

Responses to feedback received on the draft monitoring proposal of October 2021

May 2022

In October 2021, the Co-Chairs, with the support of the Joint Support Team (JST), released a [draft monitoring proposal](#), covering both the monitoring process and framework. A key milestone in the monitoring reform, the proposal reflected guidance from the Steering Committee (SC) and inputs from extensive stakeholder consultations¹. Feedback was invited through a [virtual consultation](#) which took place between 25 October and 12 November 2021 on the GPEDC Knowledge Sharing Platform (KSP). That proposal [hereafter “draft monitoring proposal”] was also the basis for the [monitoring document](#) submitted to the SC for its 21st meeting, in December 2021 [[SC meeting summary](#)]. The JST prepared a [consolidated summary of the feedback received through the virtual consultation](#), which was circulated to the SC and made available on the KSP.

At its 21st meeting, the SC agreed that technical work to refine the proposal should proceed in the first half of 2022. **This phase of technical work considered the feedback received during the virtual consultation**, while also benefitting from targeted outreach to stakeholders and experts. It has culminated in a revised monitoring proposal, inclusive of a proposal on the monitoring process and [the monitoring framework](#), released on the GPEDC website in May 2022 [hereafter “revised monitoring proposal”].

This document explains how the feedback received on the draft monitoring proposal was taken into account in the revised monitoring proposal, both as concerns the monitoring framework and process.

How to read this document

This document provides point-by-point responses to the feedback received to the draft monitoring proposal. For comprehensiveness, it deliberately replicates the structure and content of the [consolidated summary](#) of the feedback from the virtual consultation:

- All ***italicised text*** is carried over verbatim from the **consolidated summary of feedback** to the virtual consultation on the draft monitoring proposal. Parenthetical references to NEs, PCs, and DPs refer respectively to the [number of] non-executive, partner country, and development partner stakeholders associated to that feedback point.
- **Text in blue font** is the response to the point of feedback. Responses are provided to feedback classified as ‘perceived risks’, ‘suggestions provided’, and ‘clarifications requested’. Feedback classified as ‘support expressed’ is retained for reference.

The original contributions can be found on the [virtual consultation page](#), which also includes responses (provided at the time of the consultation) to questions and requests for clarification from stakeholders.

Summary of feedback about the monitoring process

Note on terminology: The draft monitoring proposal, as concerns the monitoring process, referred to an “open waves approach”. The revised monitoring proposal incorporates changes to this model, including with respect to introducing the new terminology of a “rolling global round”, and no longer refers to waves.

1. Occurrence

The proposal to move to open waves received broad support from partner countries, development partners and non-executive stakeholders (8 PCs, 6 DPs, 2 NEs).

Support expressed:

- *Increased flexibility will improve country **institutionalisation and synchronicity** with national/sectoral strategies and other international exercises (6 PCs, 3 DPs, 1 NE).*
- *The proposed occurrence could facilitate **engagement of new participants and alleviate reporting burden** (1 PC).*
- *Open waves could incentivise countries to **participate in more than one wave** (1 PC).*

¹ Since the beginning of the monitoring reform, there have been extensive stakeholder consultations. A virtual survey in 2020 about the trade-offs related to making changes to the monitoring exercise resulted in 137 responses including 62 from partner countries (summary [here](#)). Later in 2020, there was a series of 9 consultations on the monitoring process (75 participants; summary [here](#)). The first half of 2021 saw a series of 19 consultations (169 participants; summary [here](#)). All of these consultations were inclusive of stakeholder and constituency groups.

- A 3-years monitoring round would provide **several opportunities** to measure effectiveness in the context of the 2030 Agenda and “decade of action” (1 PC).
- The stronger focus on country ownership should help to **increase data relevance** (1 DP).
- The emphasis on institutionalisation is an opportunity to help **strengthen countries’ capacity** to manage and monitor their development co-operation relationships (1 DP).
- The proposed approach could facilitate **peer learning** across waves (between country A that has already participated, and country B which is about to partake) (1 DP).
- The open waves approach could facilitate **thorough data collection and validation** including through better support to participating partner countries (1 DP).

Perceived risks:

- Keeping **the momentum and mobilising partners** through a stretched process is more difficult, especially for smaller development partners, which may result in diminished engagement (2 PCs, 2 DPs, 3 NEs).
- The rolling process raises **resourcing implications** as it will require permanent capacity to support country monitoring and engage stakeholders (2 DPs, 2 NEs).

[In response to the above two feedback points] To keep political momentum, visibility and frequency of monitoring results will be increased to balance for less frequent global aggregates (every 4 years instead of every 2 years and 7.5 months in the past). This will be possible through the release of country results briefs and a summary of results for all partner countries which submit data for a given period of time, approximately every year (see Part V of the [background document](#) to the 22nd Steering Committee). The new rolling global approach to the monitoring rounds will mean a different engagement model for stakeholders to support and engage in the process. For DPs in headquarters (HQs), while this will mean being engaged on a rolling basis, this will be a lower intensity of engagement given that fewer partner countries will be participating at one time. Work is also already underway to develop an online reporting tool that aims to make it easier for DPs to report and validate data, and to smooth communication between HQ and country offices of DPs. As a more general matter, it is acknowledged that the past approach, used by some global constituency groups, of investing in larger global in-person trainings may no longer be the most suitable. It may be necessary to explore other approaches, such as decentralised (possibly virtual) trainings/engagement which are focused on only those countries which are participating in a certain time period. The development of online training modules, rather than in-person trainings, which can be re-used each year, could also be explored.

