and concentration of resources and management are essential to put the principles in practice. There is some evidence that the Busan process has a positive impact. Whether this is a structural trend will have to be verified.

**6. South South and triangular cooperation add new dimensions and perhaps challenges to development assistance beyond direct aid, in particular in the context of Middle Income Countries.**

Aid should be seen in the context of broader economic development through investments, trade and knowledge exchange. Measuring effectiveness of cooperation should not be confined to the classic understanding of aid. South-south and triangular cooperation as well as cooperation with and between countries in East Europe and Central Asia have many positive sides that could be highlighted more; and also might raise questions about development and domestic revenues impact that might have to be addressed in true partnership between equal partners. These dimensions are therefore to be addressed in Mexico alongside the Busan agenda. This should include the issue of standard income per capita criteria for categorization between countries, which neither takes into account economic growth realities nor social challenges of countries regardless their 'status' in our outdated way of defining the world and imposing 'graduation' degrees on millions of people still left behind. It might be worth considering to differentiate the "aid effectiveness" agenda according to the degree of institutional capacities that exist in MICs.

**7. As natural contributors to shaping domestic and international debate CSO's benefit from increased transparency of data and decision processes.**

Their role in the Busan process is recognized. Yet some reservation is warranted as to suggestions to formalize their role or to scrutinize their representativeness in order to avoid compromising the existential bottom-up, independent, nature of their role.

**8. The level of in-country commitment of International Financial Institutions deserves explicit attention and assessment.**

Translating macro-economic policies into human development results is well known to be a key challenge in many countries. Effective development cooperation is therefore impacted by the level of engagement that IFI's display in country practice. This is important information for recipient governments as well as bilateral partners and other multilateral organizations to take into account.

**9. The role of the private sector should be recognized as indispensable to generate growth and employment.**

Aid providers and recipients should therefore seek alignment of the type and processes of aid delivery to economic and labour market requirements and opportunities. Creating healthy conditions for business and trade in a productive economy will serve as a potential multiplier from growth and jobs. Conversely engaging the private sector will create space to promote social dialogue and social standards and commitment to environmentally sustainable production as part of the broader development agenda. Such interaction seems more fundamental than focusing at corporate social responsibility initiatives that tend to be more limited in their impact on structural development.

**10. The Busan "business model" could benefit from better connecting between High Level commitment and in-country implementation.**

The Government of Korea's offer to host an annual stocktaking meeting offers a welcome opportunity to take stock regularly as change processes need patience and perseverance for success. However at the 'intermediary' level there should be more opportunities to link country practice with the High Level discussion. This could be done through regional peer review or through an information/ombuds function organized around the secretariat for the annual meetings. In addition there should be provisions to meet the need for more permanent communication, including on the work of the Global Partnership Steering Committee to all stakeholders, both at political and at technical levels, possibly through a UNDP role in countries concerned.

## Annex I. List of Participants

### International Participants

ADB	Anuradha Rajivan	Advisor, Strategy and Policy Department	<a href="mailto:arajivan@adb.org">arajivan@adb.org</a>
ADB	Manju Senapaty	Lead Planning and Policy Specialist	<a href="mailto:msenapaty@adb.org">msenapaty@adb.org</a> ; <a href="mailto:mdimaano@adb.org">mdimaano@adb.org</a> ; <a href="mailto:aorong@adb.org">aorong@adb.org</a> ; <a href="mailto:vfrancisco@adb.org">vfrancisco@adb.org</a>
Afghanistan	Mustafa Aria	Aid Management Director MOF	<a href="mailto:mustafa.aria@budgetmof.gov.af">mustafa.aria@budgetmof.gov.af</a>
Albania	Alpina Qirjazi	Coordinator of Foreign Assistance, Department of Strategy and Donor Coordination	<a href="mailto:ilirjanqirjazi@yahoo.it">ilirjanqirjazi@yahoo.it</a>
Albania	Nevila Como	Policy Adviser on Aid Effectiveness, Department of Strategy and Donor Coordination	<a href="mailto:nevila.como@aidharmonisation.org.al">nevila.como@aidharmonisation.org.al</a>
Bangladesh	Karolien Caesar	Advisor	<a href="mailto:karolien.casaer@undp.org">karolien.casaer@undp.org</a>
Bangladesh	Monowar Ahmed	Deputy Secretary ERD	<a href="mailto:ahmedmonowar@hotmail.com">ahmedmonowar@hotmail.com</a>
Benin	Mohamed Gado	Advisor to the Minister, Ministry of Economy and Finance	<a href="mailto:gadsoon@hotmail.com">gadsoon@hotmail.com</a>
Burkina Faso	Amadou Diallo	Directeur de la coordination et de l'efficacité de l'aide publique au développement DGCOOP/Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances	<a href="mailto:amadouyaya@yahoo.fr">amadouyaya@yahoo.fr</a>
Burundi	Émile NIMPAYE	Suivi-Évaluation des Programmes au SP/CNCA	<a href="mailto:nimpayeemile@gmail.com">nimpayeemile@gmail.com</a>
Burundi	M. Cyriaque MIBURO	Cadre d'Appui Economiste au Secrétariat Permanent du CNCA	<a href="mailto:cyrimibu@yahoo.fr">cyrimibu@yahoo.fr</a>
CABRI	Neil Cole	CEO	<a href="mailto:neil.cole@cabri-sbo.org">neil.cole@cabri-sbo.org</a> ; <a href="mailto:ashani.singh@cabri-sbo.org">ashani.singh@cabri-sbo.org</a>

