

Global Partnership Monitoring Reform

Background document for Session III: “Key elements for a new monitoring proposal for the GPEDC HLM 2022”

22nd Steering Committee Meeting, 15-16 December 2021

This document is shared with Steering Committee members as background for discussion on the monitoring reform. It includes:

- 1) A distillation of the core changes proposed to the monitoring process;
- 2) An overview of the implications for resources and stakeholder engagement, to make the new monitoring exercise a success;
- 3) A summary of key considerations related to the proposal for a revised monitoring framework; and
- 4) The roadmap for the final phase of the reform, with a focus on key milestones in the lead-up to HLM3 and in anticipation of a resumption of monitoring in 2023.

Contacts:

Ms. Ashley PALMER, e-mail: Ashley.PALMER@oecd.org

Ms. Rebekah CHEW, e-mail: Rebekah.CHEW@undp.org

At its 21st meeting in July 2021, Steering Committee members endorsed the contours of a new monitoring framework and requested that the reform of the monitoring exercise be accelerated.¹ To this end, a [draft monitoring proposal](#) was released by the Co-Chairs on 25 October. The draft proposal was based on: guidance in the past three Steering Committee meetings; extensive stakeholder consultations and inputs throughout 2020 and 2021 with all constituencies; analytical papers produced in the first half of 2021 on (1) occurrence of the monitoring process and (2) SDG linkages; as well as past feedback and observed challenges faced by partner country governments and other stakeholders during previous monitoring rounds.² The draft proposal was the basis for an [open virtual consultation](#) that ran for three weeks, until 12 November, and tested the proposed changes to the process and framework by inviting feedback from all stakeholders.

This document outlines the key directions and areas for Steering Committee guidance that emerged from the online consultation: on the monitoring process (Part I), implications for resources and engagement (Part II), the monitoring framework (Part III), and next steps toward the 2022 High-Level Meeting and resumption of monitoring in 2023 (Part IV). Part V complements the framing on the monitoring process in Part I, by providing important information on the specifics of what is proposed for a shift to an “open waves approach”.

Part I. An Improved Monitoring Process: Guidance required on key proposed changes

What are the main problems that the monitoring reform set out to address and what is the direction of guidance that the Co-Chairs and Steering Committee have provided to date?

By embarking on a transition period to re-think the monitoring exercise to ensure it meets its original aims, the [2020-2022 GPEDC Work Programme](#) recognised that the way the monitoring exercise was previously carried out is no longer an option. The main problems of the monitoring process were set out in that Work Programme and [19th Steering Committee meeting documentation](#). This includes the insufficient use of monitoring results for dialogue, action, and ultimately for behaviour change. Another problem has been the lack of institutionalisation of the process in partner countries. But perhaps the most fundamental problem is striking an optimal balance between two sometimes-at-odds elements: (1) driving accountability for commitments at the global level based on the performance of stakeholder groups, particularly of development partners, and (2) incentivising and facilitating the participation of partner country governments, for a *voluntary and complex exercise*, which they not only must lead as a technical process but for which they must also generate political commitment and ownership within their own government and amongst stakeholders in their country.

Each of these problems leads back to questions around the quality of the monitoring process. For example, while a record 86 partner countries participated in the last monitoring round, about half did not complete data collection on most of the indicators.³ The right incentives and support for partner country government participation need to be present, without which the monitoring exercise (and global accountability) ceases to exist, at least in its current country-led form. Given these challenges and the need to re-balance the exercise towards the country level, the Steering Committee over the past year and a half has reconfirmed the importance of strengthening the quality of the exercise. This includes strengthening country capacity, improving the use of results, and allowing for a more flexible exercise that can be increasingly embedded into national processes. This guidance resonates with the feedback and inputs received over the past year and a half, and is the basis upon which the proposed main changes to the monitoring process were conceived.

¹ [21st Steering Committee Meeting - summary](#)

² Since the beginning of the monitoring reform, there have been extensive stakeholder consultations. A virtual survey in 2020 about the trade-offs related to making changes to the monitoring exercise resulted in 137 responses including 62 from partner countries (summary [here](#)). Later in 2020, there was a series of 9 consultations on the monitoring process (75 participants; summary [here](#)). The first half of 2021 saw a series of 19 consultations (169 participants; summary [here](#)). The recent [virtual consultation on the Knowledge Platform](#) attracted 40 responses from stakeholders to the draft proposal. All of these consultations were inclusive of stakeholder and constituency groups.

³ See more details in Part V.

What are the main changes proposed to the monitoring process?

All changes proposed to the process are detailed in the draft monitoring proposal but there are **essentially two core [proposed] changes that require Steering Committee guidance, at this juncture, in order to move forward with the next steps of the reform (see Part IV):**

- 1) *A shift in the occurrence of the exercise, to an **open waves approach**.* Occurrence refers to a package of changes to the frequency, timing, and duration of the exercise (see summary explanation in footnote⁴ and details in Part V). This proposed change responds to the need to increase the institutionalisation of the exercise in partner countries by providing more flexibility.
- 2) *The inclusion of a follow-up phase, with **country-level Action Dialogues** an integral part of the monitoring process.* This is proposed as the primary change to the monitoring process to address the importance of facilitating the use of results at country level, through a process of reflection, dialogue, learning and action on the monitoring results in a given country.

Members are encouraged to carefully read Part V of this document: *Understanding the open waves approach*. It outlines what the open waves approach⁵ is and explains how the approach will allow for comparability of results between countries, global aggregation and visibility of the exercise, availability and frequency of development partner results, and SDG reporting, among others. Given that these proposed changes respond to Steering Committee guidance and stakeholder feedback, as could be expected, the majority of feedback from the recent virtual consultation⁶ expressed support for the open waves approach and the inclusion of Action Dialogues as an integral part of the monitoring process.

What are the main risks/concerns related to taking a decision on these changes to the monitoring process?