- *The sample of countries per wave may be too small or too large, resulting in **different levels of support to participating countries** (1 PC).*

See Part V of the [background document](#) to the 22nd Steering Committee. Differing numbers of countries participating at different points within the three-year window for data collection (with the fourth year reserved for global data analysis and preparation of the global report) could have implications for the remote support provided to countries by the JST, with those joining a more “crowded” time period within the global round, getting less support. To mitigate that risk, and ensure a degree of balance across the three-year period, it will be crucial to have early engagement of partner countries and a commitment for participation, if possible even prior to the 2022 Summit.

- *If this approach leads to a fall in coverage and response rates, the monitoring **results may lack reliability and be insufficiently representative** for development co-operation providers to be challenged (1 NE).*

See Part V of the [background document](#) to the 22nd Steering Committee.

- *The proposed occurrence might **reduce institutionalisation**, as more regular rounds would help to better link the monitoring to country processes (1 NE).*

The approach of rolling global rounds will allow more flexibility to partner countries on when they undertake the monitoring, so that the monitoring can be institutionalised by allowing it to be embedded

in relevant national processes. Partner countries will be encouraged to participate in the monitoring at least one time in each four-year round. This proposed regularity of PC participation is also in function of the enhanced focus on institutionalising a process of dialogue and action/implementation on monitoring results in every country which participates in the monitoring. If a PC sees value, including as related to opportunities for institutionalisation, it will be possible that they participate twice per round, thereby doing monitoring more regularly.

→ Part V of the [background document](#) to the 22nd Steering Committee meeting provides clarifications on the occurrence of the revised monitoring exercise, as well as the risks associated with changing the occurrence of the monitoring exercise to an 'open waves' approach. Detailed information on the occurrence of the monitoring exercise are found in the [full analytical paper](#) shared ahead of the 21st Steering Committee meeting.

Suggestions provided:

- Encourage participation of countries from the same region in the same wave to enhance **peer-learning** (1 PC, 1 DP). **Groupings by region** or country context might allow for more focused partner support with monitoring and reporting results (1 NE).

This suggestion is well noted and there will be an effort to encourage countries in the same region to participate at the same time, although still allowing each country the flexibility to choose when to undertake monitoring, which could be informed by various considerations.

- Encourage **early enrolment** of participants ahead of the next monitoring round (1 NE).

The advantages of early confirmation of participation are well recognised. Steering Committee members, among others, will need to play an important role in encouraging early commitments.

Clarifications requested:

- How the monitoring exercise will ensure **comparability** over time and between countries (2 PCs, 2 DPs, 1 NE).
- How results will be **aggregated and compared** considering different reporting periods (1 PC).
- How **SDG reporting** can continue considering the need to aggregate data across waves (1 NE).

→ As noted above, Part V of the [background document](#) to the 22nd Steering Committee meeting provides clarifications on these points.

2. Action Dialogues

Support expressed:

- Action Dialogues can help to **strengthen and systematise the use of monitoring results** at country-level, **improve buy-in** by country-level stakeholders and bring about **behavioural change** (5 PCs, 4 DPs, 2 NEs).
- They provide a **formal, dedicated and high-level platform** to focus on country-level implementation of the effectiveness principles (2 PCs).
- They feed into, and **complement, existing nation-wide or sector-wide** co-ordination and consultation mechanisms to discuss and disseminate monitoring results (2 PCs).

Perceived risks:

- Action Dialogues risk becoming **an information-sharing exercise on the monitoring results** rather than a **space for dialogue and decision-making** (2 NEs).

Making the Action Dialogues (ADs) a space for meaningful dialogue will depend on country-level stakeholders engaging actively, including but not limited to partner country governments who have the role to lead them. The ability of partner country governments to effectively play this leadership role will, depending on the country and circumstances, require support from DPs and other stakeholders. In an evolution of the framing of the ADs since the draft monitoring proposal, the revised monitoring proposal

recognises that the dialogue (ADs) phase of the follow-up to monitoring results will only be a first step, and that the ADs will need to provide a forum for not only dialogue, but also identification of actions for change, which will need to be implemented by relevant stakeholders over time.

Suggestions provided:

- Ensure that **adequate timing** is dedicated to the **analysis of monitoring results** prior to the Action Dialogues (1 PC, 1 NE).

It is planned that a country results brief, based on the country-specific monitoring results, would be produced within three months of the final submission of monitoring data by the national co-ordinator to the JST. The three-month timeframe reflects the need for balance between, on one hand, the JST needing reasonable time to calculate and analyse results to produce the brief and, on the other, the importance of providing the results brief (as an input to kick off the Action Dialogue/implementation process) in good time so as not to lose momentum on the monitoring amongst stakeholders at the country level.

- **Scale up Action Dialogues to region-wide dialogues** on monitoring results and encourage sharing of good practices (1 PC).

In line with the emphasis on a more decisive country-level anchoring of GPEDC initiatives in the future, the Action Dialogues and their follow up are envisioned as taking place at the country level. This is also in recognition of the fact that monitoring results need to be discussed and acted on within a particular country context and with stakeholders within that country. Regional-level learning on Action Dialogues would also be valuable, and regional organisation and entities are well placed to lead on this and should be encouraged to do so.