Cambodia	Chhieng Yanara	SG CDC/CRDB	<a href="mailto:chhieng.yanara@crdb.gov.kh">chhieng.yanara@crdb.gov.kh</a>
Cambodia	Im Sour	CDC/CRDB	<a href="mailto:im.sour@crdb.gov.kh">im.sour@crdb.gov.kh</a>
Canada	Rashmi Sharma	Team Leader, International Strategy and Donor Relations	<a href="mailto:rashmi.sharma@international.gc.ca">rashmi.sharma@international.gc.ca</a> ; <a href="mailto:michel.ladouceur@international.gc.ca">michel.ladouceur@international.gc.ca</a>
China	Guo Zehua	Attache, Department of International Trade and Economic Affairs, Ministry of Commerce	<a href="mailto:guozehua@mofcom.gov.cn">guozehua@mofcom.gov.cn</a>
China	Liang Hong	Director Chief, Department of International Trade and Economic Affairs, Ministry of Commerce	<a href="mailto:lianghong@mofcom.gov.cn">lianghong@mofcom.gov.cn</a>
CSO	Martin Faller	Head of Regional Delegation, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies East Asia Delegation	<a href="mailto:martin.faller@ifrc.org">martin.faller@ifrc.org</a>
CSO	Philipp Schönrock	CEPEI	<a href="mailto:psm@cepei.org">psm@cepei.org</a>
CSO	Roy Anunciacion	People's Coalition on Food Sovereignty	<a href="mailto:secretariat@foodsov.org">secretariat@foodsov.org</a>
CSO	Vitalice Meja	CPDE	<a href="mailto:meja@roafrica.org">meja@roafrica.org</a>
CSO	Eleanor Maeresera	Senior Researcher	<a href="mailto:eleanor@afrodad.co.zw">eleanor@afrodad.co.zw</a>
Dominican Republic	Lic. Omar Herrera	Director de la Unidad de Análisis y Coordinación de la Cooperación Internacional	<a href="mailto:oherreraci@gmail.com">oherreraci@gmail.com</a>
DRC	Yvon Mombong		<a href="mailto:yvonmombong@hotmail.com">yvonmombong@hotmail.com</a>
Egypt	Marie Naguy Edward	Senior Research and Evaluation Officer, PEMA	<a href="mailto:mnagy@pema.gov.eg">mnagy@pema.gov.eg</a> ; <a href="mailto:marie@aucegypt.edu">marie@aucegypt.edu</a>
Eritrea	Ghebrekristos Ogbamichael Beraki	Director, Ministry of National Development	<a href="mailto:hagahwo2005@gmail.com">hagahwo2005@gmail.com</a>
China	Xiaoyun LI	Chair and Dean, China International development Research network, College of Humanities and Development Studies, China Agricultural University	<a href="mailto:Xiaoyun@cau.edu.cn">Xiaoyun@cau.edu.cn</a>
Consultant	Ad Melkert		<a href="mailto:apwmelkert56@gmail.com">apwmelkert56@gmail.com</a>
Consultant	Johnathan Glennie		<a href="mailto:j.glennie@odi.org.uk">j.glennie@odi.org.uk</a>