- Will the open waves approach result in a long period without data/evidence to drive global accountability or provide an overall trend on development partners' progress during the monitoring round? As detailed in Part V, country briefs for each partner country and a summary of wave results will be released after each monitoring wave, and global aggregates (including performance for development partners) will be available at the end of a monitoring round. This means that global aggregated results would be available every 3-4 years (depending on the HLM frequency), while previously global results have been made available every 2.6 years (no country results were available at intermediate points during past monitoring rounds). With this approach, global aggregated results will be available somewhat less frequently than in the past. However, to mitigate the effect this may have on global visibility of the exercise, the rolling availability of interim results (after each wave) can be used to advantage through the production of interim reporting briefs which will help keep attention to the exercise on a regular basis.
- Will partner countries be incentivised to participate going forward? Based on experiences observed in the past and inputs to the various consultations undertaken until now (see footnote 2), an informed decision can be taken on the shift to open waves. The open waves approach has been designed with the specific intention of providing the flexibility requested by partner countries, in turn providing the basis for institutionalisation with national processes. This is outlined in detail in Part V. An additional measure to incentivise participation could be to utilise HLM3 to garner an explicit commitment by stakeholders to participate in the monitoring exercise regularly – for example, in the

⁴ *Frequency:* In the past, monitoring rounds took place roughly every 2.5 years. In the future, they would happen every 3 or 4 years (to be decided based on the HLM schedule). *Timing:* In the past, all partner countries had to undertake the monitoring following the same timeline and had no flexibility in terms of when to do it. In the future, they would be able to choose their preferred wave within a round. *Duration:* In the past, partner countries had 6-7 months from the official launch of the monitoring round until final data submission. In the future, this would be extended to 12 months.

⁵ The term "open waves" originates from analysis on the [occurrence of the monitoring process](#), undertaken prior to the 21st Steering Committee meeting. That analysis weighed benefits and trade-offs of several options for occurrence of the exercise. With the *open waves* (as opposed to waves organised rigidly by regions or country context), countries have flexibility to enrol in the waves they choose. At the same time, the open waves model also allows for the possibility of regional or context-specific groupings within a wave without undercutting the intended flexibility with a rigid approach that assigns countries to a wave. More detailed explanation can be found in Part V.

⁶ All feedback is available in its original form on the [consultation page](#) and a summary is being prepared by the JST.

case of partner countries, it could be a commitment to conduct the monitoring before the next HLM (i.e. participate in at least one monitoring wave in the upcoming monitoring round).

- Will participation be similar to the numbers seen in the past? The draft proposal responds to the ambitions of the reform agreed by the Steering Committee as well as to the expectations of stakeholders expressed over multiple consultations. These ambitions and expectations emphasise that the monitoring exercise should be a truly multi-stakeholder exercise that leads to behaviour change at country and global levels, through improved *quality* of participation (leading in turn to increased comprehensiveness of data), including meaningful follow up on results. While a record 86 countries participated in the last monitoring round, there were significant gaps in the quality of participation. A change to an open waves approach guarantees neither an increase nor a decrease in the number of participating countries. However, the changes to the process, such as the increased flexibility built in to the waves approach, respond strongly to what partner countries have reported as a key barrier to their participation in the past. Nonetheless, ensuring high numbers of partner country participation is dependent on many factors beyond issues related to how the process is designed, including in relation to political mobilisation that Steering Committee members also must play a critical role in.
- What are the implications for delaying a decision on the monitoring process? In essence: the monitoring exercise may not be ready to be re-launched following HLM3; momentum from past monitoring rounds will be further jeopardised; stakeholders and partner countries may be unwilling to continue to engage in deliberating on details of the reform beyond HLM3; and perhaps most significant is that it could be detrimental to SDG reporting.⁷ As set out in Part IV, the work to finalise the framework and the political mobilisation needed to ensure a successful resumption of monitoring in 2023 can meaningfully move forward only once there is clarity on how the exercise will take place in practice. Furthermore, stakeholders have emphasised repeatedly how important it is to have adequate time to prepare and mobilise for the exercise. This means that mobilisation during 2022 is needed for stakeholders to get ready for a re-launch of the monitoring exercise following HLM3.

Question for Discussion

- *Do you agree that the key elements of the Co-Chairs' proposal on the monitoring process, namely a shift to an open waves approach and the inclusion of Action Dialogues as part of the process, should be the basis on which to move forward? If you do not agree, what alternative do you propose?*

Part II. Factors for Success: What are the resource and stakeholder engagement implications, and can they be met?

The draft monitoring proposal made clear that its ambition – derived from ambitious stakeholder expectations for an improved monitoring exercise – needs to be matched with increased resources and enhanced engagement efforts. That is, **a monitoring exercise that advances country and global/stakeholder-specific accountability, better leverages the monitoring results, utilises an increased multi-stakeholder approach, maintains SDG reporting requirements, and continues to build on the breadth of participating countries and actors, will require increased resources and capacity in order to be successful.** Yet the anticipated future resource needs are *not only* to underwrite *new ideas* or *enhancements*. There were resource gaps in the past as well. For the 2018 round, the available resources were insufficient to, for example, meet partner countries' support requirements, organise the regional

⁷ If the monitoring exercise is not re-launched following HLM3, there will be a period of possibly five years or longer without reporting SDG data, which may raise concern on the frequency of data for the three SDG indicators that the GPEDC monitoring exercise generates.

orientation workshops that were conducted and appreciated in the 2016 round, or to provide comprehensive country profiles.

Background documents for recent Steering Committee meetings relayed outcomes of the extensive consultations during the reform thus far. They included analysis of the constraints and specific ideas for how to overcome them. In particular, members are encouraged to recall the [21st Steering Committee meeting document](#), which discussed at length the bottlenecks for a successful monitoring process, making repeated reference to resource implications of various ideas for improving the quality of participation and increasing stakeholder ownership of the exercise.

