## ANNEXES - TAILORING GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP MONITORING TO FRAGILE AND CONFLICT AFFECTED SITUATIONS

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Annex 1: An urgent call to action: tracking progress toward delivering effectively in fragile and conflict affected situations

Tackling fragility will be one of the most pressing challenges of the 21st century. Recognising the need to reach populations at risk of being left behind, the international community has begun to adapt and scale-up targeted efforts. While effective development co-operation is fundamental in all contexts to achieve lasting development results, it is particularly crucial in fragile situations. Creating a climate of mutual accountability, between the international community and governments, as well as ensuring coherent humanitarian-development-peace efforts, will be an integral part of effectiveness in fragile contexts. Relevant data are urgently needed to inform these scaled up efforts and reinforce mutual accountability of all partners. Cutting-edge evidence will enable robust, timely policy decisions to ensure that development co-operation is effective, achieves maximum impact and yields lasting development results to realise the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030.

Tackling fragility will be one of the most pressing challenges of the 21st century. More than 1.6 billion people, or 22% of the global population, live in fragile situations. While the overall number of people living in extreme poverty is falling globally, the number of extremely poor people living in contexts affected by fragility, is set to increase from 480 million in 2015 to 542 million in 2035. Preventing conflict and sustaining peace is central to reducing poverty and achieving shared prosperity. Working coherently across humanitarian, development and peace efforts, in ways that are consistent with national ownership and leadership, is critical to delivering on the universal aspiration to leave no one behind and reach the furthest behind first. This means that, to some degree, all development actors will have to become sensitive to and experts on fragility in the SDG-era. Without building resilience and investing in prevention to guard against the adverse consequences of fragility, the ambition of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development will not be met.

Recognising the need to reach populations at risk of being left behind, the international community has begun to adapt and scale-up targeted efforts. During the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) era, when it became clear that countries affected by fragility were falling behind, the international community in partnership with countries-affected by conflict and fragility, responded with Helping Prevent Violent Conflict (2001), OECD Fragile States Principles (2007) and the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (2011). Since then, the 2030 Agenda has signalled a groundbreaking shift in approach and global commitments to support peace, notably: SDG16 for peaceful, just and inclusive societies and effective institutions; and, the twin UN resolutions on sustaining peace. In parallel to the USD $68.2 billion Official Development Assistance (ODA) that was channelled to countries in fragile and conflict affected situations in 2016, renewed emphasis on tackling fragility is reflected in the UN-WB Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Conflict Prevention report (2018); the UN report on Sustaining Peace (2018); Fragility Commission report (2018); and the OECD’s States of Fragility 2018 (forthcoming). Concrete initiatives have also been rolled out, including the UN Secretary General’s core focus on prevention, and the development of a New Way of Working between development, humanitarian and peace actors towards collective outcomes, over multi-year timeframes, based on the comparative advantage of development, humanitarian and peace actors. These commitments and initiatives reaffirm the need for country owned and country-led pathways toward peace and prevention with the assistance of the international community emphasize that implementation will be best be achieved through inclusive partnerships.

While effective development co-operation is fundamental in all contexts to achieving lasting development results, it is particularly crucial in fragile and conflict-affected situations. Delivering effectively is more complex, yet arguably more crucial, in these contexts. In addition to high ODA dependency, volatile flows, and an often narrow donor base, fragile and conflict affected situations are typically plagued with higher and multiple factors of risk, greater complexity due to the number and different types of actors present, and the dual challenge of addressing immediate needs and the underlying causes of fragility in addition to anchoring state legitimacy. This is often coupled with limited institutional capacity and unstable political settlements. In addition, gender-
specific burdens are heightened in fragile situations with women and girls facing increased risk of inequality. Humanitarian, development and peace actors must work coherently in these challenging environments if the overall co-operation effort is to be effective. Development assistance in fragile situations that does not adhere to effectiveness principles, is not only a missed opportunity to strengthen statebuilding efforts, build institutional capacity and accountability between government and their citizens, as well as between governments, citizens and international actors, but also it can be detrimental to the country’s long-term development\textsuperscript{i}. Tracking progress toward delivering effectively in fragile and conflict affected situations must reflect these nuances, complexities and limitations, while also even-handedly promoting mutual accountability between all partners – government, civil society and the international community.

Compelling data on effectiveness in fragile situations are urgently needed to inform ongoing efforts, reinforce mutual accountability of all partners, and enable the right decisions at the right time. The international community has demonstrated its resolve to do things differently, with high-level commitments and initiatives providing the blueprint. To deliver on these ambitions by 2030, there is a need to strengthen mutual accountability in these contexts, and identify underlying determinants of success – to track in real time what works and what does not. The renewed attention in the SDGs context on data and review responds to a key lesson from the MDGs era – that real time tracking of progress is essential to ensure that collective action generates results. With 12 years left to reach the SDGs, this feedback loop of data and evidence must be put in place now.

Responding to the need for data to inform action, a tailored approach to monitoring effectiveness of development co-operation in fragile situations will be collaboratively developed under the auspices of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation\textsuperscript{vii}. This work will benefit from close engagement from diverse stakeholders, together with relevant policy networks including the members of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding\textsuperscript{viii}. Drawing on the Partnership’s established methodology to track effective development co-operation, experts, representatives from developing countries, key development partners, and civil society will convene in an open working group (see Annex I). Within the context of adapting existing Global Partnership monitoring, the open working group will map key challenges and actions for delivering effectively and coherently in fragile and conflict affected situations. Where current monitoring efforts do not suffice and data are needed to inform scaled efforts, a tailored approach to monitoring effectiveness in fragile situations will be developed and fine-tuned based on open consultation and light country testing. The result will be shared with the international community at the 2019 Global Partnership Senior Level Meeting, to be held in the margins of the 2019 HLPF in July, which will have a focus on SDG16.

Draft timeline

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Month & June 2018 & October 2018 & April 2019 & July 2019 & ... 2020 \\
\hline
Activity & Establish open working group & Open working group to map key challenges and actions for delivering effectively in fragile situations & Open working group to develop a proposed approach to monitoring & Open consultation and light country testing & Approach shared with international community at Global Partnership Senior Level Meeting, in the margins of UN HLPF \\
\hline
Draft timeline, continued:
\begin{itemize}
  \item Global Partnership Steering Committee reviews preliminary recommendations
  \item Global Partnership Steering Committee reviews proposed monitoring approach
  \item Roll-out of approach in 2020 Global Partnership monitoring round
\end{itemize}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{i} The OECD 2016 States of Fragility report defines fragility as the combination of exposure to risk in five areas – economic, environmental, political, social and security – and the insufficient capacity of the state or system to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks. Since their inception in 2005, the States of Fragility Series has helped underpin better understanding of the relationship between fragility and development, and to provide data on resource and financial flows that exist to address fragility’s underlying drivers.


Obtained using 2016 OECD data and the 2016 States of Fragility list of countries in fragile and conflict affected situations.


The Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation is a multi-stakeholder platform to advance the effectiveness of development efforts by all actors, to deliver results that are long-lasting and contribute to the achievement of the SDGs. The Global Partnership tracks progress on effective development co-operation through 10 indicators that are based on established effectiveness principles. The last monitoring round of the Global Partnership attracted the participation of 81 partner countries, more than 125 development partners as well as hundreds of civil society organisations and private sector representatives and others. In addition to driving behaviour change at country level, Global Partnership monitoring is the global data source for SDG17.15, SDG17.16, and SDG5c.

The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding is the first forum for political dialogue to bring together countries affected by conflict and fragility, development partners, and civil society. The International Dialogue is composed of members of the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), the g7+ group of fragile and conflict affected states, and the Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS).
Annex 2: TERMS OF REFERENCE
Open working group: tracking progress toward delivering effectively in fragile and conflict affected situations

Tackling fragility will be one of the most pressing challenges of the 21st century. Recognising the need to reach populations at risk of being left behind, the international community has begun to adapt and scale-up targeted efforts. While effective development co-operation is fundamental in all contexts to achieve lasting development results, it is particularly crucial in fragile situations. Relevant data are urgently needed to inform these scaled up efforts and reinforce mutual accountability of all partners. Cutting-edge evidence will enable robust, timely policy decisions to ensure that development co-operation is effective, achieves maximum impact and yields lasting development results to realise the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030. To this end, under the auspices of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, an open working group will be convened to guide, in an inclusive and transparent manner, the development of a tailored approach to monitor the effectiveness of development co-operation in fragile and conflict-affected situations.

Objective
Within the framework of established effectiveness principles and against the backdrop of the existing Global Partnership monitoring framework, the objective of the open working group is to: 1) map key challenges for effective development co-operation in fragile and conflict-affected situations; 2) identify and recommend actions to address those challenges; and, 3) where current monitoring efforts do not suffice and data are needed to inform scaled efforts, guide the development of a monitoring approach to track progress on the identified actions for more effective development co-operation in fragile and conflict affected situations. The direction provided by the open working group will aim at resulting in a relevant, context-specific approach to monitoring effectiveness in fragile and conflict affected situations that is supported by key stakeholders, to be rolled out for the 2020 monitoring round of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation.

Deliverables
To achieve the stated objective, the open working group will:

- Provide inputs on existing lessons and experience on key issues and challenges for effective development co-operation in fragile and conflict-affected situations;
- Map key challenges to delivering effectively in fragile and conflict-affected situations, reflecting diverse perspectives;
- Provide recommendations, reflecting different options if necessary, on the actions needed to address these challenges, aligned to existing commitments made;
- Provide inputs on where these actions can be tracked through existing monitoring indicators by introducing any necessary adaptations, and if new measurement approaches are needed;

1 The data generated by the Partnership’s global monitoring framework informs UN-led follow-up and review of SDG targets 17.16 on multi-stakeholder partnerships, 17.15 on countries’ policy space and 5.c. on gender equality.
• Provide inputs on proposed revisions and new measurement approaches, where necessary, as proposed by the OECD-UNDP Joint Support Team, to track progress and facilitate mutual accountability and learning;
• Review the results of light country testing of adapted and new measurement approaches to ensure feasibility and relevance; and,
• Recommend a measurement approach, reflecting different options if necessary, that draws on feedback received from light country testing, to track progress on effective development co-operation in fragile and conflict affected situations.