CSO	Antonio (Tony) Tujan	CPDE	atujan@iboninternational.org ; aalconis@iboninternational.org; secretariat@csopartnership.org
EU	Ellen Kelly		Ellen.kelly@ec.europa.eu
Finald	Timo Olkkonen	Director, Development Policy Planning , Ministry of Foreign Affairs	<a href="mailto:timo.olkkonen@formin.fi">timo.olkkonen@formin.fi</a>
G7+	Habib Ur Rehman Mayar	Senior Policy Specialist	<a href="mailto:habiburrehman.mayar@gmail.com">habiburrehman.mayar@gmail.com</a>
Honduras	Karoline Pacheco	Vice Minister, Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation of the Honduran Government	kpacheco@seplan.gob.hn
Jamaica	Andrea Stewart	Manager, Multilateral Technical Cooperation Unit, Planning Institute of Jamaica	<a href="mailto:Andrea_Stewart@pioj.gov.jm">Andrea_Stewart@pioj.gov.jm</a>
Jamaica	Dianne McIntosh		dianne.mcintosh@mof.gov.jm
Kosovo	Evlane Bajraktari	Senior Donor Coordination Office, MEI	<a href="mailto:elvane.bajraktari@rks-gov.net">elvane.bajraktari@rks-gov.net</a>
Lesotho	Toeboho Monesa	Economic Planner, Ministry of Development Planning	<a href="mailto:monesa8@gmail.com">monesa8@gmail.com</a>
Madagascar	M. Isaora Zefania ROMALAHY	Permanent Secretary, Prime Minister's Office	<a href="mailto:rmizef@gmail.com">rmizef@gmail.com</a>
Mexico	Mauricio Escanero	Deputy Permanent Representative of Mexico to UNESCO	<a href="mailto:mescanero@sre.gob.mx">mescanero@sre.gob.mx</a>
Morocco	Abdelmalek ACHERGUI	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	<a href="mailto:achergui@maec.gov.ma">achergui@maec.gov.ma</a>
Morocco	Mohammed LAMJOUN	Ministry of Economy and Finance	<a href="mailto:lamjoun@db.finances.gov.ma">lamjoun@db.finances.gov.ma</a>
MP	Eric Byrne TD		<a href="mailto:byrne.eric1@gmail.com">byrne.eric1@gmail.com</a>
Niger	Dankarami Mamadou	Direction Générale du Plan, Ministère du Plan, de l'Aménagement du Territoire , Niger	mdankarami@yahoo.fr
Niger	Issa Moutary Moustapha	Gestionnaire des données des Projets / Programmes, Ministère du Plan AT/DC Niamey	<a href="mailto:moustupis@yahoo.fr">moustupis@yahoo.fr</a> ; <a href="mailto:moustaphaissam@gmail.com">moustaphaissam@gmail.com</a>
Nigeria	OLADIMEJI TAJUDEEN SHOGBUYI	National Planning Commission	olashogbuyi@yahoo.co.uk