- Support Action Dialogues with **a how-to guide** (1 PC).

A guidance note for Action Dialogues and their follow up is planned.

- Action Dialogues could also be held within existing parliamentary proceedings such as multi-stakeholder hearings within budget or development committees. This would help building on existing national capacities and empowering the parliament at once (1 NE).

Depending on the country context, this could certainly be explored. The government leading the monitoring exercise in their country will, as an overall matter, be encouraged to explore avenues to embed Action Dialogues within relevant existing processes in the country.

Clarifications requested:

- How to ensure that the **scope and format** will comprehensively address the outcomes of the monitoring results in each partner country (2 NEs).

It is not possible to guarantee that the Action Dialogue and its follow up will comprehensively address all aspects of the monitoring results in each country. In fact, given the scope of the issues covered by the monitoring framework, it may be more feasible and advisable to focus on issues of priority in the country, on which relevant stakeholders can take action to bring about change. As the Action Dialogues are to be multi-stakeholder in nature, it is foreseen that any discussion about prioritisation could be informed by views of a diversity of stakeholder groups.

3. Monitoring results: Country Results Briefs, Development Partner Profiles and Exit Survey

Support expressed:

- Country Results Briefs are **essential** as a resource for effective country engagement and use of

monitoring results (1 PC, 1 DP, 1 NE).

- Development Partner Profiles are useful and essential for an **independent review** of the performance of development partners (2 NEs).
- Post-monitoring exit surveys are welcome (1 PC).

Suggestions provided:

- Country Results Briefs should **include potential actions and recommendations** in the areas to be strengthened (1 PC, 1 DP).

The country results brief will be enhanced as compared to the country profiles that were produced following the 2016 and 2018 monitoring rounds, by including more granular presentation of monitoring results for the country, as well as through inclusion of relevant secondary data (breadth of secondary data included in the briefs will depend on resource availability). However, including potential actions and recommendations will not be feasible unless there is an appreciable increase in JST resources.

- Need to ensure that stakeholders have **early and full access to raw monitoring data** to facilitate their own reporting (1 NE).

Raw monitoring data will be made available once the data has been validated and is considered final. An advantage of the shift to a rolling global round is that data will be available on a rolling, country-by-country basis.

- The exit survey could be **done during the Action Dialogues** (1 NE).

This suggestion will be taken into consideration as the exit survey is developed.

Clarifications requested:

- Identify clearly **who evaluates who** in the post-monitoring exit surveys (1 PC).

This suggestion will be taken into consideration when the exit survey is developed.

- How resources will be made available to produce **Country Results Briefs** (1 NE).

Country results briefs are seen as a critical output of the monitoring exercise, not least given the renewed focus on country-level anchoring of the GPEDC which has emerged as a key recommendation of the Review of the GPEDC undertaken in 2021. Country results briefs will provide the substantive evidence, emerging from the monitoring exercise, on which country-level dialogue and action is encouraged to be based. As such, the production of these briefs are seen as a core function of the JST. However, the scope of the country results briefs will depend on funding for JST institutional support.

→ Also discussed in Part II of the [background document to the 22nd Steering Committee meeting](#).

4. Data collection/validation and related support

Support expressed:

- Offering **technical support** at country level is welcome (2 PCs, 1 DP, 1 NE).
- Nominating stakeholder “champions” to support the monitoring exercise is essential to **promote a more inclusive process** (1 DP, 1 NE) and **enhance enrolment of new participants** in the monitoring exercise (1 PC).
- **Country-level workshops** to launch monitoring rounds and/or validate monitoring results have proven to be effective in reinforcing partnerships and increasing knowledge and motivation to participate in the monitoring exercise (1 PC).

Perceived risks:

- **The data collection tool remains cumbersome** (2 PCs).

Work is ongoing to develop a new online data collection tool to make data collection process easier for the users. The new tool is expected to be available when the monitoring resumes in 2023.

- *Nominating stakeholder champions could hamper **partner countries' ownership** of the monitoring exercise (e.g. in fragile contexts and conflict-affected states - FCAS)* (2 DPs).

National co-ordinators [representing partner country governments] will continue to lead and co-ordinate the exercise, to ensure full ownership of it. For partner countries that would like support, a country-level development partner champion can be identified. Support from the DP champion would be provided without undermining the leadership of the government in the exercise and could include technical capacity building and technical assistance.

Suggestions provided:

- **Data collection should be simplified and its format clarified**, particularly with regard to the types of data required (e.g. country-sourced statistics versus global data) (1 PC) and overall through improved communication around the monitoring exercise (1 DP).

Guidance will be provided to clarify the data collection process including its format. There will be careful attention to indicating which data is to be collected at country level, and which will be collected from global sources.

- Consider **digitalising data collection and validation** to improve the process (1 DP), for example through an online platform (1 PC).

A new online data collection tool is expected to be available when the monitoring resumes in 2023.