Group composition and membership
The open working group will be comprised of experts on development co-operation in fragile and conflict affected situations that represent key stakeholders and communities of practice including representatives from the following:

• Fragility and crisis units within multilateral organisations
• OECD-DAC Member States that represent International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF)2
• g7+ group of fragile and conflict-affected states3
• Partner countries engaged with Global Partnership monitoring, and
• Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS)4

The open working group will remain accessible for interested stakeholders to contribute at key points as observers, which includes, in particular, all members of the Steering Committee of the Global Partnership. Co-Chairs of the Steering Committee of the Global Partnership will engage in the proceedings of the group. Open consultation on the recommendations developed by the working group will facilitate an inclusive and transparent process and help generate broad awareness and support.

Governance and working arrangements
The group will be led by two members of the Steering Committee of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation. Secretariat support for the group will be provided by the Joint OECD-UNDP Support Team of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation in liaison with Secretariats of other policy networks and bodies where relevant.

The group’s work shall be guided by the principles of openness, transparency, inclusiveness and consensus. The group will present initial recommendations to the Steering Committee of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation in the fall of 2018. Care will be taken to present recommendations in a way that transparently presents the considerations and positions of members of the open working group. Final approval of any monitoring methodology to feature in the monitoring framework of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation rests with its Steering Committee, which can adopt, amend or reject recommendations made by the open working group.

2 One of three member constituencies of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS)
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
Working modalities will be flexible and time-efficient. This will include convening virtual exchanges through teleconferencing and electronic platforms. In order to achieve the above-described deliverables, the group co-leads will establish the frequency of exchanges, as agreed with the group.

**Timeframe**

The open working group will be convened from June 2018 to July 2019. An indicative timeframe is shown in the table below.

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<tr>
<th>Table 1. Indicative timeline: adapting effectiveness monitoring to fragile and conflict-affected situations</th>
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<tr>
<td>Preliminary issues and actions identified</td>
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<tr>
<td>Roadmap and preliminary recommendations developed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preliminary measurement approach, light country testing and stakeholder consultation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finalisation of measurement approach building on feedback received</td>
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<td>Awareness raising</td>
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<td>New monitoring approach shared at the UN HLPF</td>
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</table>

**Resources**

Unless specified otherwise, members of the open working group will contribute based on their own resources and organisational/ institutional capacities. Secretariat support will be provided.
## Annex 3: Participants of the open working group

| Fragility and crisis units within multilateral organisations | **World Bank Group**: Mr Steen Andersen, Fragile, Conflict and Violence Group  
**United Nations**: Ms Laurel Patterson, Senior Policy Advisor, Crisis, Fragility and Resilience, UNDP |
|---|---|
| OECD-DAC Member States that represent International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF)¹ | **Australia**: Ms Emily Rainey, Fragility and Conflict Section, Governance, Fragility and Water Branch, Development Policy Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
**European Commission**: Mr Patrick Rabe, Directorate-General Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, Unit B2 Fragility and Resilience  
**Canada**: Mr Yallena Cica, Senior Policy Analyst, Planning and Deployments Division, Peace & Stabilization Operations Program (PSOPs) |
| g7+ group of fragile and conflict-affected states² | **Afghanistan**: Mr Habib Mayar, Deputy Secretary General, g7+, and GPEDC Steering Committee member  
**Central African Republic**: Mr Bienvenu Hervé Kovoungbo, Directeur de la Coopération Multilatérale Co président du Groupe de Travail International de mise en œuvre du New Deal Ministère de l’ Economie, du Plan et de la Coopération  
**Haiti**: Mr Marc Anglade, Cadre de Coordination de l’Aide Externe au Développement, Le Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe  
**Somalia**: Mustakim Waid, Senior Policy Advisor, Office of the Prime Minister, Federal Republic of Somalia |
| Partner countries engaged with Global Partnership monitoring | **Cameroon**: Mr Loïc Chemo, Ingénieur Statisticien Diplômé en Gestion de la Politique Economique Secrétaire du Comité Multi-Partenaires MINEPAT/SG/DSR  
**Solomon Islands**: (tbc) |
| Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS)³ | **Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS)**: Dr. Erin McCandless, Associate Professor, School of Governance, University of Witwatersrand, South Africa, and Research Director, Forging Resilient Social Contracts, and Civil Society Co-chair of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Implementation Working Group |
| Global Partnership Steering Committee Co-Chairs | **Germany**: Mr. Udo Weber, Deputy Head of Division, Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development, and Ms Lisa Royaee, Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development, Germany |

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¹ One of three member constituencies of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS)
² Ibid.
³ Ibid.
ANNEX 4

Monitoring effective development co-operation in fragile and conflict affected situations

Part 1 of 2: Mapping International Commitments and Key Challenges
8 October 2018
Abbreviations

BMZ  Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (Germany)
CSOs  Civil Society Organisations
CSPPS  Civil Society Platform for Peace-building and State-building
DAC  Development Assistance Committee
DFAT  Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia)
EU  European Union
GPEDC  Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation
IDA  International Development Association
IDPS  International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding
INCAF  International Network on Conflict and Fragility
ISE  Institute for State Effectiveness
ODA  Official Development Assistance
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PFM  Public Financial Management
PSGs  Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals
SDGs  Sustainable Development Goals
UCS  Use of Country Systems
UN  United Nations
WB  World Bank
WP-EFF  Working Party on Aid Effectiveness and Donor Practices
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Open Working Group Paper
Monitoring effective development co-operation in fragile and conflict affected situations

A. Introduction

This paper is to inform discussions of an open working group (‘working group’), which, under the auspices of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (the ‘Global Partnership’), has been convened to guide, in an inclusive and transparent manner, the development of a tailored approach to monitor the effectiveness of development co-operation in fragile and conflict affected situations (‘fragile contexts’). The direction provided by the working group will aim at resulting in a relevant, context-specific approach to monitoring effectiveness in fragile contexts that is supported by key stakeholders. The Steering Committee of the Global Partnership will consider the deliberations of the working group, with a view to roll out a tailored approach to monitoring effectiveness in fragile contexts in the 2020 monitoring round of the Global Partnership.

The paper will (i) map key international commitments for effective development co-operation, and (ii) identify the key issues and challenges to making progress against these commitments. The paper draws on three key sources: a body of international commitments on effective development co-operation and engagement in fragile contexts; inputs received from members of the working group (consisting of written contributions, a meeting of the working group held in Paris on 10 September 2018, and bilateral interviews); and, a panel discussion on delivering effectively in fragile contexts held during the Global Partnership event Reinvigorating Effectiveness for the 2030 Agenda on 12 September 2018. The paper is co-authored by the Institute for State Effectiveness and the OECD-UNDP Joint Support Team of the Global Partnership.

Purpose

Countries in fragile and conflict affected situations are home to some of the world’s most vulnerable populations and, as the joint-report of the UN-World Bank Pathways for Peace notes, they have only been increasing in number and complexity since 2011 (UN and World Bank, 2018b). It is projected that unless concerted action is taken, more than 80% of the world’s poorest could be living in fragile contexts by 2030 (OECD, 2018). The international community has begun to scale-up targeted efforts. IDA18 represents a ‘paradigm shift’ in this regard by doubling financial support (to $75 billion) for countries facing current or rising risks of fragility (World Bank, 2018a). In support of scaled efforts, and to maximise the impact of limited resources, ensuring that all development co-operation in these contexts is effective is critical. Getting monitoring right to track effectiveness is essential to provide a feedback loop to inform ongoing efforts, reinforce mutual accountability of all partners, and enable the right decisions at the right time.

This review is situated within broader efforts to ensure that the Global Partnership delivers relevant, cutting-edge data on effective development co-operation. Upon agreeing on its monitoring framework in 2012, the Global Partnership foresaw a comprehensive review to ensure relevance to the successor of the Millennium Development Goals. In 2016 at its High Level Meeting in Nairobi, the Global Partnership reaffirmed the relevance of existing effectiveness principles – on country ownership, focus on results, inclusive partnerships, and mutual accountability and transparency – but stressed the need to “update the existing monitoring framework to reflect the challenges of the 2030 Agenda, including the pledge to leave no one behind” (GPEDC, 2018). As a result, in 2017-18, the Global Partnership strengthened the quality and usefulness of the existing indicators based on lessons and feedback from past monitoring rounds (see Annex 1 for information on existing framework and indicators). In this second-stage of the

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1 Based on upcoming deliberations of the working group, the paper will be updated to include a second part that presents critical actions to address the challenges to delivering effectively in fragile contexts, and consider options for a more tailored approach to tracking progress toward effectiveness commitments in these contexts.
review, the focus is on adapting Global Partnership monitoring to the pressing challenges of the 2030 Agenda, starting with a focus on conflict and fragility as agreed by the GPEDC Steering Committee in April 2018 (GPEDC, 2018).

As a result, the Global Partnership is taking a closer look at its current monitoring approach with the view to ensure that it is adequately tailored to track progress in fragile contexts. To do this, the Global Partnership has brought together a community of relevant stakeholders through the working group to build on the current monitoring approach and advise on actionable, relevant monitoring approaches that meet the needs of practitioners and policy makers operating in fragile contexts. There is an extensive body of commitments, frameworks, tools, and organising entities that guide development co-operation in fragile contexts and progress towards SDG 16. Building on this expertise and practical experience, the working group will discuss options to guide the development of a tailored approach to monitor the effectiveness of development co-operation in fragile contexts. As with all Global Partnership monitoring, it will remain a voluntary, country-led and multi-stakeholder exercise. The end goal is to develop a light monitoring approach to reduce the burden on already stretched bureaucracies, provide more pertinent data and a clearer understanding of progress toward commitments on effective development co-operation in fragile contexts.