OECD/DAC	Robin Ogilvy	Joint Team	Robin.OGILVY@oecd.org; Claire.CONDON@oecd.org
Peru	Luis Humberto Olivera Cárdenas	Director APCI	lolivera@rree.gob.pe
Philippines	Violeta Corpus	Deputy Director General NEDA	<a href="mailto:VSCORPUS@NEDA.GOV.PH">VSCORPUS@NEDA.GOV.PH</a> ; <a href="mailto:MEFALLADO@NEDA.GOV.PH">MEFALLADO@NEDA.GOV.PH</a>
Private Sector	Godfrey Simbeye	Executive Director, Tanzania Private Sector Foundation	<a href="mailto:simbeye@tpsftz.org">simbeye@tpsftz.org</a>
Saudi Arabia	Saleh Fahid Al Shehri	Planning Specialist, Ministry of Planning and Economy	sshehri@planning.gov.sa
Senegal	Amadou Dia	Expert in Public Policies and Public Finance, Advisor to the Coordinator, Ministry of Economy and Finance	atdia@yahoo.com
Somalia	Ahmed Ainte	Director, ACU, President's Office	<a href="mailto:ahmed.ainte@gmail.com">ahmed.ainte@gmail.com</a>
South Sudan	Mary Yak	Deputy Minister, Finance and Economic Planning	<a href="mailto:mawajulang@gmail.com">mawajulang@gmail.com</a>
Sudan	Gamar Eissa Elswar	Director, Aid Management and Coordination Unit, General Directorate for International Cooperation, Ministry of Finance and National Economy	<a href="mailto:gelswar@yahoo.com">gelswar@yahoo.com</a>
Sudan	Sara Mohamed Ahmed Hamed	Assistant Director, Aid Management and Coordination Unit	<a href="mailto:saramottage@gmail.com">saramottage@gmail.com</a>
Switzerland	Suzanne Müller	Focal Point, Aid Effectiveness, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA	<a href="mailto:suzanne.mueller@eda.admin.ch">suzanne.mueller@eda.admin.ch</a>
Tajikistan	Jamshed Shoimov	Head of Department, Aid Coordination and Project Monitoring, SCISPM	<a href="mailto:j.shoimov@gki.tj">j.shoimov@gki.tj</a>
Tajikistan	Vali Musaev	Project Manager, ACIP	<a href="mailto:vali.musaev@undp.org">vali.musaev@undp.org</a>
Tanzania	Omar Mkima		<a href="mailto:omarmkima@gmail.com">omarmkima@gmail.com</a>
UK	Rhona Birchall	Policy Advisor	R-Birchall@dfid.gov.uk
UNDP	Ahmed Hussein Ahmed	Aid Effectiveness and Coordination Consultant, Sudan	ahmed.hussein@one.un.org
UNDP	Bruno POUENZAT	RR, UNDP Morocco	<a href="mailto:bruno.pouezat@undp.org">bruno.pouezat@undp.org</a>
UNDP	Derek Kielner	Joint Team	<a href="mailto:derek.kilner@undp.org">derek.kilner@undp.org</a>

UNDP	Dmitri Mariassin	Advisor Europe/CIS	dmitri.mariassin@undp.org
UNDP	Elaine Venter	Advisor Africa	elaine.venter@undp.org
UNDP	Herve Kouraogo	Advisor Burkina Faso	herve.kouraogo@undp.org
UNDP	Kopano Masilo	DPCF Coordinator Lesotho	kopano.masilo@undp.org
UNDP	Mansour Ndiaye	Advisor Niger	mansour.ndiaye@undp.org
UNDP	Manuel Filipe	Advisor Mozambique	<a href="mailto:manuel.filipe@undp.org">manuel.filipe@undp.org</a>
UNDP	Maria Luisa Isabel Jolongayan	Advisor Philippines	luisa.jolongbayan@undp.org
UNDP	Niels Knudsen	Advisor Tanzania	niels.knudsen@undp.org
UNDP	Sebastien Tshibungu	Advisor DRC	sebastien.tshibungu@undp.org
UNDP	Steven Sabey	Deputy Country Director, UNDP China	steven.sabey@undp.org
UNDP	Yuko Suzuki	Joint Team	yuko.suzuki@undp.org
UNDP	Mereseini Bowers	Advisor Asia/Pacific	mereseini.bower@undp.org
UNDP Africa	Alain Akpadji	Advisor Africa / Aid Effectiveness Specialist	alain.akpadji@undp.org
Vietnam	Cao Manh Cuong	Deputy Director General, MPI	cmanhcuong@yahoo.com
Vietnam	PHUNG VAN QUAN	Aid Effectiveness Forum	PVQUAN4CONSULTING@GMAIL.COM