The reform is moving now to its final phase, and **towards decision-making on concrete elements of the future exercise. It is critical that the Steering Committee considers, at this juncture, how the need for additional resources and upscaled engagement can be met.** This issue is raised for discussion now because the guidance that has been given by the Steering Committee thus far, as well as the expectations and needs expressed by stakeholders, points to a monitoring process with upscaled needs for resources and stakeholder engagement including through mobilisation by Steering Committee members. This is the reality of a revised monitoring process with a more robust inception phase; an institutionalised approach to following up on results; a more pronounced multi-stakeholder approach; and an answer to the request from partner country governments for support to lead a comprehensive and high-quality process at country level.

It is also relevant to note that a shift to a more country-focused monitoring exercise is consistent with the recommendations emerging from the [GPEDC Review](#), which encourage reflection on how GPEDC can strategically contribute to the 2030 Agenda with a focus on engagement at the country level. A monitoring exercise which is more focused on the country level provides an important path to meeting this aim, but for it to be a success, the aspiration and vision for such will need to be accompanied by a strategy for how it can be done in practice.

The draft monitoring proposal has been developed to re-balance the exercise towards the country level, without sacrificing its function of driving global and stakeholder-specific accountability. It is **therefore, in relation to enabling quality country-level participation, dialogue, and action, where the greatest resources and engagement are anticipated**, such as for:

- *Supporting and/or engaging in the monitoring process in a meaningful way at the country level.* Consultations have underscored that more investment in the inception and preparatory phase of the exercise is critical. Political-level engagement from the government will set the stage for strong ownership throughout the process, and increase the chances that results will be acted on. Communication between headquarters and country offices of development partners is also important, as is engagement between global constituency-specific networks and in-country focal points.
- *The continued need to provide support and capacity building to [some] partner country governments to participate in the exercise.* This has consistently been voiced by partner countries during the reform and during past rounds. Some countries emphasise that the quality of their participation has been constrained in the past by an unmet need for support. The proposal suggests that an in-country development partner champion could support the government with stakeholder co-ordination, logistical and organisational support; one or more non-executive champions could also help ease the co-ordination burden. Capacity building of country-level non-government actors to effectively engage in the exercise also requires resources.
- *A dedicated effort and investment in Action Dialogues.* The Action Dialogues anticipate a commitment by partner country governments to convene a multi-stakeholder Action Dialogue as part of the exercise; for this, some may require technical, logistical and financial support. Other constituency groups would need to organise their participation as well.

Making the monitoring a success will require more focus and resources on supporting country-level stakeholders and processes. But what needs to happen at **global level**, and within stakeholder groups, is also very important. It is well recognised that more focus on the country level should not come at the cost of global momentum and visibility. All constituencies have a role to play in this regard - to draw attention to the results of the exercise and to find opportunities to embed follow up into existing processes and dialogues.

The proposed changes to the process also have implications for the technical support provided by the JST. With a waves approach, supporting countries at different stages of the process (e.g. guidance during the inception and data collection phases as well as indicator calculations, aggregates and reports after each wave) will require support on a continuous basis, including additional statistical capacity. The proposal also provisions for new and/or enhanced products to be developed by the JST. These include development partner profiles (not produced in the past), country results briefs which provide more comprehensive information than the [past] country profiles (to be produced more frequently; after each wave), and guidance materials for Action Dialogues. If the JST is expected to substantially support countries in their Action Dialogue, this will also have significant implications on the scale of resources required.

Question for Discussion

- *What ideas do you have for mobilising resources and key stakeholders, and exploring partnerships to ensure that the new monitoring exercise is a success? What contribution could your constituency make?*

Part III. A Revised Monitoring Framework: Direction needed for work to move forward

The draft monitoring proposal provides significant detail on the proposed changes to the monitoring framework. It includes an overall structure for how the data points and evidence collected would be organised and communicated in a simplified and novel way: under four focus areas (Figure A).

Figure A: Overall Structure of Revised Monitoring Framework

Focus Area	COLLECTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY AND A WHOLE-OF-SOCIETY APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT	QUALITY AND USE OF COUNTRY SYSTEMS	TRANSPARENCY OF DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION	LEAVING NO ONE BEHIND (LNOB)
Busan Principle/s	Mutual accountability and inclusive partnerships	Focus on results and country ownership	Transparency	Cross cutting - all principles
What is measured	<i>Stakeholders promote a whole-of-society approach to development and are accountable to each other</i>	<i>Partner countries improve the quality of their systems and DPs make use of them</i>	<i>Partner countries have information management systems to report on development co-operation; DPs report to those systems and to global systems and standards</i>	<i>Partner countries and DPs have policies, strategies and data to meet the LNOB commitment</i>

The focus areas are linked closely with the four principles of effective development co-operation, and build on the “contours” of the revised framework that the Steering Committee endorsed at its 21st meeting, which in turn were formulated based on extensive stakeholder consultations in 2020 and 2021. The proposal includes a detailed indication of data points and the aggregate results they will produce, which can also be found in Annex I of this document⁸, as well as a suggested approach to adapt the monitoring to Fragile and Conflict Affected Situations⁹. Furthermore, [Annex I of the draft monitoring proposal](#) explains in greater detail the suggested technical changes to existing measurements as well as the new elements proposed to be introduced in the framework. This includes, but is not limited to: an approach to measure Leaving No One Behind (LNOB); initial work to develop an approach for monitoring implementation of the Kampala Principles (accompanied by a [dedicated technical working paper](#)); proposed adjustments to indicators measuring

⁸ The table presented in Annex I is the same as was included in the proposal released for the virtual consultation with stakeholders (Table 4 in the proposal). The table is re-produced here for easy reference, but no adjustments have yet been made to address comments received from stakeholders.

⁹ See box 1 of the draft monitoring proposal.

commitments made before 2011 (in Busan); and a suggested approach to better reflect how bilateral partners fund and support the multilateral system. The draft monitoring proposal also explains how the indicative data points were derived from the contours endorsed at the 21st Steering Committee meeting.

The virtual consultation confirmed strong overall support from stakeholders for the four focus areas. Stakeholders provided in-depth feedback on aspects of the framework, for which the full original contributions are available on the virtual [consultation page](#). Summarising in broad strokes the overall nature of feedback received, there was general appreciation that the revised framework retains most indicators and that it is more responsive to different country contexts – in particular fragile contexts. Stakeholders also appreciated the move from mutual accountability to collective accountability. They valued that indicator 2 is retained and that new stakeholders may be added to the reporting. There were also overall positive reactions to the explicit focus on private sector engagement in development co-operation through a Kampala Principles assessment.