- *Specific support should be offered to **first-time participants** (1 PC) and to mobilise **specific constituencies** (e.g. CSOs, private sector) (1 PC).*

Given the pause in monitoring since the 2018 round, it is recognised that there has been significant turnover of focal points so there is likely to be a higher number of first-time participants when monitoring resumes in 2023. With the shift to rolling global rounds, the JST (assuming core institutional resourcing is adequately available) anticipates being able to provide more tailored support and backstopping to national co-ordinators as they lead the data collection and validation during the monitoring. The JST will also develop ToRs to help mobilise specific constituencies, including by proposing potential models/approaches of engagement, to engage in monitoring at country level. Steering Committee members and their networks must also play a proactive role in mobilising their constituencies for the monitoring.

- *Ensure the validity and independence of the data collection process by **recruiting national consultants** to support partner country governments (1 PC) or by **relying on the JST** (1 DP).*

The JST will provide backstopping and a "help desk" function to national co-ordinators during the data collection and validation process. With the shift to rolling global rounds, and the associated expectation that fewer countries will be doing the monitoring at a given time, it is anticipated that the JST will be able to provide more tailored support to countries than was the case in the past (although this depends on whether there are resources available for the full scope of JST institutional core functions). While the model of partner countries hiring national consultants has worked well for some countries in the past, the feasibility of this will depend on whether resources can be mobilised at country level to cover this cost.

Clarifications requested:

- *How resources will be made available for the timely mobilisation of “champions” among non-executive stakeholders (1 NE).*

The JST will draft terms of references (ToRs) to support the identification of champions/reporting focal points. There will also be an effort to encourage partner country confirmation of participation with as much lead time as possible. The increased time and emphasis dedicated to the inception phase of the exercise at country level will also help allow for identification of suitable champions and reporting focal points. Steering Committee members and their networks/counterparts at global and country levels will be expected to play an important role in mobilising for these roles at country level.

→ Resources are discussed in Part II of the [background document to the 22nd Steering Committee meeting](#).

Summary of feedback about the monitoring framework**1. Focus areas and general feedback on the framework:****Support expressed:**

- *All proposed **focus areas are important** to effectiveness commitments (3 PCs, 3 DPs, 3 NE).*
- *New **focus areas are relevant** to take into account challenges linked to SDGs and COVID-19 (2 PCs, 1 NE).*
- *This choice of focus areas could help **make GPEDC products more visible** (1 NE).*
- *It is a good initiative to **retain most indicators** in the revised framework (1PC, 2 NE).*
- *The inclusion of more **qualitative elements** in the monitoring framework is excellent and will provide important information for the Action Dialogues (3 PCs, 1 DP).*
- *The framework is more **responsive to different country contexts**, in particular fragile ones (1 PC, 1 DP).*
- *The proposal recognises **the efforts of bilateral donors to support the effectiveness of the multilateral system**, which is relevant for bilateral partners that increasingly channel resources through multilateral partners (1 DP, 1 NE).*

Perceived risks:

- *There is little clarity about the role of the focus areas in the revised framework (1 NE); the focus areas relate to how data can be grouped in the analysis and in the report, but do not affect the framework itself; the original four **effectiveness principles should be the basic structure of any global report** (1 NE).*

Please see the revised monitoring proposal for additional explanation of the rationale for organising the framework as four focus areas (noting that the focus areas are now referred to as dimensions), as well as how the four effectiveness principles relate to the revised framework. As has been the case in the past, the structure of the global report will most likely be determined once all the data that it will be based on has been collected and analysed. Whatever the structure of the next global report, how the monitoring data speaks to the four effectiveness principles can be expected to feature prominently.

Suggestions provided:

- *The framework could recognise the value for development effectiveness of **support provided to CSOs** (1 DP) or delivered **through multilateral organisations** (2 DPs, 1 NE).*

To highlight also the support provided by a DP through other channels, the DP profiles will aim to indicate (from secondary sources like OECD Creditor Reporting System) the share of funding to CSOs and multilaterals. Furthermore, when displaying results for a DP, the monitoring results for the top multilateral organisations funded by that DP will also be indicated. So for the DP profiles and country

results briefs of partner countries, there will be secondary data on the funds providers channel through other co-operation modalities (e.g. multilateral, private sector, CSOs, including domestic CSOs). The assessment (indicator 2) on CSO enabling environment will also continue to provide valuable information about actions by DPs to support and enable CSOs at country level.

- **Need to avoid duplication** of efforts between the GPEDC forum and the DAC and build on each fora's strength and value added. For example, the DAC already tackles effective multilateral donorship (1 DP).

This suggestion is well noted and the monitoring proposal has been developed with attention to not duplicating between the GPEDC and the work/mandate of others, including that of the DAC. The proposed approach to multilateral donorship in the monitoring proposal suggests to draw explicitly on data and analysis on this topic which is development by the Secretariat to the DAC (OECD's Development Co-operation Directorate). See Annex I of the draft monitoring proposal for more details.

- Provide a **detailed monitoring guide** (both on process and framework) for each stakeholder so they are engaged and know what they are going to get from it once it is concluded (1 PC).

A detailed monitoring guide will be developed for national co-ordinators leading the monitoring exercise in their country. The document will contain guidance on the monitoring process and methodology, outlining every step in terms of preparation and launch, data collection and validation, and use of results. A smaller guide will also be developed to provide development partners with the information necessary to engage in and support partner countries participating in the monitoring.