<b>UNDP Seoul Policy Centre</b>			
UNDP Seoul Policy Centre	JiEun Kim	Policy Researcher	<a href="mailto:ji.eun.kim@undp.org">ji.eun.kim@undp.org</a>
UNDP Seoul Policy Centre	Ahyoung Jeong	Communication Assistant	
UNDP Seoul Policy Centre	Artemy Izmetstiev	Policy Specialist	<a href="mailto:artemy.izmetstiev@undp.org">artemy.izmetstiev@undp.org</a> <a href="mailto:hyoung.jeong@undp.org">hyoung.jeong@undp.org</a>
UNDP Seoul Policy Centre	Christophe Bonneau	Policy Research Consultant	<a href="mailto:Christophe.bonneau@undp.org">Christophe.bonneau@undp.org</a>
UNDP Seoul Policy Centre	Jaehyeon Lim	Policy Researcher	<a href="mailto:jaehyeon.lim@undp.org">jaehyeon.lim@undp.org</a>
UNDP Seoul Policy Centre	Alvaro Pinto Scholtbach	Director	<a href="mailto:alvaro.pinto@undp.org">alvaro.pinto@undp.org</a>
UNDP Seoul Policy Centre	Kirsty Taylor	Communication Assistant	<a href="mailto:kirsty.taylor@undp.org">kirsty.taylor@undp.org</a>
UNDP Seoul Policy Centre	Matthew Taylor	Communication Specialist	<a href="mailto:matthew.taylor@undp.org">matthew.taylor@undp.org</a>

UNDP Seoul Policy Centre	Sueun Kim	Policy Researcher	<a href="mailto:sueun.kim@undp.org">sueun.kim@undp.org</a>
UNDP Seoul Policy Centre	Sun Young Park	Policy Researcher	<a href="mailto:Sun.young.park@undp.org">Sun.young.park@undp.org</a>

**Government of the Republic of Korea**

Country	Name	Position	Contact
South Korea	SONG, Hye Ryoung	Deputy Director, Development Policy Division	<a href="mailto:hrsong.mofa@gmail.com">hrsong.mofa@gmail.com</a>
South Korea	KIM, Da-yeh	2nd Secretary, Development Policy Division	<a href="mailto:dykim@mofa.go.kr">dykim@mofa.go.kr</a>
South Korea	SHIN, Hyung-chul	2nd Secretary, Development Policy Division	
South Korea	JEONG, Sun-ho	2nd Secretary, Development Policy Division	
South Korea	JOH, Yae Min	Staff, Development Policy Division	<a href="mailto:bluaprilsky@gmail.com">bluaprilsky@gmail.com</a>
South Korea	JEONG, Jin Kyu	Deputy Director Generalm, Development Cooperation Bureau	
South Korea	PARK, Young-kyu	Director, Development Policy Division	
South Korea	OH, Young-ju	Director General, Development Cooperation Bureau	
South Korea	CHANG, Ji Soon	Director, Prime Minister's office	
South Korea	Hyun-Keun Kim	KOICA	<a href="mailto:kimhk@koica.go.kr">kimhk@koica.go.kr</a>
South Korea	Sojin Lim	KOICA ODA Research Team	<a href="mailto:sjlim@koica.go.kr">sjlim@koica.go.kr</a>
South Korea	SookHee Baek	KOICA, Representative of Koica Cambodia office	-

**Embassies**

Country	Name	Position	Contact
Bangladesh	Iahidul Islam Bhuiyan	First Secretary	<a href="mailto:haqnizam74@gmail.com">haqnizam74@gmail.com</a>
Belgium	Laurent Preud'homme	First Secretary	<a href="mailto:laurent.preudhomme@diplobel.fed.be">laurent.preudhomme@diplobel.fed.be</a>
CAMBODIA	TITH RITHIPOL	COMMERCIAL COUNSELOR	
Chile	Ricardo Leon Valdes	Consul	