B. International Commitments on Effective Development Co-operation

To devise an appropriate monitoring approach for fragile contexts, the first step is to outline the key international commitments on effective development co-operation from the past 15 years. These commitments are well-documented (see, e.g., Abdel-Malek, 2015; OECD, 2018) and will not be restated at length here. They are summarised for the purposes of framing and distilling the key challenges in implementing these commitments, which will inform the working group’s consideration of critical actions, and options for monitoring progress in these contexts. Set out below (Table 1) is a summary chronology of key international commitments from 2003 to 2016, including specific commitments made with respect to fragile and conflict affected situations.
Table 1: Overview of international commitments, 2003-2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Instrument</th>
<th>Participation</th>
<th>Key Principles</th>
<th>Monitoring</th>
<th>Fragile context specificity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2003   | Rome Declaration on Harmonisation                         | 150 delegates, 28 partner countries, various UN agencies                     | ● Ownership  
● Alignment  
● Harmonisation                                                                 | No single, systematic framework                                                | -                                                                                |
| 2005   | Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness                    | 50 partner countries, 30 development agencies, various CSOs                 | Ownership, alignment and harmonisation, plus:  
● Focus on results  
● Mutual accountability                                | Binding targets and monitoring framework (5 principles, 12 indicators, baseline data); monitoring conducted in 2006, 2008, and 2011 | ● Effective governance  
● National development strategies  
● Broad participation  
● Avoid harm  
● Flexibility                                               |
| 2007   | Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations | OECD Development Assistance Committee                                        | 10 principles on engagement in fragile contexts with the aim of doing no harm | Voluntary country survey of the 10 principles; monitoring conducted in 2009 and 2011 | ● Context specificity  
● Avoid harm  
● Effective governance  
● Prevention  
● Non-discrimination                                         |
| 2008   | Accra Agenda for Action                                   | 1700 participants, 120 countries, 80 CSOs, dozens of development agencies    | Re-emphasising Paris commitments; emphasis on:  
● Country ownership  
● Effective & inclusive partnerships  
● Results  
● Aid predictability  
● Reducing conditionalities                             | Paris Declaration monitoring framework (above)                                | -                                                                                |
| 2011   | Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation   | 3,500 delegates, 160 countries, 50 CSOs                                      | Re-emphasising:  
● Focus on results  
● Country ownership  
● Transparency and mutual accountability  
Emphasis on:  
● Developing inclusive partnerships                         | GPEDC monitoring framework (10 indicators), structured around the 4 effectiveness principles (left) and building on Paris Declaration monitoring efforts; monitoring conducted in 2014, 2016 and ongoing in 2018 | ● Results frameworks tailored to country needs  
● Untying aid  
● Use of country systems  
● Transparency  
● Common data standards  
Reducing project proliferation & development partner fragmentation |
| 2010-2011 | Dili Declaration on Peace-building and State-building and New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States | IDPS members (g7+, INCAF, CSPPS)                                            | ● New aid architecture for fragile contexts specific commitments on:  
● 5 Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals  
● FOCUS principles  
● TRUST principles                                           | 34 indicators developed; monitoring conducted in 2014 through a New Deal country survey and an INCAF survey; review of the New Deal and its impact conducted in 2016 | Dili Declaration  
● Capacity development  
● Flexibility  
● Planning processes  
● Political dialogue  
New Deal – PSGs  
● Legitimate politics  
● Security  
● Justice  
● Economic foundations  
● Revenues and services                                       |
## Open Working Group Paper
### Monitoring effective development co-operation in fragile and conflict affected situations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Initiatives/Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2015 | SDGs (Goals 16 & 17 especially) | 193 countries, UN General Assembly, dozens of CSOs | - SDG 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions;  
- SDG 17: Partnerships for the Goals  
- SDG 16: 10 targets, 23 indicators  
- SDG 17: 19 targets, 25 indicators  
- Annual SDG follow-up and review  
- Of the 34 New Deal indicators, 21 are covered by SDG indicators |
| 2016 | Nairobi Outcome Document | Constituencies of the Global Partnership, 1,900 participants, 157 countries, hundreds of representatives from CSOs, private sector, parliamentarians, foundations, academia and others | - Reaffirmed principles (Busan 2011)  
- Mandated update to the existing monitoring framework to reflect the challenges of the 2030 Agenda, including the pledge to leave no one behind  
- Recognition of the New Deal  
- Fragile-to-fragile co-operation  
- Engagement between humanitarian and development partners |
| 2016 | Stockholm Declaration on Addressing Fragility and Peace-building in a Changing World | IDPS members (g7+, INCAF, CSPPS) | - Reaffirmed commitment to New Deal principles for achieving SDGs  
- New Deal framework (above)  
- Recognition of the New Deal  
- Fragile-to-fragile co-operation  
- Engagement between humanitarian and development partners |
| 2016 | World Humanitarian Summit | 9,000 representatives from government, civil society, the private sector and international organizations | - 5 core responsibilities  
- 24 proposed shifts/ changes in direction  
- Multiple initiatives including the New Way of Working, the Grand Bargain and others  
- Engagement between humanitarian and development partners  
- Common objectives |

*Source: Institute for State Effectiveness, ‘Re-examining the Terms of Aid’ project (ongoing)*
2003 Rome Declaration on Harmonisation – first set of concrete commitments

The Rome Declaration represented the first concrete set of international commitments on effectiveness. Broadly, commitments were made on:

- **Ownership**: providing support for country analytical work in ways that strengthen government leadership and ownership of development results;

- **Alignment**: delivering development assistance according to partner country priorities, bolstering country-led efforts to streamline development partner procedures and practices (including with respect to technical co-operation), aligning with country budget cycles and poverty reduction strategies, improving development partner efforts to work through delegated co-operation, and increasing the flexibility of staff to manage country programs and projects; and

- **Harmonisation**: tailoring policies and practice to facilitate greater aid harmonisation at country, regional and global levels, including reducing development partner missions, reviews, and reporting; streamlining conditionalities; and developing incentives to foster recognition of the broader benefits of harmonisation.

Rome commitment monitoring was undertaken by the OECD-DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness and Donor Practices (WP-EFF) chaired by the World Bank, however, there was no single, systematic monitoring framework. Rather, the monitoring report presented in Paris in 2005 drew from a range of sources, including, a country-level survey on harmonisation and alignment. The survey, which collected responses from 14 countries, reported on 12 measurement indicators selected by the WP-EFF. The results showed some progress on achieving better alignment with partner country development priorities, but also persisting implementation challenges, including: (i) the costs of implementation and inadequate resourcing, and (ii) lack of incentives to change policy and behaviour in both development partners and partner countries. The World Bank also pointed to challenges with the survey itself, including the reporting burden (the survey requested information on 118 items) and relevance of certain indicators.

2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness – binding targets and formal monitoring framework

Building on the lessons from Rome, the Paris Declaration introduced binding targets and a framework for monitoring progress against commitments. There was considerably more momentum behind the 2005 Paris forum, with double the number of participating partners and countries. The Paris Declaration also introduced two additional effectiveness principles:

- **Managing for development results**: delivering effectively with a view to focussing on results, with partner countries strengthening links between development strategies and budget processes and establishing monitoring frameworks, and with development partners improving linkages between country programs and results and aligning better with performance assessment frameworks.

- **Mutual accountability**: improving accountability between development partners and partner countries to their respective constituencies and each other with respect to the use of development resources, including by strengthening the role of parliaments and reinforcing participation of a broad range of development partners, and with development partners increasing transparency and timely publication of data on development co-operation.

Paris also marked the start of a specific focus on delivering effectively in fragile contexts, recognising the need to address unique factors and circumstances in fragile contexts and for greater adaptability in
“environments of weak ownership and capacity and to immediate needs for basic service delivery” (Paris Declaration, [37]). It identified five specific commitments for fragile contexts: (i) building effective governance structures and institutions; (ii) engaging with partners in developing national planning tools and development strategies; (iii) encouraging broad participation in priority-setting by a range of national actors; (iv) avoiding activities that undermine national institution building; and (v) using an appropriate and flexible mix of instruments, particularly for countries in promising but high-risk transitions.

The Paris monitoring framework comprised 12 indicators across five principles of ownership, alignment, harmonisation, results, and accountability, to measure progress against commitments. The first monitoring round in 2006 established baseline data for these indicators. The second round in 2008, which had 54 participating countries, showed mixed results. Key takeaways included the continuing need for political leadership and change in the underlying incentives for both development partners and partner countries, as well as greater involvement of stakeholders beyond government and development partner officials, and improvements in the monitoring and evaluation process (Abdel-Malek, 2015, 105).

**2008 Accra Agenda for Action – an attempt to accelerate progress**

In an attempt to accelerate progress against the Paris commitments, and building on the principles set out in the OECD’s 2007 Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (‘Good Engagement Principles’), the Accra Agenda re-emphasised priority areas of country ownership, building more effective and inclusive partnerships, and managing for development results. Greater attention was also given to improving predictability as well as reducing conditionalities. For fragile contexts, additional commitments were made on:

- **Fragility assessments**: conducting joint fragility and governance assessments, and engaging developing country authorities and other relevant stakeholders to the maximum extent possible;
- **Capacity development**: providing demand-driven, tailored and co-ordinated capacity-development support for core state functions and for early and sustained recovery;
- **Humanitarian & peacebuilding support**: working on flexible, rapid and long-term funding modalities, on a pooled basis where appropriate, to support humanitarian development phases and peacebuilding;
- **Addressing root causes**: working and agreeing on a set of realistic peace- and state-building objectives that address the root causes of conflict and fragility and help ensure the protection and participation of women; and
- **Monitoring**: monitoring implementation of the Good Engagement Principles and sharing results as part of progress reports on Paris implementation.

Accra marked a shift in thinking towards results. The third monitoring round carried out in 2011, based on the Paris monitoring architecture, again revealed mixed, though generally poor, results with only one indicator target (50% of technical co-operation implemented with co-ordinated programs consistent with national development strategies) being achieved. For fragile contexts, the 13-country survey in 2009 to assess progress on the Good Engagement Principles also revealed slow progress, with key challenges including the absence of a shared vision for change, conflict/fragility analyses, and trust between partner countries and development partners, as well as divergent stakeholder priorities.
2011 Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation – inclusive development strategy

The Busan Partnership marked a fundamental shift in focus and approach from ‘aid effectiveness’ to a broader conceptualisation of ‘effective development co-operation’. This semantic change reflects a conceptual shift beyond the traditional ‘donor-recipient’ relationship, recognising the importance of all development actors, including civil society, the private sector, parliamentarians and trade unions among others. While reiterating the core principles set out in the Paris/Accra framework, greater emphasis was placed on forming inclusive development partnerships that captured the new realities of the global architecture of development co-operation. One key outcome was the establishment of the Global Partnership, and its monitoring exercise to track progress on effectiveness commitments.