There was also broad agreement that measuring LNOB is relevant. Some saw the inclusion of LNOB as an entry point to engage more stakeholders and raise the political profile of the monitoring exercise. Recognising that the development of an approach to measure the effectiveness of South-South co-operation is ongoing¹⁰, some partner country governments raised the importance of their dual role and emphasised that this be adequately reflected in the framework.

On the use of country systems, some stakeholders would like to see the inclusion of other systems beyond public financial management, and more information about support provided towards enhancing national systems, data and statistics. Some partner country governments found that the assessment of "quality" of national systems is too ambiguous and would like to see the criteria more clearly defined. Overall, stakeholders appreciated that their feedback will need to be worked-through following this Steering Committee meeting. Some of the feedback received (e.g. the inclusion of systems beyond those of the government to reflect use of country systems) may require strategic reflection led by the Co-Chairs, as **the scope of the reform is to collect evidence and track progress on existing commitments. Stakeholder feedback which points to a re-negotiation of commitments** would need to be taken up through a political process outside of the reform, with any new or revised commitments subsequently being integrated into the monitoring exercise.

Against this backdrop, two broad elements are highlighted here for Steering Committee guidance.

Firstly, Steering Committee guidance is sought on the overall structure of the draft framework and its four focus areas (Figure A), so that further work can move forward on this basis (Part IV of this document describes in more detail the next phase of the reform including the potential points of involvement for Steering Committee members).

Secondly, Steering Committee guidance is sought regarding whether, and how, the framework should be made leaner. The recent virtual consultation raised to stakeholders' attention that **the [draft] revised framework does not currently provision for a significantly leaner framework that reduces the reporting burden or scope.**¹¹ There are essentially two reasons for this. First, many stakeholders have voiced strong expectations for continued data collection on current indicators. Second, during the reform, stakeholders have, if anything, expressed interest in *expanding* the scope of reporting by making many suggestions of data points to *add*. In the recent virtual consultation, stakeholders were explicitly asked to suggest core measurement areas (meaning existing indicators) to drop if they wished to see a leaner framework. No proposals were forthcoming. As such, members should be aware that, **as things currently stand, unless the Steering Committee takes up this issue deliberately, work will move forward to finalise a framework that is not expected to be leaner.** To facilitate Steering Committee guidance, the table in Annex II illustrates the former indicator framework, and the key changes proposed to it.

¹⁰ This approach is being developed as part of Action Area 2.3, under the leadership of Colombia and in parallel to the monitoring reform.

¹¹ The proposal does make suggestions for reducing complexity, for example by re-organising around four focus areas, by differentiating between global and country-level data, and by highlighting core versus complementary data points. Additional work is needed to further refine these ideas, which aim to produce a less complex framework. This is distinct, however, from the concept of a 'leaner' framework that covers less in terms of the scope of reporting.


Questions for Discussion

- Do you agree with the overall structure of the draft framework and its four focus areas (Figure A), such that further work can move forward on this basis?
- Do you agree to move forward with a [not leaner] framework which retains all core measurement areas? If not, which do you propose are removed?

Part IV. Way Forward: What is needed, by when, for endorsement of a new monitoring proposal at HLM3 and re-launch of the exercise in 2023?

Figure B is a birds-eye view of the trajectory and milestones of the reform. It has been a widely consultative and highly inclusive process since its inception. The final phase of the reform, during 2022, presents challenges, as much needs to be done in a short period of time, and on two parallel but complementary tracks: technical and political.

Figure B: Overview of the reform




The roadmap for the final phase of the reform has been developed based on **two critical guideposts**:¹²

(1) The new monitoring proposal (note: proposal refers to framework and process) will be tabled for endorsement at HLM3; and (2) monitoring will resume in early 2023. For these expectations to be reached the following are key steps:

- the monitoring framework is fully developed (provisionally, for piloting) in quarter one (Q1) of 2022
- piloting (of framework and process – see Box 1) takes place in quarter two (Q2) of 2022; the proposal is fine-tuned based on experiences from piloting
- a final monitoring proposal is submitted in mid-2022 to the Steering Committee for consideration and agreement. Following this, *on the basis of the proposal which emerges from the Steering Committee's deliberations*:
 - (a) preparations are made for HLM3, as related to endorsement of the proposal at political level
 - (b) preparations advance for resumption of monitoring in early 2023

¹² The [2020-2022 GPEDC Work Programme](#) set out for the new monitoring proposal to be endorsed at HLM3, and specified that the 'period of transition' during which the monitoring exercise would be paused would span 2020-2022.

Figure C: The final phase of the reform and resumption of monitoring



What will be the key milestones on the monitoring proposal in 2022 and at what points can members engage?

Figure C shows the critical milestones of the reform in 2022, highlighting points where members of the Steering Committee can be involved. It also illustrates that there are two tracks of work that need to advance, not entirely in isolation from each other but in parallel: the relatively more technical work and the work related to political outreach and mobilisation.

During quarter one (Q1) of 2022: Feedback on the framework received through the virtual consultation will be addressed with the aim of *having, by the end of Q1, an indicative final framework as the basis for piloting* in quarter two (Q2). To do this, under the guidance of Co-Chairs, the JST will continue the work on the data points and indicators, reaching out to experts on specific technical issues as needed. This work will be captured in **technical papers, which will be posted on the Knowledge Sharing Platform (KSP), for information and for inputs. This process in Q1 will be the key avenue for members to be informed of, and weigh in on, the work on the framework that will take place in the first half of 2022.** For some specific measurement areas, such as the monitoring of (respectively) Kampala Principles and South-South co-operation, members can also be engaged through the Action Areas. If there is feedback from the virtual consultation that cannot be addressed at a technical level, as it has more strategic or political implications, the Co-Chairs will consider this feedback early in 2022 and inform members transparently on how it will be addressed. However, as the scope of the reform is not to open a process of political negotiations, compromises may be sought such as avoiding major shifts in what is measured in favour of more contextualised presentation of results. Also during Q1, preparations for piloting will take place.