Commercial Office of Ecuador	Marcelo Pazos	Commercial Attaché	<a href="mailto:ocecucorea@naver.com">ocecucorea@naver.com</a>
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	ERNESTO TORRES-PEREYRA	MINISTER COUNSELLOR	<a href="mailto:embadom@kornet.net">embadom@kornet.net</a>
Dominican Republic	Grecia Pichardo	Ambassador	
France	Eric Sanson	Counsellor	
France	Yann MOREAU	Scientific and Academic Cooperation Attaché, Institut Français de Corée	<a href="mailto:yann.moreau@diplomatie.gouv.fr">yann.moreau@diplomatie.gouv.fr</a>
Germany	Claudia Olbrish	Third Secretary	
Germany	Johannes Regenbrecht	Deputy Head of Mission	
Guatemala	H.E. GUSTAVO ADOLFO LOPEZ CALDERON	Ambassador	
Guatemala	MANOLO ALEJANDRO MONTUFAR CHAVEZ	First Secretary	
Honduras	Karoline Pacheco	Vice Minister	-
Hungary	Tibor Baloghdi	Deputy Head of Mission	<a href="mailto:hungaryembassy@yahoo.co.kr">hungaryembassy@yahoo.co.kr</a>
Paraguay	Cecilia Crosa		<a href="mailto:ceci.crosa@gmail.com">ceci.crosa@gmail.com</a>
PERU	EDUARDO CASTAÑEDA	COUNSELLOR-DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION	<a href="mailto:ecastaneda@peruembassy.kr">ecastaneda@peruembassy.kr</a>
PERU	JAIME POMAREDA	Ambassador	<a href="mailto:ecastaneda@peruembassy.kr">ecastaneda@peruembassy.kr</a>
Portugal	Paulo Graca	Deputy Head of Mission	<a href="mailto:portseul@gmail.com">portseul@gmail.com</a>
Vietnam	Nguyen Thi Minh Hien	Economic Counselor	<a href="mailto:hienmpivn@yahoo.com">hienmpivn@yahoo.com</a> ; <a href="mailto:minh_hien@mpi.gov.vn">minh_hien@mpi.gov.vn</a>

## Academia

Country	Name	Position	Contact
South Korea	HWANG, Won-gyu	Professor, Gangneung-Wonju National University	18th/ Afternoon plenary session onwards, 19th/full day
South Korea	KIM, Eun-mi	Dean, Ewha Graduate School of International Studies	18th/ 8:45-11:30
South Korea	Kyewoo Lee	Visiting Professor, KDI School of Public Policy and Management	<a href="mailto:kwlee@kdischool.ac.kr">kwlee@kdischool.ac.kr</a>
South Korea	Myung-Hwan Oh	Professor, Gachon University	<a href="mailto:myunghwanoh@nate.com">myunghwanoh@nate.com</a>
South Korea	SON, Hyuk Sang	Professor, Kyung Hee University	18th/ full day, 19th/ morning only

## Organizations

Country	Name	Position	Contact
South Korea	Geul Kwak	UN 6C Korea Network	<a href="mailto:geul.kwak@gmail.com">geul.kwak@gmail.com</a>
South Korea	HongJae Im	Ambassador of UN Global Compact	-
South Korea	Jieun Song	UN 6C Korea Network	<a href="mailto:jieun.song.byeon@gmail.com">jieun.song.byeon@gmail.com</a>
South Korea	Maria Kim	Manager, Governors Association of Korea	<a href="mailto:ymkmaria@gmail.com">ymkmaria@gmail.com</a>

## CSOs, Private Sector

Country	Name	Position	Contact
South Korea	Augustine, Kyoung IL, Minn	General Director, One Body One Spirit Movement (OBOS)	<a href="mailto:augustine.minn@gmail.com">augustine.minn@gmail.com</a>
South Korea	Hyun Jin Jeon	Manager of CSR Team, LG Electronics	<a href="mailto:hj.jeon@lge.com">hj.jeon@lge.com</a>
South Korea	Ilhyung LIM	Policy Center Fellow, KCOC	<a href="mailto:constant77@naver.com">constant77@naver.com</a>
South Korea	Jae Chul. PARK	Team Leader of International cooperation Team, One Body One Spirit Movement (OBOS)	<a href="mailto:reo9170@gmail.com">reo9170@gmail.com</a>
South Korea	Jee-eun JUN	Policy Center Assistant Manager, KCOC	<a href="mailto:eun0726@ngokcoc.or.k">eun0726@ngokcoc.or.k</a>
South Korea	Jeewon Yang	Manager, POSCO	<a href="mailto:jw.yang@posco.com">jw.yang@posco.com</a>
South Korea	Kinon O Chang	MinWhaHyun	
South Korea	LEE, Seong Hoon	Director, Korea Human Rights Foundation	
South Korea	Patricia Tan Peck	DHL Supply Chain	
South Korea	Seong-hoon LEE	Director of KCOC Policy Center	<a href="mailto:alee7080@gmail.com">alee7080@gmail.com</a>
South Korea	Sujung NAM	Program Coordinator, KoFID	<a href="mailto:sujung.nam@gmail.com">sujung.nam@gmail.com</a>
South Korea	Yong Seon PARK	President, FRIENDASIA	<a href="mailto:friendasia@naver.com">friendasia@naver.com</a>