Terms of reference (ToR) will be prepared for other stakeholders with targeted information about their role in the monitoring process, the main activities they can engage in and the profile of a potential focal point. The JST plans to work collaboratively with the different constituencies to develop their respective ToR, prior to resumption of the monitoring exercise in 2023.

- Do not limit monitoring to commitments but also **bring in other data and information** relevant to improving development effectiveness (1 DP).

It will be important that the monitoring remains anchored in the commitments stakeholders have made to effective development co-operation. However, with this reform, and as discussed in both the draft and revised monitoring proposals, there will indeed be other relevant data brought in, both through complementary and secondary data when these can help with interpreting and understanding the monitoring results.

- **Reduce complexity** wherever possible (1 DP); reduce "overload of data requests" and use globally-sourced data wherever possible (1 DP).

Although many stakeholders have stressed the importance of reducing complexity through this reform, this has proven very challenging in practice. The primary reason is that stakeholders have not put forward any core measurement areas to drop from the previous framework. This was acknowledged in the 21st Steering Committee [\[meeting summary\]](#). In addition, many stakeholders have proposed *additions* to the framework. Given these circumstances, it is clear that the framework will not become appreciably leaner. However, the JST has made a concerted effort, in doing the technical work, to balance the addition of new data points with the removal of data points that brought less value in the past, thereby attempting to ensure that on balance the framework does not become more inflated. Globally-sourced data will also be drawn on to the extent possible, while not undercutting the value of the monitoring exercise as one which is led by partner countries.

- Recognise in the framework the other implementation **modalities beyond government-to-government** (1 DP).

The previous framework already recognised in various ways other implementation modalities beyond government-to-government co-operation. For example, the measurement related to how development partners align with country-owned results frameworks can include DPs' interventions which are implemented by various implementing partners including but not limited to government. In the assessment on civil society enabling environment, module 2 will continue to provide an indication of how development partners enable CSOs to act as development actors in their own right. Looking ahead, as noted in the revised monitoring proposal, there will be additional focus on other implementation modalities, including the new Kampala Principles assessment which focuses on private sector engagement through development co-operation. There will also be secondary data, drawn from the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS), which shows the various modalities used by development partners to deliver their co-operation at country level, including but not limited to that delivered directly to the public sector.

- **Technical co-operation should also be a provider modality** included as disbursements to the public sector and used for several indicators (1 DP).

If technical co-operation can be quantified as flows disbursed to the public sector and directly to the public sector, it can be included in the total amount DPs report to those measurements which use that amount as a basis. This was the case in the past as well, but will be made more explicit in the guidance.

- *For those aspects of the focus areas that are unique to development partners, data could be collected directly from headquarters of development partners, through a separate indicator framework for example (1 NE).*

One of the unique features of the GPEDC monitoring exercise is that it generates and collects data at the country level. As part of the monitoring process, development partners are requested to report on their own behaviour at country level, at the request and leadership of the partner country government, once the latter have decided to lead the exercise in their country. These country-level responses from development partners should also be consulted and agreed with their HQs. While there are other data collected at global level from development partners, in the reform's draft proposal there has been careful consideration to not duplicate data or other reporting mechanisms at global level, such as DAC peer reviews (more information [here](#)). When relevant to contextualise the results, data collected at global level may be reported - as secondary data - in country briefs and global report.

- *Consider an indicator to assess commitments to quality climate finance (1 PC, 1 NE).*

When agreeing on the thematic contours of the new framework in mid-2021, Steering Committee discussions did not raise or focus on climate finance. Furthermore, GPEDC would need to do the conceptual and political work on this topic, potentially in connection with the 2022 Summit and the framing of the next GPEDC work program, following which it would be feasible to consider the normative basis and technical feasibility of inclusion in the monitoring. In addition, not adding complexity to the monitoring exercise has been repeatedly highlighted by stakeholders and the Steering Committee as an important guidepost of the reform.

- *Consider a new indicator to capture the extent to which aid is used as a leverage or a catalyst to generate additional resources (taxes, private investments) or to stem losses (illicit flows, poor return on extractive industry contracts, etc.) (1 NE).*

The agreed thematic contours of the new framework did not include as broad an objective as leveraging the catalyst function of aid, which makes the conceptualisation of a full indicator on this challenging. This challenge also relates to the overall issue of limiting the addition of major new elements of the framework to those previously agreed in the Steering Committee (e.g. Kampala Principles).

2. Collective accountability, Whole of Society approach and CSO indicator (indicator 2):

Support expressed:

- The **move from mutual accountability to collective accountability** and Whole of Society approach is welcome (2 DPs). The new contour of collective accountability responds to the broader range of co-operation actors and embraces the Whole of Society approach (1 DP, 1 NE).
- Dialogue between partner country government and civil society is important and **the preservation of indicator 2** is appreciated (1 NE). It is good that new stakeholders are added to the reporting of indicator 2 (2 NEs).
- The use of available **global data** sources will help strengthening global reporting (1 DP, 1 NE).
- The proposal to **reinforce parliamentary oversight** is welcome (1 DP).

Perceived risks:

- Collective accountability could give the impression that the focus on **partner country governments' accountability is fading** (1 DP).

The focus on collective accountability has in large part materialised in the form of more entry points for stakeholders to be engaged in the monitoring exercise, including being better represented in the evidence collected through the exercise. This does not mean that the stakeholder-specific accountability (whether for partner country governments or others) is weakened, as there will be continuity all the existing core measurement areas (and associated commitments).

