



**Global  
Partnership**  
for Effective Development  
Co-operation

# MONITORING ADVISORY GROUP: MEETING SUMMARY

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Advisory Group on the Monitoring of the Global Partnership for Effective  
Development Co-operation (GPEDC) – Summary of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Meeting

5-7 February 2016, Glen Cove

This document the outcomes and decision points from the third meeting of the GPEDC  
Monitoring Advisory Group

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## Background

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The third Monitoring Advisory Group (MAG) meeting took place from 5 to 7 February 2016 at Glen Cove, United States of America. Nine out of 12 [MAG members](#), representatives of the 3 Co-Chairs of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (Malawi, Mexico and the Netherlands) and the OECD-UNDP Joint Support Team (JST) were present at the meeting. The meeting was chaired by the MAG member Brian Tomlinson facilitating dynamic and open discussions and exchange through plenary and break-out sessions. The meeting aimed at advancing the review of the GPEDC monitoring indicators and framework, further developing the MAG recommendation on the GPEDC theory of change, and finalising advice on the 2016 Progress Report. The meeting also identified key areas of further work and lead persons for each deliverable as elaborated under session 10 in this report.

## Session 1: Introductory session

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The MAG Chair opened the meeting welcoming participants and introducing the agenda. Representatives of the GPEDC Co-Chairs and Joint Support Team shared their expectations for the meeting and for ongoing MAG work:

- Increase relevance of the GPEDC monitoring in the **new global framework** including Agenda 2030 and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA). The GPEDC has been recognised in the UN forum with specific references in [Transforming the World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development](#) and [AAAA](#) – the outcome of the third International Conference on Financing for Development. It presents an opportunity to review and improve the GPEDC's monitoring framework and indicators to ensure its relevance in advancing development results through effective development cooperation. This work will benefit from the experience and lessons learned from the Second Monitoring Round.
- The importance of aligning the work of the revised framework to the preparation process for the High-Level Meeting (HLM) outcome document was also noted. In particular, a refined GPEDC theory of change would contribute to the GPEDC mandate as well as working arrangements, in turn, informing the outcome document
- MAG members were invited by the Co-Chairs to directly contribute to the **GPEDC High-Level Meeting** by participating in side events, core groups or plenary sessions.
- Effective communication on the purpose of MAG work and the **importance of a Theory of Change** to a wider audience was noted as important for ensuring the closer alignment of the work on a revised framework to the HLM 2 process, as well as the SC discussions on the GPEDC mandate and working arrangements.

## Session 2: Framework for Reviewing the Indicators

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The draft framework (circulated to MAG members in January) was agreed to guide the work of the MAG for reviewing the individual indicators and monitoring framework. The review will focus on: relevance; efficiency; and usefulness of individual indicators and the framework as a whole. The MAG also agreed the importance of linking the indicators to outcomes for effective development cooperation, particularly in terms of influencing incentives and institutional change needed for effective development cooperation. The small working groups (as agreed in the previous MAG meeting) are expected to develop the following outputs in reviewing the individual indicators:

- Specific proposals on ways to strengthen individual indicators;
- Laying out substantial grounds for finalising the overall framework; and
- Providing alternative options in areas of diverging opinions.

The MAG members also shared some initial thoughts as they initiated their review work in small groups:

- **The political economy dimension** should be taken into account when reviewing the framework and indicators to ensure political feasibility. Balanced recommendations were important to ensure that the recommendations are operational in practice.
- **Busan commitments and the Mexico outcome documents should be used as important references in defining the scope of the review.** These documents represent a political agreement, endorsed by the GPEDC membership, and thus they provide some guiding boundaries to the scope of revision of the monitoring framework. Within these parameters, it is expected that GPEDC indicators will be reviewed in order update and strengthen their relevance, efficiency and usefulness in measuring progress towards effective development cooperation principles, increasing the overall relevance of future monitoring rounds in the context of Agenda 2030.
- **Relevance:** The MAG was requested to review the applicability of the indicators and the framework across various country context, and in particular middle income countries.
- **Other modalities of development finance:** The MAG noted that consideration should be given, especially in middle-income countries, as to whether and how other types of development finance, in addition to ODA, may be assessed with regard to their effectiveness (such as south-south cooperation, private sector investment, and non-concessional official finance).
- **Drivers of change:** In reviewing the relevance, efficiency, and usefulness of the monitoring framework, there is need to consider who are the main drivers of change and what actions are needed by them so as to identify incentives for changes. In this context, it may be useful to identify the primary and secondary drivers for each indicator (provider/recipient/development stakeholders).