2010 Dili Declaration and 2011 New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States – a new architecture for fragile contexts

To address the growing concern around the unique challenges facing fragile contexts in meeting the Millennium Development Goals, the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS) at its first global meeting in 2010 endorsed the Dili Declaration, which identified four areas of focus for fragile contexts: capacity development, resource flexibility, planning processes, and political dialogue.

Building on Dili, and crafted in the margins of the Busan Partnership, the 2011 New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (the ‘New Deal’) set out a new architecture and ways for working in fragile contexts, better aligned to their conditions and priorities. Signatories committed to using:

- **Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs):** which prioritise legitimate politics, people’s security, justice, economic foundations, and revenues and fair services, as an important foundation to enable progress towards the MDGs to guide work in fragile contexts;

- **FOCUS:** a new country-led and owned approach to engaging in fragile contexts, comprising five features: fragility assessments, ‘one vision, one plan’ approach, compacts (mutual accountability frameworks), use of PSGs for monitoring, and support to political dialogue; and

- **TRUST:** a set of commitments to enhance transparency, share risk, use country systems, strengthen national capacities, and improve the timeliness and predictability of development co-operation to achieve better results.

In 2014, a monitoring report of the New Deal highlighted mixed progress against the PSG-FOCUS-TRUST commitments, with the poorest results in use of country systems, capacity strengthening, and use of PSGs for monitoring.

2015 Sustainable Development Goals 16 & 17

Together, Sustainable Development Goals 16 (peaceful and inclusive societies, access to justice, and effective, accountable and inclusive institutions) and 17 (means of implementation and revitalizing the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development) underscore the importance of both effective partnerships and the necessity of peace, prevention and resilience in the context of our shared long-term objectives to be achieved by 2030. As part of a wider conflict-prevention agenda, SDG 16 recognises that fragility impedes, and can indeed reverse, hard-won development gains. The first comprehensive audit of global progress against SDG 16’s 10 targets and 22 of its 23 indicators was published by the Institute of Economics and Peace in 2017. It highlights several critical challenges in monitoring progress against SDG 16, including: (i) data availability and statistical capacity (e.g. 8 of the 22 indicators have data for less than 50% of countries), (ii) political sensitivities in monitoring, (iii) methodological issues with indicators that
are multidimensional or globally oriented, and (iv) contextual constraints in fragile contexts (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2017).

The commitment in SDG 17 to “strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development” cuts across all the other SDGs, including SDG 16. It has 19 targets which span a range of related issues, including ODA, debt relief, trade access, and ‘operational’ dimensions such as capacity building and data monitoring/accountability. Global Partnership monitoring provides source data and measures progress against SDG targets 17.15 (country ownership and leadership in forming national development policies), SDG 17.16 (enhancing global, multi-stakeholder partnerships in achieving the SDGs) and SDG 5.c (sound policies and enforceable legislation for gender equality and women’s empowerment).

2016 Nairobi Outcome Document

The Nairobi Outcome Document built on the findings of the 2016 monitoring round of the Global Partnership, which was led by 81 low and middle-income countries and included the participation of 125 countries, 74 development organisations and hundreds of civil society organisations, private sector representatives, trade unions, foundations, parliamentarians and local governments. The 2016 monitoring results found that fragile contexts: (i) are particularly affected by low annual predictability; (ii) show, in general, comparatively lower levels of scheduled development co-operation funding on annual budgets; and (iii), had no proportionate increase in use of countries’ public financial management and procurement systems while improvements had been made in several fragile contexts.

Reflecting on this, the Nairobi Outcome Document sought to strengthen previous commitments, including the New Deal, by reconfirming the importance of upholding effective development co-operation principles in fragile contexts. The Nairobi Outcome Document committed to: “a) support the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States as a set of guiding principles for co-ordinated action among development partners providing and receiving support, civil society and the business sector; and b) address the challenges in improving the effectiveness and results of development co-operation, in particular ODA, for countries in fragile situations.” Commitments were also made to promote peer learning among fragile contexts, enhance co-ordination between development, peacebuilding, security and humanitarian efforts, and “reaffirm in particular the 2030 Agenda’s pledge to leave no-one behind as a philosophy that imbues our work and recognise that development co-operation must leave no one behind to be effective.” As a result, the Nairobi Outcome Document set out a renewed mandate of the Global Partnership, which among other things, stressed the need to update the existing monitoring framework to reflect the challenges of the 2030 Agenda, including the pledge to leave no one behind.

2016 World Humanitarian Summit and the Stockholm Declaration

The World Humanitarian Summit was a watershed moment in strengthening coherence between humanitarian and development efforts. An unprecedented number of stakeholders came together in Istanbul with an Agenda for Humanity that set out five core responsibilities and 24 proposed shifts/changes in direction (UN, 2016). Numerous commitments and initiatives were launched as a result of the Summit, including the New Way of Working. The New Way of Working aims to transcend the humanitarian-development divide by working to collective outcomes, which is “a commonly agreed quantifiable and measurable result or impact in reducing people’s needs, risks and vulnerabilities and increasing their resilience, requiring the combined effort of different actors” (OCHA, 2017).
Also 2016 – and in light of the SDGs – IDPS members made a renewed commitment in the Stockholm Declaration on Addressing Fragility and Building Peace in a Changing World, to implement the 2030 Agenda in line with the principles and commitments set out in the New Deal and considering the specific contexts of fragile contexts.
C. Key Challenges to Effective Development Co-operation in Fragile and Conflict Affected Situations

The challenges to effective development co-operation are well-known and have been the subject of targeted international attention since the Rome Declaration. Also well-documented is the reality that the manifestation and impact of these challenges in fragile and conflict affected situations (‘fragile contexts’) is more complex and/or pronounced, making implementation of commitments considerably less straightforward. In order to adapt Global Partnership monitoring to capture progress against effectiveness commitments in fragile contexts, it is important first to agree on what the challenges are to delivering effectively in fragile contexts and how they play out in these contexts. This allows stakeholders to find consensus on the critical actions to address the challenges and bottlenecks, and to develop a monitoring approach that both adequately captures progress being made towards key effectiveness commitments and in fragile contexts.

Based on inputs from working group members at their first meeting in September 2018 and during separate interviews, four major challenges were identified as preventing realisation of commitments in fragile contexts: (i) lack of trust, (ii) fragmentation (iii) weak humanitarian, development and peace coherence, and (iv) lack of country ownership/ weak capacity.

These challenges are not exhaustive, nor necessarily unique to fragile contexts but perhaps more pronounced. They were raised consistently during the working group’s first meeting, in bilateral exchanges, and during the Global Partnership’s panel discussion on delivering effectively in fragile contexts. The identified challenges and the symptoms are interlinked: a lack of trust can lead to a lack of country ownership, which in turn can fragment development activities and actors in country. While each challenge is listed independently, there are overlapping issues. A short description of each of the challenges follows, along with a brief list of symptoms and/or key contributing factors that were raised by the working group and highlighted in other inputs.

Lack of trust

Lack of trust was a recurring theme raised by the working group as preventing actors from upholding effectiveness principles in fragile contexts, including ownership of development priorities by developing countries, inclusive development partnerships, focus on results, and transparency and mutual accountability. This trust deficit can manifest in many ways. A lack of trust can exist between development partners and partner countries. It can result from tensions within government between competing factions, sectors and/or interests, and it can also surface between partner country governments, their citizens, civil society organisations and the private sector. However, trust is foundational to building strong relationships and effective partnerships. The working group identified key causes for this lack of trust throughout the entire sequence of the development relationship in contexts of fragility:

- **Failure to deliver.** Real and perceived failures by parties to deliver on commitments reinforces a trust deficit. Both development partners and partner countries can fail to uphold commitments, including those enshrined in international declarations and requiring behavioural or organisational change, which for example can entail predictability of funding and programming.

- **Concerns regarding legitimacy and representation.** In cases of severe political and/or security fragility, where institutions have been eroded over time, concerns regarding government legitimacy and representation can fuel a lack of trust. The working group noted how in certain fragile contexts, concerns about government legitimacy and inclusion of citizenry in formulating
national visions and development strategies can contribute to a lack of trust. Where such concerns arise, this can lead to fragmentation and a lack of ownership as partners tend to follow their own development strategies in country, undermining existing co-ordination mechanisms and limiting the extent to which country systems are used.

- **Concerns on assessment processes and results.** Sensitivities and tensions surrounding fragility and other assessment mechanisms weaken trust from the very beginning of partnerships. Post-conflict, -crisis, and -election assessments, including fragility assessments, help new governments determine national and development priorities. They also provide a common framework for partners to agree on areas of focus, shaping co-ordination, co-operation, and resource allocation outcomes. By their nature, these assessment mechanisms raise fears of criticism among all participating actors, including development partners. As noted above, particularly in contexts where the peace or political settlement may be contested, there are often compounding concerns about inclusivity and transparency in the process and results. This trust gap endangers the legitimacy and utility of these assessments, which lay the foundation for the relationship between development partners and governments, and between states and their citizens.

- **Lack of broad consultation.** Lack of trust can build from the way in which national visions and development strategies are developed and implemented. Inclusive partnerships that draw on the voices of citizens, civil society, the private sector and other national actors are essential to achieving long-lasting development results. In addition, while competing interests can exist in any government this can be more pronounced in fragile contexts. The term ‘country-led’ assumes one voice for government whereas there can be competing views and priorities across ministries and sectors. For instance, in Cameroon, co-ordinating a national strategic document was difficult, given each ministry, overseeing a different sectoral issue, needed to have a sense of ownership of their contribution. If the final national strategic document does not adequately reflect each Ministry’s perspective, the national strategy will ultimately lack country ownership. Furthermore, this consultation on development plans sometimes only occurs at the highest levels of government leadership, meaning there is little input or ownership at the lower levels of the bureaucracy/administration. There was also a sense among working group members that development activities could better integrate subnational levels of government to prevent capture by capital cities.