- **Indicator 2 may not apply as well to trade unions and particularly to foundations**; a revised set of module questions should at least be created for foundations (1 NE).

See responses to relevant feedback points below, which touch on this issue.

- **Parliamentary oversight is not a legal requirement in all countries** and creating a role for it could cause important delays in the development co-operation process (1 PC).

It has been proposed that the revised monitoring framework captures core evidence on whether partner country governments provide parliaments with information they receive on development co-operation. This responds to the commitment made by partner country governments, reflected in the Nairobi Outcome Document, to share information with parliaments, to promote and support their full participation in processes for developing and reviewing policies and modalities for development co-operation. If the legal framework in a particular country is in conflict with this global commitment, this would be a useful point of discussion for the Action Dialogue, for contextualising the monitoring results.

Suggestions provided:

- Explore simple, practical **adjustments to indicator 2 in light of the DAC CSO Recommendation** (1 DP, 2 NEs).

In consultation with experts, the JST identified nine different elements of the DAC Recommendation on Enabling Civil Society in Development Co-operation and Humanitarian Assistance that are assessed by indicator 2 questions. These questions are part of module 3 of indicator 2, which looks at the relation between development partners and CSOs, and module 2, which focuses on the effectiveness, accountability and transparency of CSOs. The data collected for these questions can be used to illustrate trends on the implementation of the DAC Recommendation, which is especially relevant for the 5-year reporting mark. The GPEDC data includes the perception of partner country governments, development partners and CSOs about each of these elements and will be comparable with 2018 results.

One of the limitations of indicator 2 for the purpose of tracking implementation of the Recommendation is that it does not capture information **per** development partner in a country, but for the collective group of development partners, including non-DAC members. A focal point is identified to respond to the indicator

questions on behalf of all development partners working in the country, which means that the data produced by this indicator cannot be used to assess a specific development partner. Having specific information per development partner would require a different methodology, with questions to be answered by each development partner present in each partner country participating in the monitoring.

- **Measures of CSO accountability** could include commitments on quality disaggregated data generation and transparency, on ensuring aid is inclusive and provided without discrimination (1 DP).

The existing module 2 of indicator 2 assesses CSO accountability and transparency through 4 questions, each containing a 4-level scale that reflects progress towards an ideal scenario. For each question, respondents (focal points of partner country government, development partners and CSOs) are asked to identify which of the 4 levels best reflects the reality in the country. The first question also captures whether partnerships between CSOs are equitable and based on mutual interest, and it considers if smaller CSOs are typically disadvantaged. This module and its four questions are being maintained in the new monitoring framework. Regarding aid provided to CSOs, secondary data can complement the GPEDC monitoring data. A valuable source is the OECD-CRS based “Aid for CSOs” statistics. These statistics show how much official development assistance is provided for CSOs/NGOs, disaggregated per type of CSO (Donor-country based, International and Developing country-based CSOs) and per form of assistance (core and earmarked).

- **Consult with philanthropies** to decide upon the exact reporting format that small, local foundations will use to report on their enabling environment (1 NE).

After discussion with the philanthropy network, a few actions were identified to strengthen their participation in the CSO enabling environment assessment (indicator 2) and more generally in the monitoring process. Terms of reference will be prepared with information about the role of foundations in the process and the main entry points for their engagement. Guidance for participating governments and CSO focal points will emphasise the importance of engaging philanthropy during the inception phase, as well as during the use-of-results phase (Action Dialogue and follow to it), and in the indicator 2 assessment. A complementary module to indicator 2 will allow philanthropies to provide their views to questions that are particularly relevant for them which will feed the discussion with the government and development partners. The names and organisations consulted in the process will be captured to increase their opportunities to remain connected to the monitoring process in their countries. A similar approach is also envisioned for trade unions, to strengthen their participation in the CSO enabling environment indicator and more generally in the monitoring process.

- *In line with a whole-of-society approach, **broaden the concept of ownership** beyond government as the owner and implementer of the development process. Clarify how this will be reflected in indicators 2 and 7 (1 DP).*

The 2030 Agenda recognises the government as leading the development process in their own country, and the monitoring exercise responds to that. In the monitoring, this is explicitly recognised with the measurement of alignment (to country owned results frameworks). On this basis, indicator 1a is recognised as the source of data for the SDG target (17.15) on respecting countries’ policy space and leadership. Indicator 7 enshrines the idea that governments have the responsibility for establishing and ensuring the quality of mutual accountability mechanisms. But the indicator also emphasises that part of the government’s responsibility is to ensure inclusive participation in those mechanisms. This element of the indicator, related to the engagement of different actors, was part of the 2017 revision to strengthen the indicator.

As related to indicator 2, the proposal is to strengthen the whole-of-society approach here, by giving more emphasis on reporting by trade unions and foundations as well as CSOs. One element of ownership that is partially captured in indicator 2 is the recognition that CSOs should be supported in their

own right and based on CSO proposals derived from their own objectives and partnerships, and not only by objectives defined through the priorities of a given development partner. A question in module 3 of indicator 2 already assesses to what extent development partner financial support maximises sustainable engagement of CSOs in all aspects of development. This question will be maintained and results can be discussed in Action Dialogues in order to identify potential drivers, challenges and how to address them.