### Session 3: Review of Indicators

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The review of indicators was done in breakout sessions of three working groups, as indicated below, and reports from each group were discussed in plenary:

Group One: Country Ownership and Focus on Results (Gonzalo Hernandez and Paul Lupunga)

- **Indicator 1** Development co-operation focused country results and priorities
- **Indicator 6** Aid is on budget subject to parliamentary scrutiny
- **Indicator 9** Use of developing country public financial management systems
- **Indicator 10** Aid is untied

Group Two: Inclusive Partnerships for Development (Peter Davis, Brian Tomlinson and Lidia Fromm)

- **Indicator 2** CSO enabling environment
- **Indicator 3** Public-Private Sector Dialogue
- **Indicator 8** Gender equality and women's empowerment

Group Three: Transparency and Accountability (Rob van den Berg, Dan Coppard, Genevesi Ogiogio and Debapriya Bhattacharya)

- **Indicator 4** Aid transparency
- **Indicator 5** Development co-operation is more predictable
- **Indicator 7** Inclusive mutual accountability for development co-operation review

## Session 4: Group Report-back and Discussion in Plenary

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In previous breakout session, the MAG group reviewed indicators in relation to relevance, efficiency, and usefulness:

- **Relevance:** Is the indicator measuring something valid, meaningful and relevant in relation to the intended Busan commitment(s) and principles?
- **Efficiency** Is the indicator reliable for assessing progress? Can the indicator be measured efficiently and over time? Can the indicator encourage multi-stakeholder engagement in the collection of data and in the verification of findings? and
- **Usefulness** Do the stakeholders see the indicator as useful in furthering behaviour change in relation to the Busan commitment and/or improved development cooperation effectiveness? Is the indicator drawing attention to key stakeholder practices in ways that inform multi-stakeholder dialogue and increase accountability?

During the plenary, each group provided a report highlighting the salient issues for each indicator and proposals to improve them. All MAG members were invited exchange views.

### 4.1 Group One: Country Ownership and Focus on Results

Indicators 1, 6, 9 and 10 pertain to two Busan principles - countries' ownership of development cooperation and focus on results. These indicators suggest an important assumption that the main drivers of development are not providers but developing countries.

**Indicator 1 - Development co-operation is focused on results that meet developing countries' priorities**

[Group One report on Indicator 1](#) (as revised in mid-February 2016):

*Excerpts from the discussion:*

- Indicator 1 was deemed as relevant. MAG members underlined that past and recent development literature has repeatedly highlighted the fundamental importance of domestic drivers for development progress. The absence of country ownership (not just government ownership) on existing development efforts affects their effectiveness and sustainability. The Busan outcome highlights the need to deepen and operationalise democratic ownership of development policies.
- In terms of efficiency, the MAG acknowledges that the complexity of measuring country ownership with accuracy (which would involve tracking all the interactions between governments and providers in setting up a new project) requires the need to resort to proxy approach as the only viable approach.
- The MAG welcomed the revisions already made in the current indicator methodology made by the JST ahead of the second monitoring round, including a greater emphasis on providers' behaviour and the addition of qualitative aspects, in line with MAG's earlier advice. Given the diverse range of different country contexts, the descriptive self-assessment of the country's priority-setting architecture (1b) may help provide such qualitative context to indicator 1a.
- Providers are often involved from the beginning in a given development project and can easily find linkages of projects with national priorities. There was concern, therefore, that in practice, the current proxy indicator may be limited to a paper exercise rather than truly aligning provider programming to country priorities.

- To ensure practical alignment by providers to developing country ownership would require provider's alignment to countries priorities in operational phases of development interventions. Some governments either have or are exploring ways to have operational indicators as part of their country-owned monitoring frameworks. In reviewing the indicator further, some participants suggested to the Group to:
  - Consider adopting operational indicators similar to the ones used in the Paris Declaration monitoring survey, such as the one related to the number of Project Implementation Units (PIU). For example, Malawi found the Paris Declaration indicator on PIUs to be still relevant, and thus the Government tracks this indicator as part of nationally owned monitoring system.
  - Consider assessing the use of a programme based approach. Countries such as Cambodia and Malawi have considered strengthening the use of PBAs to address development effectiveness.
- The MAG was reminded, however, that indicators related to *harmonisation* were dropped from the Paris Survey for being costly and politically difficult. An efficient approach to measure operational aspects of cooperation should be explored.
- This review of the monitoring framework to ensure relevance against a changing global environment provides an opportune time to consider reintroducing certain indicators if there is strong demand from partner countries.
- It was suggested that consideration be given to linkages between indicators, to improve the linkage between results and mutual accountability for example.