- **Lack of available information.** A trust deficit in sharing information and data compromises commitments to transparency and mutual accountability. Making transparent information publicly available – and accessible – is central to effective development co-operation. However, this can be politically sensitive and a lack of trust can prevent actors from fulfilling these commitments. Information and data on development co-operation is often reported at global level due to the way in which co-operation is channelled. Partner countries that participate in Global Partnership monitoring, however, overwhelmingly cite difficulties in accessing (e.g. language barriers) and understanding (e.g. limited capacity) data reported through these initiatives. Moreover, it is often considered a low priority in contexts with so many priorities, as in fragile contexts, so data collection and co-ordination remains under-resourced. While lack of publically available, and accessible, information at country level reinforces a trust deficit between development partners and partner countries, it also inhibits the ability of civil society to hold governments accountable thus adding to a lack of trust between governments and their citizens.
Fragmentation

A multiplicity of projects, sometimes with very low project budgets, leads to project and resource fragmentation. Spreading resources thinly across a number of projects reduces cost and time efficiencies in addition to other negative implications mentioned below. The working group identified fragmentation as a critical and long-acknowledged challenge to delivering effectively in fragile contexts, and made the following observations on the persistence of fragmentation in contexts of fragility:

- **Weak institutional capacity.** Fragmentation in fragile contexts is multi-dimensional, affecting all actors and all levels of co-operation, and is compounded by weak capacity. Members of the working group noted that weak administrative and national procurement systems and insufficient investment in strengthening these core capacities results in limited institutional capacity to engage with and fulfil the requirements of technical and financial partners. This frustrates the ability of all parties to track resources and results, and impacts recipient governments’ abilities to effectively co-ordinate development partners.

- **Lack of alignment to and use of country systems.** Lack of alignment to national priorities and development strategies increases fragmentation of projects and resources. Not operating through or in alignment with country systems results in fragmentation of country-led development in several ways, including by; (i) limiting the utility and effectiveness of co-ordination mechanisms; (ii) disempowering country governments from overseeing activities and funds spent in country, (iii) reducing the likelihood that programs align with country strategies and ministerial activities, (iv) restricting their ability to track progress against national visions and plans; (v) creating parallel programs and/or implementation units that are sometimes duplicative and contribute to domestic ‘brain drain’, and (vi) leaving systems that are considered ‘too risky or problematic’ without any of the support to improve. One example of how to tackle this comes from the Federal Government of Somalia, which is currently addressing this challenge through efforts to align development assistance with national priorities. The Government is undergoing a mapping initiative aimed at supporting national planning through tracking future development co-operation flows by projects and programs rather than by development partners.

- **Competing priorities and interests.** While competition can create efficiencies, pervasive competition of partners’ priorities and interests can fuel resource fragmentation in fragile contexts and increase costs. There is often a strong domestic imperative for development partners to invest in certain sectors, such as health and education, and less on others, including public financial management or bureaucratic processes, which then remain chronically underfunded. As noted by the working group’s representative from Haiti, the lack of alignment in partner priorities can result in sectoral and/or regional development partner crowding. This crowding results in overlap between projects of varying scales, making it more difficult to track the impacts of development resources and increasing the transaction costs of co-ordination and harmonisation (already high to begin with). A recent study by Bigsten and Tengstam (2016) estimates that development partners could save up to US$1,840 million in transaction costs by reducing fragmentation (Bigsten and Tengstam, 2016, 79).

- **Attribution.** The desire to demonstrate short-term results, and put a label on who delivered those results, exacerbates fragmentation. The working group noted that in some cases, the multiplicity of actors makes it difficult for development partners to track their ‘attribution’ and demonstrate the impact of their development assistance. This results in fragmentation of development activities.
as it causes development partners to ‘badge’ activities and fund national actors (NGOs, contractors, suppliers etc.) through earmarked contributions.

- **Risk diversification.** Managing risk can be another cause of fragmentation in fragile contexts. Due to risk – real or perceived – development partners can seek to manage and mitigate risk through a dispersion of activities and programmes, which contributes to overall fragmentation.

- **Exclusion of actors.** Lack of inclusion and poor information sharing exacerbates fragmentation. The working group noted that fragmentation can also stem from information gaps between actors, including from the exclusion of civil society from negotiations and decision-making processes. These information asymmetries drive a wedge between parties that should be striving to work in co-ordination with one another. This is especially acute given overlap of multiple development, humanitarian and private actors in fragile contexts. Information sharing systems are an important tool for reducing the degree and effects of fragmentation, but are too infrequently used.

**Weak humanitarian, development and peace coherence**

As is increasingly being raised by global reports and forums, including in the joint UN-World Bank *Pathways for Peace* report, the disconnect between humanitarian assistance and longer-term development co-operation poses a significant threat to delivering effectively in fragile and conflict affected situations. Recognising the need to also address incoherent, and occasionally contradictory, humanitarian, development and peace efforts, the twin UN resolutions on sustaining peace and the subsequent reports of the UN Secretary General call for stronger operational and policy coherence (UN, 2018). The working group highlighted this also in the context of natural disasters, given that they can dramatically increase fragility, and brought up Haiti’s annual hurricane season and Somalia’s recent droughts. The working group deliberated on some of the symptoms and contributing factors to weak co-ordination and linkage of humanitarian, development, and peace efforts. Their observations included the following:

- **Lack of complementarity.** Fragile contexts require greater coherence and complementarity across humanitarian, development and peace efforts. Building on comparative advantages, greater complementarity means working better together while respecting the roles and responsibilities of each actor. The representative from Somalia noted the impact of recent droughts in prompting policy practitioners to think urgently about more innovative ways to strengthen these linkages. Working group members noted the importance of co-ordinating between actors, including partner governments, at all stages of assistance, beginning with the earliest stages of conducting assessments. The European Commission referenced post disaster needs assessments and recovery and peacebuilding assessments as focal means for co-ordinating actors with multiple and often divergent priorities, and highlighted the Central African Republic and Nepal as examples. However, challenges in timing (i.e. knowing when to conduct a ‘post-conflict assessment’) and mandate (that humanitarian actors may not be obligated to the same principles) were also acknowledged. In fragile contexts in particular – which again, are increasing globally – development, humanitarian, and peacebuilding agendas and actors are deeply enmeshed, making co-ordination tools that work ‘on the ground’ increasingly important to facilitate better, and more co-ordinated, outcomes.

- **Differing goals, incentives and principles.** It is often the case that fundamental incentives and drivers of humanitarian and development assistance do not neatly align. Humanitarian actors have different objectives and institutions that are designed to respond quickly in times of crisis and help
meet immediate needs on the ground. Humanitarian actors are not bound by the principles of development co-operation. However, greater coherence between the two actors is needed. Humanitarian emergencies are increasingly complex, sustained, and linked to broader development challenges, meaning there is greater need for closer alignment on joint analysis, programming and planning, leadership and co-ordination, and financing (OCHA, 2017). The challenge here is understanding the multiplicity of needs and priorities in situations of fragility and co-ordinating to make sure that the two are not working in opposition. Working group members pressed that Global Partnership monitoring should track progress on this issue.

- **Lack of shared information.** Joint information systems can be critical mechanisms for building linkages between security, humanitarian, and development actors in fragile contexts. The working group representative from Cameroon noted the benefits of strengthening joint information systems to establish better linkages between humanitarian activities and longer-term development programming. Establishing efficient, information sharing mechanisms can facilitate dialogue between actors that results in greater alignment in decision making and monitoring. Attempts to achieve this are being made in Cameroon with the adoption in 2017 of a multi-year humanitarian response plan covering 2017-20, which aligns with the UN Development Assistance Framework spanning 2018-20.

**Weak country ownership**

Country ownership is one of the guiding principles of effective development co-operation. During the working group meeting, development partners expressed concern that country ownership is often taken to refer to ‘government’ ownership, which can raise concerns about legitimacy and inclusivity. Working group members, however, stressed that country ownership does not – and need not – refer only to government. Rather, as recipient government representatives articulated, it should mean owned and endorsed by the people of the country, articulated through national institutions – government, but also by civil society, the private sector and in other forms of public deliberative democracy exchanges. As referenced in the 2030 Agenda, governments have primary responsibility for implementation, follow-up and review, of the SDGs yet this needs to be carried out with the participation of all stakeholders and all people. This highlights an important point: that supporting country ownership and building national capacity refers to both partner country governments, and to civil society organisations.

Country ownership is often linked to use of country systems. A common fallacy is that use of country systems equates exclusively to budget support; meaning that funds are dispersed to central government and managed through government systems. While this is one dimension of using country systems to build capacity it is only one, as highlighted by the CABRI (Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative) framework on use of country systems (2008). For example, ‘on plan’ support constitutes consultation with government for planning and co-ordination; alignment with national priorities; and, engagement with government during implementation. Another dimension is ‘on report’, referring to reporting on development co-operation through government structures. Other dimensions include ‘on audit’, ‘on procurement’ and ‘on parliament’ among others. While different dimensions of use of country systems might be more applicable in certain contexts, all are critical to building national capacity, supporting statebuilding, reducing fragmentation, and delivering development investments with long-term benefit.

Allocating resources to ensuring country ownership is especially difficult in countries (fragile contexts in particular) with many competing needs and already stretched resources to deliver immediate services. It is made even more challenging when local actors are so frequently asked by development partners to use
new tools and frameworks. There is often insufficient capacity to even stay atop all of them, let alone adopt or monitor all. Working group members underscored some of the contributing factors that weaken country ownership, which notably incorporate similar themes as the underlying causes of lack of trust and fragmentation:

- **Administrative capacity constraints.** Weak and limited capacity of governments in fragile contexts are often cited as a contributing factor to lack of country ownership. Decades of violence, which many fragile contexts are emerging from, can unsurprisingly degrade or destroy administrative faculties, national systems processes, resulting in deterioration of core government functions (UN-World Bank, 2017b). The brain drain that occurs with such conflict exacerbates this, and is compounded by the establishment of parallel institutions comprising highly paid international actors.