During Q2 of 2022: Key elements of the framework and process will be piloted at the country level. See Box 1 for more details. While noting that the expected scope of piloting may not make it feasible for all members to be directly involved, **an effort will be made to involve constituency representatives in the pilots, particularly through the Action Dialogues.** Lessons from the pilots, related to the framework and process, will be shared with members and will inform fine-tuning of the indicative final proposal, resulting in a final proposal that will be submitted for Steering Committee consideration early in Q3.

During Q3 and Q4 of 2022: A critical milestone **early in Q3 (around middle of the year)** will be the point where the Steering Committee will be asked to review the final proposal, and ideally provide their agreement on it. Depending on when the meeting takes place, this could happen at the 23rd Steering

Committee meeting, or through a written procedure. As described above, members will have had the opportunity to be engaged in the development of the framework (in Q1) and informed of lessons from the piloting (in Q2), with potential opportunities for direct engagement in the piloting for some members. Therefore, **the aim is that the proposal submitted to the Steering Committee in mid-2022 will have been developed in such a way as to incorporate the expectations and views of members through the process of developing it.** It will be incumbent upon members to engage, if they wish, in the processes in the first half of the year, so that any “red lines” are known and can be discussed and addressed *before* the proposal is submitted to the Steering Committee in mid-2022. This is with the aim that the proposal can be submitted to the Steering Committee in mid-2022 with a reasonable expectation that it will be agreed, or agreed to with minimal changes. This is important because there is a significant consequence of not having a final or near-final (and agreed) monitoring proposal by the middle of 2022, namely that it will stall a re-start of the monitoring exercise in early 2023 because preparations (technical but also to mobilise and prepare stakeholders for it) will need to advance quickly from mid-2022.

More specifically, from mid-2022, on the basis of a final/near final proposal, several things need to happen in parallel. On the one hand, *there will be preparations to table the proposal for endorsement at HLM3.* This will involve, at a minimum, an effort to distil the relevant elements of the proposal into an appropriate format and level of detail for endorsement at a high-level political meeting. While it is too early to know the specifics, **the 24th Steering Committee meeting (perhaps early in Q4) would be a key point for members to provide any final inputs to shape the political discussions on the monitoring at HLM3.** In addition, *preparations will need to begin in earnest in mid-2022 for the monitoring to resume in early 2023.* A significant part of this work will be technical, and shouldered by the JST, for example preparing technical guidance materials. Equally important will be a dedicated effort, led by Co-Chairs and Steering Committee members, to mobilise partner countries and other stakeholders to commit to participate in the next round of monitoring.

What do the political and technical tracks mean for members?

As outlined above, members will have the opportunity, if they so wish, to provide inputs to the work to further develop the framework. This can be through active engagement, by following and/or inputting to the work, via the Knowledge Sharing Platform, and also through Action Areas. And/or it can be limited to engagement at more strategic decision points, with a critical point being the consideration of the final proposal by the Steering Committee in mid-2022.

However, even as details of the proposal are iteratively finalised in 2022, it will be important that all Steering Committee members fulfil their role to build support among their constituencies – particularly at a political level – for a successful endorsement of the proposal at HLM3 and a visible commitment to engage in the re-launched exercise from 2023 and beyond.

Box 1: How will the monitoring proposal be piloted?

The main aim of the piloting is to inform and refine the revised monitoring approach before the final proposal is submitted to the Steering Committee ahead of HLM3. In addition, the piloting – if completed in time – will produce concrete deliverables for HLM3: the actual monitoring evidence generated, samples of the country results brief, and reports of the Action Dialogue. Partner countries that lead the pilots can also speak to them at the HLM3. Piloting can also be used to encourage other partner countries to sign up for and build momentum toward the re-launch of the monitoring exercise following HLM3.

Piloting is envisioned as a robust ‘dry run’ of the monitoring process and framework in a limited number of partner countries. Data will not necessarily be collected on all indicators/data points; the scope will be based on feasibility (what is ready to be piloted, what is reasonable to collect within the timeframe of the pilots) and relevance to country context. To the extent possible, elements of the revised monitoring process will also be piloted. These include, for example, the development of a country results brief, an Action Dialogue on the monitoring results, and identification of in-country champions. Note that it is not possible to ‘pilot’ the proposed changes to the duration of the exercise or the waves approach.

While being mindful to balance region, context, income-level and other key factors to the extent possible, the limited number of partner countries that agree to lead pilots will need to meet certain conditions. They will need to commit to conduct the pilot in a short timeframe in the first half of 2022; engage diverse stakeholders during the pilot; undertake a multi-stakeholder Action Dialogue on the monitoring results; share outcomes of the pilot as an input to HLM3; and engage with other partner countries to share lessons and encourage peers to participate in the next monitoring round.

Questions for Discussion

- *As a Steering Committee member, how do you foresee being engaged in 2022?*
- *What specific efforts can you make to mobilise your constituency at a political level, in preparation for the monitoring proposal endorsement at HLM3 and re-launch of the exercise? What information, in what form, is needed in order to generate commitment among your constituents for the new monitoring exercise?*


Part V. Understanding the open waves approach

This section has been developed in complement to the discussion on the monitoring process outlined in Part I. It provides an explanation of how a monitoring round composed of open waves would work in practice. It also responds to the questions most frequently asked by stakeholders.

1. Key features of the open waves approach

The open waves approach to monitoring consists of two or three consecutive reporting waves that would take place within a monitoring round. Partner country governments can choose in which wave they enrol within a monitoring round, to best align monitoring to in-country processes, such as other data collection activities, Voluntary National Reviews, reviews of national development plans, and/or so that Action Dialogues on monitoring results can be integrated with existing dialogue and coordination mechanisms. The number of waves within a round will depend on the duration of the round, which should align to the frequency of GPEDC HLMs. **Within a three-year round (three years between HLMs) there would be two waves; within a four-year round (four years between HLMs) there would be three waves** (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Possible organisation of a round based on HLM cycle



How is a wave organised?