#### Indicator 6 - Aid is on budgets which are subject to parliamentary scrutiny

[Group One report on Indicator 6](#) (as revised in mid-February 2016):

*Excerpts from the discussion:*

- Indicator 6 is relevant in terms of both country ownership, and transparency and accountability. When development cooperation funding is included in the national budget, it enables participation beyond government actors, by enabling parliaments and civil society to provide oversight.
- However, questions and challenges remain:
  - Is this leading to stronger national dialogue within the country and with providers?
  - Are supreme audit institutions enabled to look at these money flows?
  - Not all forms of development cooperation can be captured in a government budget (e.g. technical cooperation). And how to account for funding to non-state actors?
- “Aid on budget” will also not cover all development financial flows. Could parliamentary scrutiny be limited to public resources since the budget is drawn on this basis (taxation plus external official development finance) and do not cover most private financial flows (e.g. private funding to a PPP)? The MAG noted that this indicator should be limited to public resources – aid and public sector revenue.
- Some countries have a non-additionality law, mandating that external flows cannot be added to budget. External financial flows where the government is responsible for execution are often included in a budget that goes to the legislative body (although budget revisions within the year weaken parliamentary oversight). In other countries, external resources are accounted for separately, in annex sections. For this indicator, only the first part of the budget is assessed, although some countries interpret the indicator to also be covering the second part. In Latin America, reimbursable aid is the only form of aid that goes to parliament as other types of aid

are directly received and executed by the ministries. However, it was also noted that, in practice, Latin American governments have a broad variety of budget practices and this is not a constant across the region.

- The AAAA process (*Financing for Development*) requires a comprehensive approach in measuring the available resources for development finance. At the same time, there is also an emphasis on monitoring and guiding the budget allocation of these resources towards priority areas.
- In some cases South-South Co-operation (e.g. investment projects in infrastructure) could be incorporated on budget, such as in areas of infrastructure and other projects, but in-kind forms of technical assistance are harder to reflect in a budget given that these are largely non-monetary transactions in nature (or paid in the provider country).
- Social accountability of government institutions can only be meaningful when national institutions own and led the implementation of development efforts.

### Indicator 9 - Effective institutions: developing countries' systems are strengthened and used

[Group One report on Indicator 9](#) (as revised in mid-February 2016):

*Excerpts from the discussion:*

- Overall, indicators 9a and 9b are regarded as relevant, efficient, and useful.
- Indicator 9b focuses on official financing disbursed to public sector entities. The indicator is considered relevant for traditional providers. However, some MAG members indicated that it may not capture specific co-operation modalities of south-south providers.
- Indicator 9a has potential for improvement. It relies on a specific sub-indicator of the [Country Policy and Institutional Assessment](#) (CPIA) of the World Bank. CPIA country scores are based on World Bank in-country staff assessments of the quality of public financial management systems in "IDA countries" for a given year. These staff assessments are often deemed as subjective and therefore some developing countries consider the scores and the CPIA indicator to be a rather arbitrary assessment. However, since there was no better alternative system at the time, it was chosen as the data source for indicator 9a. The *Effective Institutions Platform*, a Global Partnership Initiative, is currently piloting an alternative system that could be considered for a data source in future GPEDC monitoring for this indicator.

### Indicator 10 - Aid is untied

[Group One report on Indicator 10](#) (as revised in mid-February 2016):

*Excerpts from the discussion:*

- The indicator is relevant for developing country ownership and can be useful in guiding discussions with providers to reduce tying of aid.
- The current indicator draws from the OECD-DAC's Creditor Reporting System. In 2001 DAC members made commitments to untie aid for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), later expanded to include Heavily-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) as well. The scope of the 2001 commitment covered ODA provided by bilateral official co-operation providers. Multilateral ODA is considered as untied by definition. The coverage of ODA excludes emergency/humanitarian assistance, as well as technical assistance. This poses limits to the coverage of providers and

scope of development cooperation covered by the indicator (i.e. it only concerns DAC providers and a portion of ODA).

- Some MAG members also pointed out that the indicator is becoming irrelevant due to current shifts in the aid paradigm (towards other forms of development finance and emerging providers). It is necessary to study new practices of development finance to identify ways to improve indicator.
- It was indicated that any change to the methodology needs to be consulted with the DAC, as they provide the assessments and data.
- MAG members discussed how to address the continued practice of informal tying of aid (*ex ante* vs *ex post* tied aid). DAC is also starting to estimate *ex post* tied aid for a number of countries (i.e. share of goods and services contracted *de facto* to firms in the provider's own country).
- There was a continued push for this indicator after Busan. At the time there was a proposal that this indicator include a sub-indicator about the proportion of aid used to purchase national goods or procure national services.
- This indicator is also relevant to South-South Cooperation providers as technical assistance can still be delivered through competitive process.

## 4.2 Group Two: Inclusive Partnerships for Development

Indicators 2, 3, and 8 fall under the principle of inclusive partnership of the Busan Agreement. MAG's main focus in reviewing these indicators therefore was on two aspects:

1) Inclusiveness: For indicators 2 and 3, the private sector and CSOs are not homogeneous entities but represent wide range of actors of different character and sizes. The process of monitoring should be inclusive to ensure that voices of diverse actors are captured.