This point of feedback also raises the issue of the role of the government as implementer of development activities. On the one hand, it is important to emphasise that the monitoring does recognise that implementation is not limited to a government-to-government modality. Indicator 1a on alignment recognises that, at the intervention level, implementation may be with/through non-government partners. One important change in the new monitoring will be to give the chance for DPs to explain their reasons for non-alignment with government-identified priorities. The FCAS adaptation will also recognise that in those contexts, there are reasonably different expectations of working with and supporting the government. For example, in the FCAS adaptation there will be exploration of how, in such contexts, different expectations for the use of PFM systems could apply.

- *While the framework includes the responsibility of partner countries to share information with parliaments, it should also include the **responsibility of development partners** to provide timely information to their partner country national counterparts (1 DP).*

The framework will continue to capture whether development partners are reporting information on their development co-operation to partner countries, via the systems that partner country governments establish to collect this information. It will also continue to track, but put more emphasis on, whether partner country governments make this information publicly available. A data collection point will be added (as complementary information) which asks to DPs about their efforts to make information about their co-operation available at country level, when partner country government systems for this do not exist, are inadequate, or when partner country governments collect the information from DPs but do not make it publicly available.

- *Explore adjustment to indicator 6 to reinforce measures of parliamentary oversight by including a measure of the share of development co-operation provided through direct budget support (1 NE).*

[Note: the JST and Co-Chairs had a discussion in early 2022 with the stakeholder who provided this feedback. The stakeholder clarified that the suggestion was not to make changes to how indicator 6 is calculated, but rather to also capture the share of disbursements to the public sector which is provided as direct budget support.] When the post-Busan monitoring framework was developed under the guidance of the Post-Busan Interim Group, it was decided to no longer track the commitment to provide direct budget support. It would require a negotiated process to re-introduce this as a commitment to be tracked through the GPEDC monitoring, and is thus beyond the agreed scope of the current reform. However, at the partner country level, governments should have information available on the volume of international co-operation provided as direct budget support, and this could be brought in, as part of Action Dialogues, as secondary data to enrich the reflection on monitoring results.

- *Include information on public-private partnership contracts, extractive industry contracts and foreign loan agreements under the proposed addition to indicator 4b regarding government efforts to provide information to parliaments (1 NE).*

In the monitoring proposal, it was suggested that a question be added under Indicator 4 (at country-level, not the global level transparency indicator) on the extent to which the executive branch of the government is sharing information on all development co-operation resources with the parliament to aid their oversight role. Transparency concerning development co-operation finance flows are captured under the new country-level transparency component, however this does not include specific types of partnerships, as would be the case when looking at contracts or companies that governments enter into contracts with. A separate question dedicated to this would require inclusion of much wider and

more specific types of partnership contracts that partner country governments enter into in their co-operation with private sector actors.

- *If parliaments are regularly invited to Action Dialogues and exit surveys, there is no need to ask partner country governments whether they shared previous GPEDC monitoring results with them (1 NE).*

This is well noted and will be taken into consideration.

3. Private sector engagement (PSE) & Kampala Principles (KPs):

Note on PSE and Kampala Principles monitoring: An initial draft of the Kampala Principles assessment questions and approach has been circulated as part of the revised monitoring proposal (as Annex II). Given that the draft assessment will be subject to additional dedicated consultations and inputs from experts, iterative revisions will continue to take into consideration the initial feedback from stakeholders on the overall parameters of the assessment, which were outlined in the draft monitoring proposal.

Support expressed:

- *The reflection of the Kampala Principles and the role of private sector in development co-operation in the monitoring exercise is appreciated (3 PCs, 2 DPs, 1 NE).*
- *The suggestions regarding a revised indicator 3 opens up new opportunities to review the role of the private sector through the lens of the effectiveness principles (1 NE).*
- *Basing the private sector engagement indicator on the methodology used to measure the enabling environment for CSOs is a good approach that can lead to a robust indicator (1 NE).*

Perceived risks:

- *There may be low uptake of the Kampala Principles by stakeholders in the early stages of the next monitoring round (1 NE).*

Suggestions provided:

- *Provide more detailed and operational options to monitor the Kampala Principles (e.g. inclusion of PSE in policies, strategies and results frameworks; contribution of the private sector to development results; effective partnering of the private sector) (1 NE).*
- *Provide additional guidance on the selection of stakeholders for the Kampala Principles assessment (1 NE).*
- *Include a measure of the respect for labour rights by the private sector in the assessment module of the indicator (1 NE) as well as a measure of whether public-private partnership contracts are submitted to national parliaments for review (1 NE).*
- *Clarify links between the monitoring framework and the measurement of the Kampala Principles (1 DP).*
- *Better articulate the Kampala Principles to the OECD Private finance for sustainable development (PF4SD) initiative and its Impact standards for financing sustainable development, that look at how investors can enhance their contribution to the SDGs, promote impact integrity and avoid "SDG washing" (1 PC).*
- *Go beyond an indicator and refocus the monitoring efforts on capturing the impact of the private sector's behaviour on the realisation of effective development co-operation, the Leaving No One Behind pledge and, ultimately, of the SDGs (1 NE).*

4. Leaving no one behind (LNOB):

Support expressed:

- *The proposal to capture LNOB more explicitly is relevant (3 PCs, 4 DPs). Measuring it could be a pioneering exercise which raises the political profile of the monitoring, enhance new participation and*

- engage more stakeholders (1 PC, 1 DP, 1 NE).
- With one exception (1 DP), participants agree that LNOB should **not feature as a standalone indicator**/separate set of indicators (1 PC, 1 DP, 1 NE).
- The framework already captures some **commitments on gender** and could strive to **reinforce those** (2 NEs).