For a partner country participating in a given wave, the timeline for completion of the data collection is a maximum of 12 months, from the launch of the wave to the final submission of country-level data to the Joint Support Team (JST) - compared to 6-7 months in the 2018 monitoring round. A country can of course choose to submit their data in a shorter timeframe. This 12-month timeline includes: partner country government confirmation of participation to the JST, launch of the exercise at country level, collection of data within the government, request for data from development partners, consultation with non-government stakeholders for reporting on certain indicators, development partners' review of data between country offices and headquarters before the data is provided to partner country governments¹³, country-level validation of data collected, and final submission of data to the JST .


After data submission from participating countries, the JST will analyse the data and prepare the country results briefs while partner country governments prepare their Action Dialogues (see [the draft proposal](#) for more information on country results briefs and Action Dialogues). The Action Dialogues would take place once the results are available to countries and ideally within 3 months of final data submission. After that, country governments and partners would continue to use the results and follow-up on what was agreed in the Action Dialogue until their next participation in a wave within the following monitoring round, or in the same round if they wish to undertake the exercise more regularly.¹⁴

Using the results generated from all partner countries that participated in a wave, the JST would report data for SDGs 5.c.1, 17.15.1, and 17.16.1. A summary of results for the countries in that wave will also be produced to support political momentum and increase visibility for the monitoring results. Figure 2 illustrates how the process would work for a specific wave, in the case of a four-year round. The figure shows the scenario, at country level, for a partner country that joins the first wave of a round.

¹³ This is important to avoid discrepancies between data from development partner country offices and their headquarters, which was problematic in past monitoring rounds.

¹⁴ Only in the case of a four year round, a country that participated in the first wave may want to (and could) also participate in the third wave within the same round.

Figure 2. Functioning of a wave; country-level perspective




How would the monitoring round work with the open waves?

Figure 3 shows, in a simplified way, how a round would function, taking a four-year round as an example.

The first wave of the new monitoring process would start after the HLM3, at the beginning of 2023. As data analysis and preparation for Action Dialogues take place for the first wave of countries, the second wave would start in early 2024 with another set of countries initiating the data collection, which will be followed by data analysis and preparation for Action Dialogues, as illustrated in Figure 2. The same process would be repeated for the countries in the third wave, beginning in early 2025.

Once results are available for all three waves, there will be global analysis and reporting to bring together results for all partner countries that participated in the three waves as well as aggregated results for development partners and other stakeholder groups that will feed into the HLM of the GPEDC.

Figure 3. Functioning of a round; global perspective



2. Frequently asked questions about the waves approach

In what key ways would the open waves differ from the past approach to monitoring?

FREQUENCY: In the past, monitoring rounds took place roughly every 2.5 years. In the future, as explained above, monitoring rounds would happen every 3 or 4 years (to be decided based on the HLM schedule). Within a four-year round, countries can undertake the monitoring once or twice (i.e. 1st and 3rd wave).

TIMING: In the past, all partner countries had to undertake the monitoring following the same timeline and had no flexibility in terms of when to do it. In the future, partner countries would be able to choose their preferred wave within a round.

DURATION: In the past, partner countries had 6-7 months from the official launch of the monitoring round until final data submission to the JST. In the future, countries would have 12 months from the launch of the wave chosen by them until final data submission.

REPORTING: In the past, global progress reports and basic country profiles for partner countries were produced at the end of a round to inform discussions at HLMs (SLM in 2019). In the future, after data collection and analysis of each wave, there will be country results briefs (beyond the headline values of the country profiles produced following the 2018 monitoring round) and a consolidated summary of results from all countries that joined a wave (new). Similarly to the past, at the end of a monitoring round, aggregate results from all participating countries and stakeholders will be available (either in the form of a progress report or other types of products such as a tracking platform or online dashboard). These global aggregates would be available at a lower frequency - every 3 or 4 years - compared to the past (i.e. 2 years and 8 months between the 2016 and the 2018 reports). For the first time, dedicated profiles for development partners will be also produced at the end of a round (contingent on resources). Finally, as in the past, the full database will be downloadable from the GPEDC website to facilitate analysis and use by all stakeholders.

USE OF RESULTS: In the past, a country-level workshop or dialogue on the results of the monitoring was suggested as good practice but was not a requirement of undertaking the monitoring exercise. In the future, Action Dialogues would be an integral and required part of undertaking the monitoring exercise.

Will results between countries be comparable despite differences in reporting years?

Although countries in different waves may not be reporting for the same fiscal year, results can still be compared and aggregated across waves without a loss of meaning. Results will remain comparable between countries participating in different waves. This is because the indicators of the monitoring framework focus on behaviour related to the implementation of the commitments rather than looking at specific trends for co-operation volumes. For reference, also in past rounds, there have been variations in terms of fiscal years within a round as not all countries start and end their fiscal years at the same time. Furthermore, some countries chose an earlier fiscal year to report on when they had more complete information for that year.

As in previous monitoring rounds, the reporting year for quantitative indicators that are based on amounts (\$) would ideally be the most recent partner country government fiscal year for which there is information available. For example, a country joining the first wave in 2023 and its development partners would likely be reporting for the fiscal year ending in 2022. A country joining the second wave and its development partners would likely be reporting for the fiscal year ending in 2023, and so on.

Will the open waves approach affect the number of countries participating in a monitoring round?