2) Feasibility: Exploring an appropriate way to facilitate data collection at country level.

### Indicator 2 - Civil society operates within an environment which maximises its engagement in and contribution to development

[Group Two report on Indicator 2](#) (as revised in mid-February 2016):

*Excerpts from the discussion:*

- Indicator 2 is relevant, as civil society organisations have increasingly been recognised as crucial actors in development processes. It is a meaningful element of multi-stakeholder processes for development envisioned within the SDGs context.
- Some of the challenges identified include:
  - This is a process-heavy indicator as the questionnaire is very long (16 substantive questions). Also, it takes a long time to translate to the local language of the participating country and interpret the questions to the various stakeholders.
  - There is concern for lack of anonymity as it may, in some circumstances, have immediate political consequences or affect the safety of the civil society participants.
  - There is a risk of governments engaging with the "usual suspects" (organisations, individuals). For example, government may only invite the organisations that are favourable to the government.
  - Quality issue. CSOs are not a homogeneous group so country-level focal points may have different levels of capacity and engagement across the CSO universe.

- The issues above will undermine the ability to capture the realities on the ground, by limiting the plurality of views from a diversity of CSOs. To address this issue, improving inclusivity is a critical element:
  - Capturing diverse voices will help ensure the questionnaire response reflects the actual state of play at country level.
  - Including complementary feedback from diverse CSOs may strengthen the indicator.
  - To improve inclusivity, the monitoring process could consult more people via a questionnaire where organisations are invited to answer on the most relevant modules or questions, preserving their anonymity.
- The working group proposed ways to improve inclusivity and incentivise participation of diverse CSO group in responding to questionnaire:
  - Mapping existing types of CSOs (large, medium, small, local; domestic vs international organisations) in order to include all types of CSOs to participate in the monitoring process;
  - Making a distinction between human rights-based / policy advocacy groups and other types of CSOs (e.g. service oriented organisations in other sectors), as different regulations may apply to different types of CSOs (i.e. diversity of impacts of regulatory environment and government and provider action);
  - Providing respondents with options to choose to engage in selected modules and/or questions, out of the four, according to the relevance for them, with module two on CSO development effectiveness obligatory.
  - Using a confidential questionnaire to address lack of anonymity issue.
- While the indicator includes a module on CSO development effectiveness where perceptions of their alignment with the Istanbul principles of transparency and accountability are discussed, the indicator *per se* does not fully assess the development effectiveness or impact of CSOs. The outcomes for this module need to be presented in a clear narrative to manage expectations.
- The experience of the 2015-2016 monitoring round will generate lessons to inform ways to improve indicator 2. Surveying focal points after the monitoring process would add value in this process.<sup>1</sup>

### Indicator 3 - Engagement and contribution of the private sector to development

[Group Two report on Indicator 3](#) (as revised in mid-February 2016):

*Excerpts from the discussion:*

- Indicator 3 is especially relevant given the broad recognition of private sector's contribution to development (and to development finance) in the context of the Agenda 2030.
- MAG members discussed whether assessing the quality of public-private dialogue (PPD) was an adequate proxy for private sector contributions in development. Given the diversity of actors and types of contribution, the MAG reckoned it was difficult to aggregate all aspects into a single indicator. There was a recognition that, in any

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<sup>1</sup> Note from the JST: The Task Team on CSOs is currently launching a study involving case studies in eight countries participating in the second monitoring round, including interviews with the participants in the multi-stakeholder meetings, direct observation of the meetings when possible, and further country contextualisation. The purpose is to draw lessons and inform a review of the methodological approach for this indicator.

case, private sector contributions often start by coordinating efforts with other actors (in particular with the government). In that light, using *Quality of PPD* as a proxy was deemed sound if it were enhanced with additional questions.

- The “private sector” includes a wide range of actors, from large multinational corporations, domestic firms, to micro enterprise or small-scale farmers. To ensure inclusiveness of such diverse range of actors, it was deemed as important to disaggregate the private sector according to size, character and sectors.
- To the question raised regarding whether *corporate social responsibility* (CSR) should be part of the assessment, it was agreed that CSR aspects were not part of Busan Agreement and therefore not the basis for this indicator.
- MAG agreed that, given the existence of alternative sources of evidence to measure private sector enabling environment (e.g. IFC’s Doing Business), the indicator did not need to cover that dimension .
- Some MAG members underlined that the indicator doesn’t address private sector’s contribution to development. Potential measures in that direction could be a measurement of whether foreign investments are supporting the achievement national development plans, or assessing dialogue with SMEs since small players are often not so present. No clear consensus emerged at this stage of the assessment.
- The focus of the indicator might be how can the private and the public sectors align their incentives and efforts with development goals.
- Indicator 3 is a process heavy indicator with several modules, which raises capacity issues. To address this concern, the use of independent consultants, familiar with the private sector, was recommended to strengthen the dialogue as development agencies are not often the best agents to liaise with private sector. In this regard, the optional case study module 3 of the indicator (dependent on consultant work) was appreciated.<sup>2</sup>