- **Weak national data systems.** Specifically when data and statistical capacities are constrained, it is difficult for countries to lead development efforts. The international community has a strong focus on results, yet there remains a severe lack of statistical capacity in fragile contexts. Many governments do not publish comprehensive data regularly, whereas development partners seek quick and tangible results to demonstrate delivery on their mandates. National statistical systems suffer from a lack of financial and human resources, and limited technical skills and security issues make data difficult to gather. Data gaps have led development partners to rely on external data, which disempowers governments when partners go elsewhere for their information. The working group acknowledged that development partners are also not sharing enough data, and though they report to their own ministers and public, they often are not fully transparent with country governments.

- **Data and information legitimacy.** While concerns around data legitimacy can lead to a lack of trust, it can also compromise country ownership. The working group discussed the biases of data, and how with insufficient localised information, there is often disproportionate data available from some regions or some sectors, leading to skewed attention. Coherent, centralised data management systems – if designed and incentivised to function in these contexts – can help ensure more equitable representation in data, which can help support (or reveal gaps in) legitimate planning, especially in contested political contexts where national and subnational entities are debating priorities and rights. Issues around reliable data collection means there is often a much greater focus on input monitoring and weakness in outcome monitoring. This is a challenge in many countries but is often more pronounced in fragile contexts.

- **Lack of inclusive planning and implementation.** The shrinking space for civil society is also a contributing factor for lack of country ownership. This was raised as a worrying trend and prompted discussion about how to better protect constructive roles of civil society in development. The impacts of development partner-funded, or -driven, organisations were raised in creating an environment of mistrust by appearing to cater to development partner needs over those of the community to ensure their projects will be approved and financed. However, all sides also discussed that there is much room for development co-operation to more effectively utilise civil society organisations to ensure equitable and sustainable development that is people-centred, rights-based, and grounded in international norms and standards. One frequently raised example was the 2014-2016 Ebola crisis when grassroots organizations were indispensable in spreading valuable information to local communities in Sierra Leone and neighbouring countries. On the other hand, a lack of information and exclusion from key co-ordination meetings hampers civil
society’s contribution to national development efforts. Overall, stakeholders acknowledged that the formation of Civil Society Platform for Peace-building and State-building (CSPPS) and the New Deal in particular have helped improve collaboration, but that more resources, capacity-building, and opportunities to engage are needed to help protect and expand the space for civil society.

- **Risk aversion.** Use of country systems is a key mechanism for bolstering country ownership. Risk aversion and concerns around fund mismanagement, however, can lead development partners to limit, or refrain from, the use of country systems – particularly where there is a general lack of trust among partners. Members of the working group highlighted that partners on all sides are often sceptical of others’ prioritisation in relation to national visions and strategies. This reduces development partners’ will to channel support through systems aligned with that prioritisation. Second, there are concerns about the risk of mismanagement of development resources by recipient government ministries, which after years of conflict or other manifestations of fragility may suffer degraded capacity, weakened institutions, brain drain, and a political economy of corruption. In managing these ‘fiduciary risks’ (perceived or otherwise), development partners often work around country systems and impose multiple conditions on development co-operation. However, circumventing country systems can create destabilising political economies and opportunities for corruption outside the state apparatus, and importantly, inhibit the needed institutional capacity building in core state functions (e.g. procurement, budgeting, and auditing).
References

**GPEDC references**


**External references**


ANNEX 5

Monitoring effective development co-operation in fragile and conflict-affected situations

Part 2 of 2: Emerging critical actions to guide the development of a tailored monitoring approach for fragile and conflict affected situations

19 November 2018
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<tr>
<td>BMZ</td>
<td>Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (Germany)</td>
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A. Introduction

This paper builds on the discussions of the open working group (‘working group’), convened to help guide the development of a tailored approach to monitor the effectiveness of development co-operation in fragile and conflict-affected situations (‘fragile contexts’). The working group was convened under the auspices of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (‘Global Partnership’).

**Where current monitoring efforts do not suffice and more relevant data are needed to inform more effective development co-operation in fragile contexts, the inputs provided by the working group are intended to guide adaptation of the current Global Partnership monitoring approach** in order to:

1. provide more relevant and useful data on effective development co-operation in fragile and conflict-affected situations;
2. provide a timely feedback loop to stakeholders on where progress is being made; and
3. spur dialogue and action where the bottlenecks lie to implementing existing international commitments on delivering effectively in fragile contexts.

**Final approval of any monitoring methodology to feature in the GPEDC monitoring framework rests with the Global Partnership Steering Committee.** This tailored approach is planned to be shared with the international community at the Global Partnership’s Senior Level Meeting in July 2019, with a view to roll it out in the Global Partnership’s 2020 monitoring round.

Part 1 of this paper was distributed to the working group on 8 October 2018. It mapped key international commitments for effective development co-operation and summarised key issues and challenges to making progress against these commitments that were discussed by the working group. **This second part of this paper builds on Part 1 and will discuss critical action areas identified by the working group** that can address key challenges to delivering on the existing international commitments set out in Part 1.

In doing so, **this paper sets out a menu of possible options that could be drawn on to develop a tailored monitoring approach** for fragile and conflict affected situations. These critical actions do not represent the scope of what would be monitored, but rather provide a basis for consultation with engaged stakeholders, further discussion and feedback from the working group, and a point of reference for the Steering Committee for strategic guidance, in order to assess which areas and actions could be prioritised and subsequently developed into a tailored monitoring approach.

This paper draws on three key sources: a body of international commitments on effective development co-operation and engagement in fragile contexts; inputs received from working group members (consisting of written contributions, meetings held in Paris on 10 September and virtually on 16 October 2018, and bilateral interviews); and a panel discussion on delivering effectively in fragile contexts held during the Global Partnership event *Reinvigorating Effectiveness for the 2030 Agenda* on 12 September 2018.

The critical action areas set out in this paper will be further developed, informed and narrowed down to a smaller set of actions that could be monitored, by: (a) light country testing during the 2018 Global Partnership monitoring round, which will include stakeholder interviews with a selection of countries that have both participated in the Global Partnership monitoring exercise in the past and identify as being in a fragile and/or conflict affected situation, (b) consultation with engaged stakeholders through targeted online discussions and international fora, (c) feedback from open working group members, and (d) strategic direction from the Global Partnership Steering Committee. This Paper and its other half (Part 1)
are co-authored by the OECD-UNDP Joint Support Team of the Global Partnership and the Institute for State Effectiveness.

B. Critical action areas to improving effective development co-operation in fragile contexts

Global Partnership monitoring provides evidence on country-level progress in implementing internationally-agreed effective development co-operation principles, namely: country ownership, a focus on results, inclusive partnerships and transparency and mutual accountability to one another. Feedback from stakeholders in both the 2016 and the current 2018 monitoring rounds indicate that Global Partnership monitoring does not adequately reflect the challenges and constraints faced in fragile contexts. It is in recognition of this, and the renewed mandate of the Global Partnership\(^1\), that this process to develop a tailored monitoring approach was initiated.

In order to deliver more relevant and useful data through a monitoring approach that is tailored to fragile contexts, the right issues and actions need to be tracked. To drill down on what the critical actions are, the working group first looked at the challenges and bottlenecks to implementing international commitments on effective development co-operation in fragile contexts. This methodology, to start with the challenges and then look at the critical actions before developing a tailored monitoring approach, ensures that the tailored approach, once developed, will accurately capture and address ‘what’ needs to be monitored in addition to ‘how’ the monitoring is carried out in these contexts.

In meetings of the working group on 10 September and 16 October 2018, and via bilateral consultations with working group members, working group stakeholders discussed critical actions required to address the four challenges to effective development co-operation in fragile contexts that were identified in Part 1 of this paper. These challenges are: lack of trust, fragmentation, weak humanitarian-development coherence, and weak country ownership. The critical actions discussed to address these challenges have been grouped into six themes: (i) inclusive processes to strengthen government legitimacy (ii) setting and aligning with national priorities, (iii) mutual accountability, (iv) use of country systems, (v) strengthening national capacity, and (vi) humanitarian, development and peace coherence. It should be noted that interlinkages exist between these six broad themes. As such, while the action areas are listed by theme there are linkages and overlaps where certain actions speak to several themes.

The purpose of setting out these critical action areas below, as defined by experts and practitioners who operate in fragile and conflict-affected settings, is to present a menu of possible options that could be drawn on to develop a tailored monitoring approach for fragile and conflict affected situations to monitor progress toward effective development co-operation and generate more relevant evidence to inform ongoing efforts, reinforce mutual accountability of all partners, and enable the right decisions at the right time.

The actions discussed below do not represent the scope of what will be monitored, but rather provide a basis for further discussion and consultation.

\(^1\) The Second High Level Meeting of the Global Partnership (Nairobi 2016) reaffirmed the relevance of existing effectiveness principles, but stressed the need to “update the existing monitoring framework to reflect the challenges of the 2030 Agenda, including the pledge to leave no-one behind”.
1. Inclusive processes to strengthen government legitimacy

Critical actions to improve government legitimacy will help tackle challenges around citizen-state and government-partner trust, in turn allowing for stronger country ownership and reduced fragmentation. ‘Legitimate politics’ as termed in the New Deal\(^2\), calls for fostering inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution. Governments, through effective, inclusive and transparent institutions and processes, can strengthen trust with the public and develop whole of society ownership for national development priorities. This source of legitimacy with society is a building block for country ownership, and builds trust with development partners. Strengthening government legitimacy is also a preventative mechanism against deterioration into fragility, particularly with regard to reinforcing social cohesion. The working group identified the following action areas where development co-operation can support government legitimacy.

   a) **Foster legitimate politics through regular political dialogue.** Development co-operation is inevitably political. This can be more pronounced in fragile contexts that are transitioning out of conflict. While challenging among other priorities, government and development partner representatives require ample space to regularly engage honestly on the risks, challenges, and opportunities related to development co-operation partnerships and activities. Working group representatives from both government and development partners noted that unease at openly discussing risks, results and challenges was an obstacle to trust. However, this kind of frank discussion has heightened value in fragile contexts where conditions borne by decades of conflict and instability have produced additional capacity constraints and challenges that must be brought to the fore.

   b) **Ensure inclusive national processes.** For example, inclusive national processes for setting national priorities and processes related to mutual accountability frameworks. Country-led development does not only mean government-led. Instead, it requires providing all stakeholders, specifically sub-national government, parliament and civil society, with the opportunity to actively engage in the planning, implementation and monitoring progress toward national development priorities.

      i. **Inclusive consultation with community, civil society, and other subnational groups** is essential. Several working group members stated that it is important to recognize that country ownership needs to be interpreted as a process that is broader than the sitting government. As such, inclusive consultation is key to legitimate country ownership. This is particularly pressing in fragile situations, where there can be subnational tensions or opposition movements, or where development partners may have reservations about being perceived to take political stances. There is also a need to ensure continuity in the development efforts and investments across successive governments, particularly given that in fragile situations, electoral cycles can be shortened artificially and longer-term continuity is critical to programming, monitoring and achieving development results. Working group members stated that bodies such as Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS) have already done a great deal to help secure civil society engagement, but more is needed to ensure it is not tokenistic, but rather deeply participatory – and productive – involvement. This can include capacity building resources for civil society, preventing partners from pitting government and civil society against one another for funding, and finding productive ways to work together.