The open waves approach does not guarantee an increase nor a decrease in the number of countries participating in a round. While the 2018 round saw the record participation of 86 countries, out of this number only around half undertook a comprehensive monitoring¹⁵. Many partner countries indicated that getting

¹⁵ Past monitoring rounds, especially the 2018 round, have been characterised by high pressure to increase the number of countries at the expense of the quality of engagement and data comprehensiveness for both partner countries and development partners. Out of 86 partner countries, one third completed less than 70% of the country-level indicators.

responses from development partners or properly engaging non-state actors was challenging within a short timeframe. Many providers equally indicated not having had enough time to adequately organise their participation in the exercise. Given these past challenges, improved *quality* of participation (including meaningful follow up on results) and increased comprehensiveness of data have been flagged by stakeholders as priorities that an improved monitoring process should address. As such, the increased flexibility of the open waves approach, the longer timeframe for data collection and the support provided by stakeholder champions, have together a great potential to improve the quality and comprehensiveness of data collected by the countries engaged. With respect to expectations for the number of countries which participate in the monitoring exercise in the future, this will depend a great deal on the mobilisation and advocacy efforts by Steering Committee members and all GPEDC actors, and is not a function alone of whether the monitoring is done in a waves approach or any other approach.

How to mitigate the risk of unbalanced participation of countries across waves?

The waves approach may lead to an unbalanced number of countries participating in different waves. This is the reality of a flexible approach. While this would not affect the process in a given country nor the global aggregates produced at the end of a full round, it could have implications for the comprehensiveness of intermediate aggregates/products (i.e. the summary of results at the end of each wave). It could also have implications for the remote support provided to countries by the JST, with those joining a more “crowded” wave getting less support. To mitigate that risk, and ensure a degree of balance across waves, it will be crucial to have early engagement of partner countries and a commitment for participation (and in which wave), if possible even prior to HLM3.

Will groupings by region or country context be possible?

Yes. With the open waves approach it will be possible to encourage countries in the same region or context to join the same wave. This could generate peer pressure for partner countries to undertake the exercise and would facilitate peer learning and knowledge sharing among countries as they undertake the monitoring. In addition, as in the past, regional and context-specific results will still be produced as part of the global analysis and reporting at the end of a round, to help stimulate exchange and learning.

When do development partners get their aggregated results?

While country briefs for each partner country and a summary of wave results will be released at the end of the data collection and analysis phase of each wave, global aggregates for development partners will be available at the end of a monitoring round after all waves are completed, every 3-4 years (depending on the HLM frequency). In the past, results (global progress reports and country profiles) have been released at an average frequency of 2 years and 7.5 months¹⁶. This slightly longer interval between global results would partially address concerns of some stakeholders that the previous interval between rounds was too short to show changes in performance.

As an example, global aggregates for development partners would include, among others, the aggregated performance of Australia in partner countries that participated in all waves; average results for DAC members or UN agencies, etc. As in past rounds, these would consist of aggregated figures by indicators in a public database and dashboard. In addition, and for the first time (resources permitting), dedicated profiles of each development partner’s performance will be produced based on their aggregate results, to further reinforce accountability at global level for this key stakeholder group. If considered relevant for a specific development partner and based on demand, the JST could provide aggregate data for a development partner for the countries participating in a specific wave.

How to ensure political momentum for the monitoring with a lower frequency of global reporting?

In the past, political momentum of the monitoring has been mainly linked to the release of global monitoring results, through a progress report and country profiles (on average every 2 years and 7.5 months) ahead of

Only 53% and 55% reported on the assessments on CSO enabling environment and public private dialogue, respectively. For one tenth of development partners, data is available for less than 60% of country-level indicators.

¹⁶ 2 years and 7 months between the 2014 and 2016 report; 2 years and 8 months between the 2016 and the 2019 report.

HLMs/SLM. With the waves, *global* aggregates for development partners and other stakeholders will be available less frequently (every 3 or 4 years). This lower frequency of global aggregates and occasion for political momentum can however be mitigated by an increased visibility and frequency of monitoring results. This will be possible through more frequent reporting within a round, with the release of country results briefs and a summary of wave results at the end of the data collection and analysis phase of every wave.

Will it still be possible to report on the SDGs with open waves?

The open waves approach will not compromise the role of the monitoring in the follow-up and review of the 2030 Agenda. The UN Statistics Division has confirmed that a rolling approach to reporting is indeed possible and is used to report on other SDG indicators (see section 2.2 in the [paper on linkages to the 2030 Agenda](#) prepared for the 21st Steering Committee meeting). As illustrated in Figure 2, country-specific SDG data and aggregates by partner country would be available after completion of the data collection and analysis phase of each wave as well as at the end of a monitoring round. SDG calculations for indicators relevant to development partners will be provided after global aggregates are available, at the end of a full monitoring round, to ensure maximum comprehensiveness.

Annex I – Draft monitoring framework – core evidence grouped by focus area

This table was included in the proposal released for the virtual consultation with stakeholders in October/November. It is re-produced here for reference, but **no adjustments have yet been made to address comments received from stakeholders** through that consultation process.

Focus area	COLLECTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY AND A WHOLE-OF-SOCIETY APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT	QUALITY AND USE OF COUNTRY SYSTEMS	TRANSPARENCY OF DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION	LEAVING NO ONE BEHIND (LNOB)
Country -sourced data	<p>% of partner countries:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> with inclusive, regular, transparent, result-focused collective account-ability mechanisms, captured in a policy framework [^] that consult diverse stakeholders on their national development plans that produce and make publicly available regular progress reports on their national development plans and strategies and use those to inform dialogue with development partners on priority areas and results where parliaments regularly receive information on development co-operation; and previous monitoring results* where government, CSOs and development partners participated in an 	<p>% of partner countries with high quality country results frameworks for sustainable development [^]</p> <p>Extent of use of country-owned results frameworks and planning tools [including data and statistical systems] by development partners (SDG 17.15.1) [^]</p> <p>% of results indicators from development partner's interventions monitored using data and statistics from partner country government</p> <p>% of disbursement to the government sector that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> is predictable and recorded in the national budget uses PFM systems [^] 	<p>% of partner countries:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> with publicly available information management systems for development co-operation/that make information of development co-operation publicly available (including on projects that engage the private sector)* <p>% of development partners regularly reporting to these systems* [^]</p>	<p>% of countries with systems to track and make public allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment (SDG 5.c.1).</p> <p>% of partner countries that in their development strategies:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> consult with, identify and target vulnerable and marginalised groups* include disaggregated indicators within CRFs* refer explicitly to targeting vulnerable and marginalised groups in describing how the private sector should be engaged in development co-operation* <p><i>% of development partners that in their country strategies:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> consult with, identify and target vulnerable and marginalised groups* include support to increase the capacity of those furthest behind to organise and