### Indicator 8 - Gender equality and women’s empowerment

[Group Two report on Indicator 8](#) (as revised in mid-February 2016):

*Excerpts from the discussion:*

- This indicator is led by GPEDC in collaboration with UNWOMEN, and it complements other gender-related indicators produced by others. Indicator 8 clearly resonates with SDG – Goal 8.
- The current indicator does not cover the broad Busan commitment on gender equality and empowerment in country, as it focuses on the narrower topic of gender responsive budgeting. However, it was acknowledged that there are other frameworks addressing broader gender issues (e.g. SDGs, human development reports) that can complement this indicator. The indicator may seem too narrow in scope, but it is nonetheless a relevant indicator - in 2013-2014 monitoring round, only a third of participating countries had some sort of gender-responsive budgeting institutions and practices in place.
- It was suggested that the scope of the methodology for this indicator go beyond government and include engagement with women’s rights organisations and other CSOs encouraging dialogue on the impact of gender responsive budgeting mechanisms.

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<sup>2</sup> Terms of Reference for Indicator 3 Module 3: <https://www.unteamworks.org/node/508669>

- It was suggested that the indicator could also cover providers' disbursements for gender equality. Providers' disbursement for gender quality can be tracked by OECD DAC's policy marker for gender equality [for providers reporting to the OECD DAC]. Alternatively, providers' allocation to women's rights organisations is also available in OECD DAC data.
- A more accurate rephrasing of the indicator's commitment would be "*Public resource allocation and women's empowerment*".
- The Paris Declaration had an optional gender module – it may be important to bring on board any lessons from this earlier experience.<sup>3</sup>

### 4.3 Group 3: Transparency and Accountability

Indicators 4, 5 and 7 address transparency, predictability and mutual accountability in relation to development cooperation efforts.

#### Indicator 4 - Transparency: information on development co-operation is publicly available

[Group Three report on Indicator 4](#) (as revised in mid-February 2016):

*Excerpts from the discussion:*

- The MAG highlighted the relevance of this indicator. In Busan, parties agreed to set a "common standard" to assess transparency of development co-operation providers by the end of 2012, and the secretariats of OECD DAC and IATI worked on a proposal.
- However, as of 2015, methodologies to assess transparency by the different technical bodies have diverged and there is not a common standard on transparency in place. After a public consultation process, the MAG advised to proceed in the 2015-2016 monitoring round by present existing transparency assessments in parallel, and focusing on strengthening the narrative and visualisation aspects.
- That said, and going forward, MAG members discussed that the indicator needs to ensure relevance and usefulness at the country level (government and non-state actors).
- The commitment in Busan was about increasing transparency and access by multiple stakeholders. The MAG committed to provide advice on how to measure this dimension of transparency.
- The MAG reckoned that transparency may look different depending on the purpose of data disclosure (e.g. for accountability, for aid management and planning).
- There were discussions on whether limiting the scope of the transparency indicator to international development co-operation, or whether it was useful to expand and include transparency of countries' public financial management systems –which could otherwise be considered under 9a.
- Discussions also involved the forward-looking nature of transparency and how this interconnects with indicators 5b. Some members called for avoiding overlapping indicators.

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<sup>3</sup> This is a summary of main findings related to the evaluation of the Paris Declaration Gender Module: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/gender-development/49014760.pdf>

## Indicator 5 - Development co-operation is more predictable

[Group Three report on Indicator 5](#) (as revised in mid-February 2016):

*Excerpts from the discussion:*

- The indicator was deemed relevant. The indicator is considered important by partner countries as they find data on commitments and disbursements useful to planning.
- Some MAG members indicated that progress for this indicator has been slow. However, the methodology is regarded as sound.
- Concerns were raised over the relation between provider as disburser and countries as recipients. For this indicator, accountability is solely put on the provider side, which may skew the reality. In practice, country implementation capacity also poses constraints to the speed of disbursements, as well as overall absorption capacity issues may challenge a provider's plan for disbursements. Qualitative explanations for the indicator behaviour will be needed.
- Some technical difficulties were highlighted (e.g. not clear when commitments count and via which channels).
- Key challenges lie in forward-looking forecasting of disbursements, as institutional and organisational constraints may hinder predictability. Peer learning may be useful in helping show how some providers are able to reach predictability scores close to 100 percent.
- MAG indicated a need to review assessments on why predictability is not improving.