\(^2\) 2011 New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States
ii. **All regions/provinces and sectors need to be engaged.** Particularly in fragile contexts where peace agreements may be quite delicate, it is especially important to minimize risks of national priorities being captured solely by central government, the ‘capital’, or particular departments/ministries. After the 2004 tsunami, development partners carefully navigated the tensions between separatist Aceh and the central Indonesia government authority in Jakarta. By establishing an agreement between the province and central government, the parties managed a successful political settlement and were able to build a strong development strategy as a result. That balance was one of the crucial elements to the success of the development and reconstruction programming and its monitoring.

c) **Reduce redundancy and overlap of actors to reinforce government leadership and legitimacy.** One effect of fragmentation that the working group highlighted is the overcrowding and duplication by actors in some sectors or regions. This often occurs because many development partners have domestic political imperatives they are responding to. However, it creates operational confusion and service gaps in overlooked areas. It also reduces the space for government to effectively intervene and lead, and be recognized by its citizens as a source of development. All these results can undermine the government’s legitimacy on the ground, despite determined efforts to help establish coherence around national priorities across a country. Reducing the number of actors in one space reduces the number of parallel systems and eases the effort to streamline or redirect assistance so that partners are working to their comparative advantage. Efforts have been made to address this, including coordination through multi-donor trust funds, compacts, and donor conferences, but this remains an ongoing problem that working group members highlight as requiring attention.

2. **Setting and aligning with national priorities**

The working group emphasized the need to respect and use national priorities as the basis to address the continuing challenges of effective development co-operation in fragile contexts. Legitimate processes for setting national priorities, strengthened alignment with these priorities by all stakeholders, and greater use of unified country results frameworks are key to tracking and promoting effective development practice. They help to build government legitimacy, improve trust between government and citizenry as well as development partners, and reduce the extent and consequences of fragmented development efforts. This applies across country contexts and is even more imperative in fragile contexts. Indeed, among the 33 countries in fragile situations that participated in the exit survey for the 2016 Global Partnership monitoring round, measuring alignment with national priorities through country results frameworks and other planning tools was identified as the highest priority indicator. The following critical actions were identified by the working group in the area of setting and coordinating around national priorities.

a) **Use existing and agreed upon tools and frameworks** designed for fragile contexts to inform the planning and priority-setting process. These tools, including the New Deal’s FOCUS framework, fragility and post-conflict needs assessments, compacts, and aid coordination

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frameworks, have been specifically developed to appreciate and address the challenges and conditions in fragile contexts. In fragile contexts, with multiple competing needs and constrained capacities, partners should avoid the tendency to run separate and disparate capacity/needs assessments and priority-setting mechanisms, which may more easily align with their own domestic processes rather than national priorities. Preventing such duplication of frameworks is crucial to ensure more coherent diagnosis, consensus, and understanding of the priorities, and strengthen country leadership of oversight. Existing frameworks, that build on joint assessments where possible, help to enable prioritization and implementation processes while also helping to identify and prevent the regeneration of conflict drivers. They also help address some of the risks that are more prevalent in contested or institutionally weak environments.

b) **Allow for flexibility and adaptation in the planning and accountability tools** when applied at the country level. The existing development co-operation frameworks and tools have broad consensus and have been developed with significant expertise and experience. However, flexibility to tailor these planning tools to their specific priorities and constraints, both initially and over time as conditions change, is essential. Creating space for adaptation can help facilitate productive dialogue between partners. This has been the experience in Somalia, where the Federal Government and its partners have used globally-endorsed tools to inform and guide rather than prescribe policies and practices. For example, the Mutual Accountability Partnership Framework in Somalia has been adapted to place appropriate emphasis on intergovernmental dialogue and shared accountability between federal and regional government. This flexibility to the context also allows for important continued policy learning. The new set of development indicators for Somalia’s next National Development Plan incorporate lessons learned from the first Mutual Accountability Partnership Framework and National Development Plan, which are being fed back into the country’s planning and monitoring processes.

c) **Ensure alignment with national priorities.** To reduce fragmentation and strengthen country ownership, alignment of development co-operation to national priorities is imperative. The extent to which development partners guide their development efforts in line with country-defined priorities and development results is also a critical aspect of maintaining a focus on results, which is key to achieving long lasting development gains. This alignment is critical at both the strategic and programmatic level. One way that partner countries can facilitate better alignment is by developing umbrella national programs that are structured around ‘umbrella’ priorities and led by appropriate government ministries to ensure that development co-operation activities are consistent with country priorities and objectives. Examples of these priority-coordinating programs include Somalia’s nine national development pillars and Afghanistan’s national priority programs under the Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework.5

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4 These tools can be found at the g7+ website: [http://g7plus.org/resources/](http://g7plus.org/resources/).
d) **Develop mechanisms to acknowledge attribution of development results** that are tied to national priorities. Attribution of development results is critical for governments in building trust and accountability with the public. It is also vital for development partners to convince domestic constituents and political actors to invest in fragile situations. Attribution helps to ensure value for money and readjust when programming approaches are not working. However, common practice, i.e. discrete activities with isolated funding and results frameworks, typically creates a difficult tension with the need to work collectively, use country systems, and reduce duplication. The working group suggested looking to the monitoring and evaluation community for solutions.

3. **Mutual accountability**

Improving dialogue and mutual accountability at country level were recognized by the working group as vital for building trust, reducing fragmentation, and addressing the humanitarian-development coordination gap. In the Global Partnership’s 2016 monitoring round, increasing transparency and mutual accountability was identified as a high priority by countries in fragile situations. Drawing from the working group meetings and bilateral consultations, the following actions were raised.

a) **Establish a mutual accountability framework** to enable both government and development partners to hold one another to account on commitments in a more accessible and transparent manner. This can help communicate and assure legitimacy of both government and partner practices. In Somalia, a mutual accountability scorecard is used to measure progress on commitments by both sides. This helps to instill confidence and encourages frank and relevant dialogue in response. Mutual accountability should not only be assessed between central government and donor partners, but also be applied to subnational governments. The working group raised the importance of engaging subnational governments in national priority setting and dialogue for legitimate outcomes in contexts of political contestation – and so too is it important to engage them in mutual accountability exercises.

b) **Send appropriate counterparts** to engage with the government on development co-operation implementation and review. Many donors send inappropriate level staff to coordination mechanisms, either too junior to action decisions or too senior to attend regularly and engage meaningfully. Without the right counterpart, government is more likely to be sidestepped, which can lead to fragmentation, reduced country ownership, and parallel systems. A shift in participation may be one action for partners to signal and support the counter-government’s legitimacy and authority, and prevent duplication, saving time and funds in many contexts.

c) **Share and consolidate existing data and information** between governments and development partners. Shared digital platforms where government and partners can upload and access data are meant to amplify available information and in turn, results. However, there remains a wealth of information that partners hold but is not being shared. These shared data platforms are often not regularly updated or maintained. Instead, there continue to be duplicative systems of data collection and storage, and repetitive conversations. This lack of sharing and transparency was a challenge consistently raised in the 2016 monitoring round – and by the working group. There are new and determined attempts to change this, however, and bring together disparate sources of data. As raised in Part I of this paper, Australia, for example, is attempting to consolidate data and bridge gaps in the Pacific region by taking stock
of data that has already been gathered through multiple channels and mechanisms, including by CSOs, in relation to SDG16 indicators through the Institute for Economics and Peace (together with UNDP and Pacific Community), and using this data to build baseline metrics where there might otherwise be none. More efforts such as this one to bring coherence to the kinds of monitoring and data collection development partners do in fragile and non-fragile countries can also help prevent duplication.