	<p>inclusive dialogue to assess civil society enabling environment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • where CSOs report improvement to their enabling environment due to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ the government; ○ development partners ○ their own effectiveness <p><i>[to define] where partner countries government and development partners articulate the envisioned role of private sector in development co-operation*</i></p> <p>% of development partners' strategies developed in consultation with the government and diverse stakeholder groups</p>			<p>represent themselves*</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • explicitly target vulnerable and marginalised groups through their PSE strategy/projects* <p><i>[to define] % of development partners interventions' results indicators reported using disaggregated data*</i></p>
Globally-sourced data		<p>% of partner countries that have (collected by PEFA¹⁷):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • made progress in strengthening their PFM systems • have quality PFM systems <p>% of untied Official Development Assistance (ODA, only applicable to DAC members) – collected by OECD</p> <p><i>[to confirm] % of de facto tied ODA (from existing OECD data)*</i></p>	Assessment of development partners' reporting to OECD-CRS, OECD-FSS and IATI ¹⁸	

¹⁷ Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability.

¹⁸ OECD-CRS stands for OECD Creditor Reporting System; OECD-FSS for OECD Forward Spending Survey; and IATI for International Aid Transparency Initiative.

*	In the table indicates new data points that will be generated at country level. For simplicity, the table does not indicate those other data points that are proposed to be removed (for this, see Annex II).
^	In the table indicates proposed adjustments in line with the tailored approach for monitoring effectiveness in fragile and conflict-affected situations.
ITALIC FONT	In the text indicates an exact data point/measurement that still needs to be defined.

Annex II – Overview of preliminary proposed changes to the former monitoring framework

This table illustrates the changes to the former indicator framework as they were included in the proposal released for virtual consultation in October, therefore **not reflecting yet the specific feedback received by stakeholders** through that consultation. More details on the previous framework can be found in the [2018 Monitoring Guide for National Co-Coordinators](#).

Indicator (Core Measurement Area)	Changes (+ additions / - removals)	Responsibility for data collection	Comparability	Focus areas
1b. Quality of national development strategies (NDS) [and country results frameworks (CRFs)] Made up of 11 criteria	+ adding LNOB related questions + adding question on which SDGs included in NDS/CRF + adding question on data/statistics + adding element on whether NDS articulates the envisaged role of the private sector	Partner country governments	Yes (may need to adjust scoring system for indicator 1b)	-Collective accountability and whole-of-society (WOS) approach -Quality and Use of Country Systems -Transparency -LNOB
1a. Development partners use national planning tools and country results frameworks Made up of four sub-indicators: 1a.1. Project objectives drawn from country plans and strategies 1a.2. Results indicators from CRFs 1a.3. Results indicators monitored using government data and statistics 1a.4. Final evaluation involves the government	- removing sub-indicator 1a.4 on evaluation as it is not part of/relevant for SDG 17.15.1 - removing complementary questions not producing relevant evidence + adding LNOB questions to strategy level + adding complementary questions (reason for not using CRFs; existence of joint planning/co-ordination; alignment to timeframes and processes of partner country governments; strategy includes UCS agreement; strategy articulates PSE objective) + possibility for large foundations to report	Development partners	Yes	-Collective accountability and WoS approach -Quality and Use of Country Systems -LNOB
2. CSO enabling environment and CSO development effectiveness Made up of 4 modules 1.Government consultation with CSOs 2.Adequate legal and regulatory environment 3.CSOs' development effectiveness 4.Effectiveness of development partners' work with CSOs	+ adding small domestic foundations and trade unions as reporting stakeholders within the CSOs group (tbd)	Partner country governments in consultation with development partners, CSOs	Yes	Collective accountability and WoS approach
3. Quality of public-private dialogue	Discontinued. To be Replaced by measurement of PSE/Kampala Principles	tbd	tbd	Collective accountability and WoS approach
4. Transparency of development co-operation (global)	= same (OECD-CRS, OECD-FSS, IATI)	Information collected by JST	Yes	Transparency
4b. Transparency of development co-operation (country-level module)	Indicator becomes central (no longer complementary) - removing questions not producing relevant evidence + adding question about off-budget	Partner country governments	Yes	-Transparency -Collective accountability and WoS approach
5a. Annual predictability	= same + complementary question for development partners to provide reason for under disbursement + possibility for large foundations to report - removing complementary question not producing relevant evidence	Development partners	Yes	Quality and Use of Country Systems

5b. Medium term predictability	+ respondents will need to provide amounts instead of yes/no answers	Partner country governments	Yes	Quality and Use of Country Systems
6. Development co-operation on budget	= same	-Partner country governments; development partners	Yes	-Quality and Use of Country Systems -Collective accountability and WoS approach
7. Quality of mutual accountability mechanisms	~ revising language of questions + adding LNOB elements (tbc) + complementary questions (preferences for modality and UCS; PSE; whether policies include effectiveness objectives; efforts by partner country governments to inform parliaments)	Partner country governments	Yes (will depend on response metric changes), except new questions	-Collective accountability and WoS approach -LNOB
8/SDG5.c.1. Countries have systems in place to track and make public allocations for GEWE	= same	Partner country governments	Yes	LNOB
9a. Quality of Public Financial Management systems	= same (PEFA)	info collected by JST	Yes	Quality and Use of Country Systems
9b. Use of Public Financial Management systems	= same + complementary questions (reason for development partners not to use PFM systems; support to strengthen partner country systems) + possibility for large foundations to report	Development Partners	Yes	Quality and Use of Country Systems
10. Untied ODA (OECD)	= same (OECD CRS) [Suggestions that do not add reporting burden] de facto untied aid data to supplement main indicator	info collected by JST	Yes	Quality and Use of Country Systems