## Indicator 7 - Mutual accountability among development co-operation actors is strengthened through inclusive reviews

[Group Three report on Indicator 7](#) (as revised in mid-February 2016):

*Excerpts from the discussion:*

- Indicator 7 is an overarching/cross-cutting indicator for the monitoring framework, as it provides the potential for dialogue around all other indicators. In reviewing the overall framework, we may consider positioning this indicator as either number 1 or number 10.
- The MAG indicated that the definition of "mutual accountability" needs clarification. The indicator gathers evidence at the country level, but not at global or regional level.
- SDGs no longer have a reference to mutual accountability since providers are no longer pushing for this framework. However, this creates an opportunity for GPEDC as it is uniquely positioned to bring Mutual Accountability aspect back to complement mutual accountability for realising the SDGs.
- UN DCF's National Mutual Accountability survey provides input to Indicator 7. However, the data is currently not made public. The report that synthesises the finding from the survey is publically available and discussed at the UN Development Cooperation Forum. Some MAG members pointed out that the DCF National Mutual Accountability Survey is an exercise of ticking boxes "yes or no" and does not address quality aspects of development partnerships, while it aims at generating dialogue at country level. Also, mutual accountability should not only happen at national level in developing countries, but also at headquarters of providers. Providers also need to demonstrate that they have mutual accountability mechanism in place through monitoring process.

- A literature review on how mutual accountability is put in practice may help strengthening the indicator.
- It was mentioned that a mutual accountability indicator can be applicable to South-South Co-operation.

### Session 5: Broader Issues related to the current Monitoring Framework

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Excerpts from the discussion:

- **Voluntary nature:** There is no political pressure or incentives to deliver due to the voluntary nature of the monitoring exercise, which slows the pace of results. Changes in the political economy preventing reform have preceded technical progress in some of the areas being monitored. Even if a renewed monitoring framework can become more technically robust in terms of relevance, efficiency and usefulness, it will not achieve the change that the implicit theory of change envisions if there is no political pressure to do so. The MAG discussed potential sets of incentives (positive and negative) for behaviour change.
- **Observed moderate progress to date:** Is it because of framework limitations or due to wider political economy issues? While we need to wait for the outcomes of Round Two, the MAG suggested including observed examples of progress against indicators in the 2016 Progress Report in order to highlight what were the factors that drove progress in different country/organisational contexts.
- **Usefulness:** The indicator exercise has become quite technical, which limits inclusion and does not contribute to progress in the end. Information should reach beyond the development effectiveness specialists and be used at country level and by managers and sector level specialists. To facilitate this outreach, disaggregated data can be made available to foster dialogue and action at the country level.
- **Capacity:** Participating in the monitoring round can enhance capacity to generate, collate and use the monitored data. Strengthening country information systems for development co-operation is needed but resources are not always available. With UNDP's support, several countries have incorporated the GPEDC indicators in their own national monitoring systems. They draw data from existing national system so they can now focus on consultation and validation (Cambodia, Rwanda). Regional platforms can also support countries in their statistical capacity.
- **Scope:** To what extent is this framework relevant beyond ODA/aid? Development co-operation (ODA) has become marginal as a resource for middle-income countries in the new reality of development finance. However many other countries are still depending on ODA and still need a framework to measure development co-operation effectiveness.
- **Missing indicators:** The MAG started reflecting on potential areas relevant to development co-operation effectiveness (some from Paris Declaration, others from emerging changes in the Post-2015 landscape) and will seek stakeholder feedback on this challenge.

### Session 6: Review of the Discussion Paper on Theories of Change and the GPEDC

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The MAG has identified an **implied Theory of Change** (ToC), derived from the Busan/Mexico outcome documents, as following: Busan Norms / Principles for Effective Development Co-operation <-> Stakeholder commitments for action <-> Country-led monitoring on the ground <-> Behaviour change / institutional reform in development cooperation practice <-> Improved development impact.



The MAG endorses this theory of change as a plausible approach for realising behaviour change in development cooperation practices for the GPEDC. At the same time, the MAG has identified **issues in implementing** this theory of change, many of which lie outside the above framework:

- **Global context:** Rooted in a complex global political process, the practicability and causality inherent in the implied theory of change have never been systematically tested. Sustaining and driving change requires strong leadership by drivers of change. It is crucial to situate the GPEDC as complementary to the SDGs process.
- **Country dynamics:** Political context and power dynamics in countries also affect causal chain of theory of change. The right actors and constituencies must be engaged. There are often “competing” theories of change in play (for example, domestic interests may overtake incentives built in monitoring framework to change behaviours around principles of development cooperation effectiveness).
- **Power relations** between the various stakeholders are often unexamined conditions affecting change, with an implicit assumption that all want to see change happen and share common development goals.
- **Weak incentives to change:** An incentive structure is missing or it is not as strong as other domestic or international incentives. It is important to be able to differentiate performance of all aid actors (an awards system can be an alternative to ranking).