4. Use of country systems

A primary component of effective development co-operation commitments – and enshrined in indicator 9b of the Global Partnership Monitoring Framework – is the increased use of country systems to help strengthen internal capacities and reinforce country ownership. However, as was identified in Part I of this paper, a lack of trust, weak institutional checks, and concerns about fiduciary risks and public perception make this one of the most difficult commitments for development partners to fulfil. Working around country systems, however, is a driver of fragmentation, insufficient country ownership, and exacerbates trust gaps between governments and donors. For these well-acknowledged reasons, the working group identified use of country systems as a crucial area to improve practices in order to deliver on effective development promises. Discussions in the working group highlighted that, whilst the ambition to use and strengthen country systems is shared amongst partners, the existing approaches to measuring use of country systems is not conducive to incentivise or track progress. As such, several actions were identified by the working group to better track progress on use of country systems.

a) **Acknowledge and measure incremental use of country systems** to track progress toward more comprehensive use of country systems. Conflict, corruption, legitimacy, and/or weak institutional capacities can lead development partners to not use country systems. However, there are a great deal of examples of partial use of country systems. Part 1 of this paper describes that “[t]he complexities of trust and risk in fragile contexts often calls for innovative and tailored ways of using country systems, including, for example finding ways to strengthen government and national institutions without wholly putting money on budget or on treasury”. DFAT, for example, mobilizes in-line advisers in key positions within government ministries, notably in the Pacific, in order to “use government PFM systems while managing its concerns about fiduciary risk.” Another illustration of partial use of country systems, is maintaining government’s oversight and planning role even if development partners must work with third parties as implementers (such as NGOs or managing contractors). Rather than employing a stringent definition of use of country system, this kind of programming could be better identified, acknowledged, and measured as a form of use of country systems, helping to strengthen institutional capacity and incrementally deepen the scope. Working group members also raised the idea of taking a broader approach to ‘country systems’ to include non-governmental institutions where risk analysis demonstrates that it may not be possible to use government systems.

b) **Recognize that baselines will vary across contexts.** Baselines for institutional capacity and delivery metrics used for decision-making on use of country systems may be lower in fragile countries, but they are not uniform. Indeed, the 2017 g7+ *Policy Note on the Use of Country Systems in Development Assistance* noted that the necessary target established by the Busan Partnership agreement to reduce “the proportion of aid not using country systems by one-third” was a score of 3.5 on the World Bank CPIA Indicator 13 on quality of budgetary and financial
management. Only two of the g7+ countries – Afghanistan and Sierra Leone – were able to reach that, despite there being marked progress in countries with very low initial scores. In response, the Global Partnership has since revised its indicator that measures the quality of country systems from the World Bank CPIA to the World Bank’s Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) standards, which provides consistent and comparable baselines to track progress but does not rely on a predefined benchmark to measure progress (i.e. progress is measured irrespective of the starting point).

c) **Evaluate the risk of alternative delivery mechanisms.** The status quo has been to consider the risks of working through country systems almost in isolation, which is a short sighted and fallible equation, especially in fragile and conflict-affected contexts where any delivery mechanism comes with risks. The reality of country engagements is that the alternative to working through country systems is rarely ‘not giving money’. In fragile environments, where development partners’ and donor governments’ on the ground presence is often constrained, the alternative is frequently working through third- or fourth-party implementers. This layering decreases value for money and makes oversight even more removed, increasing fiduciary risk. Several bodies have been doing work to highlight the contradictions and need to balance fiduciary and development risks including the Somalia Working Group on Use of Country Systems and ISE, with the publication *Who Cares about Development Risk.*

5. **Strengthening national capacity**

Effective support for state and institutional capacity building, particularly in management capacities such as procurement and administration, is central to reducing fragmentation and unlocking country ownership over planning and implementation processes. In the group discussions and bilateral consultations, the following action areas to better build capacity in fragile contexts were raised.

a) **Assess which country capacities are the most important to build legitimacy and country ownership and strengthen national capacities in these areas.** The UN-WB Pathways for Peace report notes that one of the central ways for governments to build legitimacy with society - particularly in fragile contexts - is to develop and use country capacities for service delivery as this is how citizens primarily encounter and shape their perception of the government. Skilled and educated people are often the first to leave in a conflict situation given opportunities and networks abroad, depleting human capital for programming that starts in post-conflict transition phases. This makes it even more crucial for development partners to support capacity building and help stop the ‘brain drain’ in pursuit of retaining national capacities and strengthening country ownership. The working group noted that while lack of capacity, in both government and civil society, is often more prevalent in fragile contexts than in other countries, current monitoring (including Global Partnership monitoring) does not address this, and therefore does not serve to incentivize such assistance.

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b) **Consider adequate support for building key central administrative functions.** Strong central administrative mechanisms and functions, including around procurement, coordination, and investment management, are necessary to enable government oversight and leadership of programming, and to prevent parallel government functions. Development partners often face pressure to demonstrate that funding is dispersed and provides quantifiable outcomes quickly. Therefore, development partners’ support often focuses on service delivery. This renders significantly less support available to help boost capacity for administrative functions, and working group discussions surfaced the need to strike a strategic balance between strengthening national capacities to address citizens’ more immediate needs and building strong administrative mechanisms for solid public sector performance in the longer term. A stable and coherent administration also provides legitimacy and capacity for government to engage with partners and the development process in the long-term, but that requires targeted support.

c) **Strengthen statistical and data collection capacities.** Investment in strengthening internal government statistical capacity supports legitimacy and the ability to lead development coordination processes. Legible, accurate data on which development partners can base programming decisions is critical for countries to receive development assistance, demonstrate preparedness for use of country systems, and engage in dialogue. In sum, it is crucial for national oversight and delivery of the development agenda. As one working group member noted, however, in many fragile countries there is very limited capacity to collect, collate, and synthesize data.

d) **Provide capacity building assistance for civil society** as well. Concern about closing space for civil society was raised as a key challenge of holistic country ownership for effective development co-operation. Working group members, including civil society representatives, remarked that support for capacity building of non-governmental actors is necessary to protect civil society engagement and ensure they have a substantive – rather than tokenistic – seat at the table. This is needed to help facilitate fruitful inputs and relationships with development partners, the public, and government in contexts where civil society can play a decisive role in citizen outreach and service delivery.

e) **Investments in capacity building need to have long-term horizons and clear exit strategies.** Pressures around short-term risks, including publicity, and reputational risks, as well as domestic pressure for immediate results, mean technical assistance terms of reference to build partner capacity still too frequently feature short-term indicators or outputs. Such ad hoc programming does not provide meaningful time to transfer skills and knowledge. At the same time, these same short-term roles then are renewed repeatedly to fill continued knowledge gaps, without a firm strategy to measure when capacity has been established and how advisors or consultants will leave. The short-term risks and costs need to be better viewed in relation to the longer-term risks of poorly delivered or patchy capacity building.

6. **Humanitarian-development-peace coherence**

There is increasing attention among stakeholders in fragile contexts to the imperative for better coordination and complementarity across humanitarian, peace, and development actors as these three processes increasingly overlap. As a result, there are a number of norm-setting initiatives currently underway to try to establish new rules of the game in these contexts, including by the OECD-DAC, United
Nations and the World Bank. Discussion on the agreed actions to be taken under these initiatives is ongoing. Once agreed upon within their own political process and context, these actions could provide a suitable basis for developing a monitoring approach that would generate relevant data for tracking progress toward better humanitarian, development, peace coherence.

In the interim of agreed international actions around which to develop any monitoring approach, the working group highlighted co-ordination as a starting point, which many of the initiatives to work better across the three actors build on. Working group members noted that joint co-ordination needs to start in the initial phases of diagnosis, with carefully designed consultations. In Part 1 of this Paper, “[t]he EU referenced post disaster needs assessments and recovery and peacebuilding assessments as focal means for co-ordinating actors with multiple and often divergent priorities and highlighted the Central African Republic and Nepal as examples.” Furthermore, co-ordination can be challenging even where national capacity is strong. Reference was made by one working group member to the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia where, despite robust capacity, the government had difficulty meeting the burden of coordinating and responding to multiple assessments and actors across the humanitarian and development spheres. This makes prioritizing and sequencing recovery, reconstruction, and development very difficult. In response, the urgency to begin sharing information and planning processes early was again raised by working group members in considering critical actions to address persistent challenges on the ground. Shared operational frameworks may help address stretched capacity and bring together diverging priorities between the different communities on timing and mandate noted in Part 1.
C. Adapting the process for monitoring to account for fragile contexts

In addition to addressing ‘what’ needs to be captured in a tailored monitoring approach for fragile and conflict affected situations to deliver more relevant and useful data (i.e. prospective indicators), working group members expressed the need to address ‘how’ the monitoring is conducted (i.e. the process). A clear message from the working group was that in order to better fit the conditions and dynamics of fragile contexts, an updated monitoring approach must be leaner than the current approach and remain balanced in tracking the responsibilities of different actors, as an alternative option that countries in fragile situations can choose to opt for in place of the full Global Partnership monitoring process. The constrained resources and multiple, often competing, priorities in fragile contexts mean that feasibility and selectivity to capture priorities in any monitoring approach need to be carefully considered.

Data collection constraints were emphasised in working group discussions. A leaner module should aim to reduce overlap with other required reporting so that country stakeholders do not have to repackage data already provided elsewhere. It should also build on existing data and frameworks wherever possible. In refining the monitoring process for fragile contexts, it will be important to balance the need for fast turnaround due to quickly changing dynamics on the ground that require swift feedback on what is working and what is not, together with the need to build on and strengthen existing national processes, which can often be lengthy. Questions were also raised in the working group around how a tailored monitoring process could cater to data generation and collection in contexts where the government’s capacity to lead the monitoring process is weak or non-existent.

Working group stakeholders raised the need for greater focus on monitoring planning processes as well as leveraging the results through dialogue and engagement. Ultimately, the working group highlighted that the adapted framework should not only better capture progress the key challenges in fragile contexts, but should also help accelerate progress by sparking dialogue on results, key bottlenecks and joint action. Ensuring that the monitoring process is feasible, light and is an exercise in itself that supports effective development co-operation, is a critical aspect of developing a tailored monitoring approach for fragile contexts. The monitoring process, and how it can be adapted to fragile contexts, will be addressed as further consultation on the critical action areas provided above takes place.

D. Next Steps

The Global Partnership Steering Committee will meet in New York on 30 November. At this meeting, strategic direction from the Steering Committee will be important to guide next steps in the development of a tailored monitoring approach for fragile and conflict affected situations.

It is proposed that this work continue to build on the emerging themes listed above to further develop a tailored monitoring approach. To do so, consultation on the critical action areas is planned to take place in the coming months, including consultation with governments in fragile contexts, development partners, and civil society representatives that are engaged in the 2018 monitoring round. The open working group will review the feedback received during the consultations to shape the contours of developing an adapted monitoring approach around emerging priority action areas.

Following consultation with these key stakeholders, the emerging action areas would be further refined from which the open working group will recommend a measurement approach to monitoring effective development co-operation in fragile and conflict affected situations. This draft proposal would then be presented for approval to the Steering Committee in the spring of 2019.
Following endorsement from the Steering Committee, the newly developed tailored approach could be presented at the Global Partnership Senior Level Meeting in 2019, with the view to roll out this tailored approach in the 2020 monitoring round for those that choose to take it up in place of the full monitoring exercise.
References

**GPEDC and OECD Materials**

GPEDC (2016) “Exit Survey Results” (Excel file).


**Other materials**