## Session 7: Review of Current Monitoring Round and JST assessment Questions

### 7.1 Progress of current monitoring round

The JST presented an update of the 2016 monitoring round progress. [79 countries](#) are engaged in this process, in different stages of implementation. Country level activities include multi-stakeholder meetings, identification of focal points for providers, civil society,

private sector, trade unions and others, data collection and validation. Deadline for data submission to the JST is 31 March 2016. Data will be processed and reviewed in April and May and the 2016 Progress Report will be prepared from June to September.

Discussion:

- **Communication between providers' headquarters and their country level focal points** is key for data quality.
- **Data collection process is substantial** for national coordinators and some face capacity issues. Engaging focal points at country level can be challenging. CSOs and trade unions are well organised, but liaising with private sector has been more difficult.
- What are the **incentives** for each actor to participate? Why are some countries really engaged and others less? How to incentivise provider country offices to respond to data requests?

## 7.2 Indicator 4 – Transparency

The JST presented an update on indicator 4 methodology. After consultation with several parties and taking into account MAG's advice, the JST prepared a proposal for inclusion of indicator 4 in the 2016 monitoring round. This proposal is being presented to the **Steering Committee for endorsement at the end of February**.

According to this proposal, transparency assessment will be done using the **three existing transparency systems/scores**: for historical/retrospective statistics (OECD CRS), for forecasting (OECD FFS), and for aid management and planning (IATI). Details on the different sub-dimensions of transparency will be presented in providers' individual profiles, with a chapeau paragraph helping interpret the provider-specific assessment. Coverage will vary with some providers getting scores in more than one category, some in all three.

Discussion:

- Need to communicate this **diversity of instruments as a positive thing** relating to the different dimensions of transparency. Having different systems and standards responds to different needs of a diversity of users.
- It can be complex to present details of all three systems in the report, so **tables with results have to be clear** and self-explanatory.
- Rationale for the weighting in the OECD CRS assessment framework of 70%-30% for accuracy needs to be clarified.

## 7.3 SDGs inclusion of GPEDC indicators

The UNDP updated MAG members on the inclusion of GPEDC in the SDGs process:

- The JST submitted documentation for an **indicator for SDG 17.16** (Number of countries reporting progress in multi-stakeholder development effectiveness monitoring frameworks to support the achievement of SDGs). This indicator has been accepted pending approval of the proposed framework in the UN system.
- The UNDP through the UNDG 'MAPS' (Mainstreaming, Acceleration, and Policy Support) is aiming to providing support to countries to set up a monitoring system of progress against SDGs and will explore ways to embed the GPEDC indicators.

## Session 8: Review of Advice for Second Progress Report

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### 8.1 Discussion around the 2016 Progress Report

JST presented a timeline for report production and reactions to MAG recommendations:

- Data will be **disaggregated** as much as possible.
- The Report will demonstrate a **diversity of progress**, highlighting areas in which progress in implementing the principles for effective development co-operation are being made, also identifying why progress is limited for some cases.
- Providing **country- and context-sensitive assessment** of the monitoring results, helping frame the observed state of play with other broader or country-specific factors affecting the effectiveness of development co-operation (this may be done through inputs from GPEDC stakeholders).
- Resorting to available relevant and **complementary analysis** undertaken by various institutions and initiatives that could also help interpret the monitoring results;
- **Collateral shorter materials**, in addition to the report

Discussion:

- **Country pages:** Country profile is a powerful tool for engagement, having evidence at country level supports dialogue. UNDP received resources to produce 2-page country profiles for recipient countries.
- **Provider profiles:** Provider performance is important for accountability and behaviour change. Due to limited resources and capacity, it is not be possible to produce provider profiles for all. One option could be to focus on top 10/15 providers or use visual ways to display provider performance (traffic light rather than rankings, trip advisor type of app).
- **Theory of Change (ToC):** Provide visual presentation of the ToC, portraying the elements of change, drivers, bottlenecks and key barriers to achieving behaviour change in development cooperation. Disaggregated data per country and provider can be useful for supporting multi-stakeholder dialogue and fostering change at both headquarter and country levels.
- **Clarify review and sign-off process:** The MAG has agreed to review the findings and guarantee technical soundness of the Report. Co-Chairs will produce the foreword which is political chapeau of the report. Emerging conclusions can be presented to SC for a temperature check to guarantee they can own and advocate for these findings. This is a UNDP-OECD joint publication and follows internal clearance processes from both organisations. JST will clarify these roles and responsibilities in a ToR.
- **Timeliness of the Report:** A timely report is essential as a preparatory document for dialogue leading up to HLM2. The MAG urges all stakeholders to respect the country-led monitoring process in which national coordinators lead in data collection and validation. In this regard, where there are disagreements on data, it should be the responsibility of country stakeholders to resolve outstanding issues with national coordinators, and not the JST, which has not authority to over-ride any outcome at the country level.
- **Collateral material:** Ahead of the report publication, preliminary findings should be available in order to start discussions, creating an appetite for the report. There will be consultations and meetings in preparation for the HLM and key messages will feed into those.
- **SWOT analysis** could be used to complement findings by providing some context.

Focal points would need to provide their views.

The MAG will ensure quality control and technical soundness of the Report by reviewing specific chapters. Around May, the MAG will be asked to provide advice on chapters' outline and on how to present findings. Later, advice will be requested on key messages.

## 8.2 Seeking feedback from second monitoring round participants

The JST will send a survey to national coordinators and focal points as soon as data is submitted (mid-March onwards). It will include a few questions to assess the data collection process. Shortly after processing of answers, data should be available online. This will be useful for the MAG to validate and finalise their advice on reviewed indicators.

## Session 9: MAG preparations for Steering Committee Meeting / Nairobi HLM

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### 9.1 Nairobi High Level Meeting (HLM)

Representative of Co-Chairs introduced the HLM agenda and how the meeting will be organised. There are mainly 2 opportunities for MAG involvement:

- Help organising a **plenary session**. Peter will join core group for Plenary 1 (Progress with implementing the unfinished aid effectiveness agenda and development effectiveness commitments) and Deb for Plenary 2 (How the Development Effectiveness Agenda supports the implementation of the SDGs and AAAA).
- Organising a **side event** on any topic of interest.

Discussion:

- Need to **feed monitoring findings into HLM discussions**. The MAG can help identify key monitoring inputs for each session. Use pre-meetings to discuss important issues and identify speaker who can pass on main report messages.
- **Partner country caucus** should be embedded in agenda, potentially as a pre-HLM session but not as a side event. On the other hand, such a caucus should also avoid going back to a polarised donor-recipient agenda.
- Relevant regional meetings leading up to the HLM:
  - 3rd Korea GPEDC forum is an opportunity to project outcome of monitoring work and ensure core links with HLM.
  - Post-monitoring regional workshops will provide space to deepen conversations and feed into outcome document. Use of findings and mutual learning is important for countries.
  - Regional platforms can discuss use of findings at regional level.
- **Outcome document**
  - Malawi SC meeting will provide clear roadmap. At next MAG meeting, a strategy session can be organised to plan opportunities for feeding MAG input into the outcome document.
  - Before the meeting, partner countries can engage in discussions to contribute to the outcome document.
- Create space and interest for countries such as Brazil, India and China to attend.

## 9.2 Steering Committee Meeting in Malawi

Representative of Malawi Co-Chair explained the agenda. On day 1 there will be a session on progress of GPEDC monitoring to support of the 2030 agenda. Brian and Peter will prepare an update on MAG's work on strengthening the relevance of the GPEDC monitoring framework. Brian and Paul will present at the SC meeting on behalf of the MAG.

## Session 10: Summary of MAG work plan and determination of next meeting

Deliverable	Lead	Deadline
<b>Theory of Change</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Presentation</b> of key MAG messages to SC</li> <li>• <b>Short paper</b> with key messages for SC (room document in SC meeting)</li> <li>• <b>Final ToC proposal</b> for the general framework and each individual indicator</li> </ul>	Brian, Paul, Peter, Arjan  All	SC 29 February SC 29 February  SC in July
<b>Stress test questionnaire</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Advice to JST</b> on questionnaire before distribution to national coordinators and other focal points</li> </ul>	All	March
<b>Progress Report</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Advice to JST</b> on chapters outline and how to present findings</li> <li>• <b>Advice to JST</b> on key messages</li> </ul>	All  All	May  June
<b>Monitoring framework review</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Proposal for individual indicators:</b> Summary of existing documents. Final call for inputs then harmonise current papers and identify outstanding issues.</li> <li>• <b>Final MAG recommendation</b> on new GPEDC monitoring framework.</li> </ul>	Each working group  All	Mid May  4-6 June (Next MAG meeting) to be presented at July SC meeting
<b>Final proposal on reviewed framework relevant for middle income countries</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consider financial flows other than ODA</li> <li>• Consider provider HQ modules</li> <li>• Could do a survey with a few middle income countries</li> </ul>	Dan, Peter, Rob, Brian	June
<b>Core groups for HLM preparation</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Plenary 1: Progress with implementing the unfinished aid effectiveness agenda and development effectiveness commitments</li> <li>• Plenary 2: How the Development Effectiveness Agenda supports the implementation of the SDGs and AAAA</li> </ul>	Peter  Deb	In the months leading up to HLM

*Next MAG meeting was tentatively booked to take place from 4 to 6 June 2016 in Paris, if possible in a retreat format similar to this New York meeting.*