Suggestions provided:

- It is important to use **national statistics that are disaggregated**, rather than relying mostly on aggregate data which hide many disparities (1 PC).

Please refer to the revised monitoring proposal, which now elaborates in detail how LNOB will be measured through the monitoring framework, including how it will capture data disaggregation.

- **More elaboration is needed on how LNOB will be measured.** The system should adequately recognise and reward explicit policy commitments, targeting and results for LNOB (1 DP).

Please refer to the revised monitoring proposal, which now elaborates in detail how LNOB is proposed to be measured through the monitoring framework.

- If LNOB is to be given prominence, need **to think about how it interplays with other important topics** like PSE, FCAS, and South-South Co-operation (1 DP).

The draft Kampala Principles assessment includes data points on the intersection between LNOB and PSE, and this is anticipated for the FCAS adaptation as well. The monitoring approach for SSC is being developed under the leadership of Colombia, in consultation with seven pilot countries, to determine the most relevant and appropriate elements to monitor on the effectiveness of SSC.

- The monitoring framework should **recognise the catalytic effects of Official Development Assistance (ODA)**, in particular of resources directed towards the commitment on LNOB (1 DP).
- Under LNOB, **development partners should be monitored for their aid allocations to countries** (too often still based on geopolitical considerations, not on relative actual needs) (1 NE).

[In response to the above two feedback points] While it is appreciated that one way to look at LNOB is to reflect how the distribution of development co-operation from providers is taking place across countries and whether providers are targeting those countries most in need - the GPEDC monitoring focuses on measuring elements relevant to LNOB at country level, in line with the nature of its overall exercise, which looks at the “how” rather than “how much” funding is provided. It is also important to note that, focusing on allocations to countries runs the risk of not representing the complexity of LNOB, which persists even within countries (e.g. within MICs or UMICS, inequalities can be very high and with an important part of the population left behind; fragile contexts/SIDS may not be those with lower income, but still some groups of the population in these countries may face significant risks and vulnerabilities). In terms of country allocations of ODA, the OECD providers’ profiles on development co-operation already provide this type of contextual information.

- The focus on LNOB is mainly a few data points suggested for several of the existing indicators, which could be highlighted clearly under each principle, with an overarching message on this aspect, **without requiring to move away from the development effectiveness principles framework to a specific focus area** (1 NE).

The response from stakeholders to the draft monitoring proposal to include a specific focus areas on LNOB was almost uniformly positive, and in its 22nd meeting (December 2021), the Steering Committee agreed that technical work should proceed on the basis of the proposed four focus areas (referred to as dimensions in the revised proposal).

- Consider **adding some questions to indicator 2** (module 4) to allow for some of those considered “left behind” to offer their own reflections on the quality of country engagements (1 NE).

Module 4 of indicator 2 assesses the legal, regulatory and political environment of countries and to what extent it allows CSOs to exercise their civic rights. A question in this module focuses particularly on the environment for CSOs working with vulnerable and marginalised groups of the population. The wording of this question and of the answer options (levels and characteristics of practice) has been revised to better reflect the current terminology used for LNOB and to make more explicit reference to vulnerable and marginalised groups. This will allow a better use of the evidence emerging from the assessment and more relevant messaging. In addition to these revisions, more explicit guidance will be provided to the CSO focal points to reach out to NGOs/civil society groups which represent, or have membership of, those considered to be left behind in the country. This would provide an entry point to those groups to offer their own reflections about their enabling environment (although still aggregated as one CSO answer in the reporting).

- While the current monitoring framework already generates data that could be relevant to the Nairobi Outcome Document commitment on youth and children, additional work is required to **streamline the indicators** (1a, 1b, 2, 7, 8) and further development is needed on the segments on youth employment and empowerment; as well as ODA targeted at children (1 NE).

The revised framework will generate various data points specific to youth and children that can be used to hold governments accountable for their commitments. This includes information on engagement and participation of youth in development by looking at whether: partner country governments have consulted CSOs representing youth and children in the development of the national development strategy; the national development strategy/CRF defines development priorities for youth and children; disaggregated targets, results indicators and data are available to monitor progress; development partners have consulted CSOs representing youth and children in the development of their country strategy and whether that strategy sets development priorities for them. The nature of the GPEDC monitoring, however, does not allow to provide more granular information related to what specific resources and policies country governments or development partners are putting in place to support youth employment and youth empowerment.

The share of ODA targeted at children, is a type of information that cannot be generated through the monitoring, which does not focus on disaggregation of ODA funds for any group of the population. This information is however reported by development partners to other existing global systems and processes (e.g. to the OECD systems/IATI) and should not be re-collected/duplicated by the GPEDC. These systems include broader and more detailed information on ODA funding, which allows interested stakeholders to extract information on ODA that targets youth and children.

We also take note of the suggestion to reflect whether systems are in place in partner countries to track budget allocations for youth and children. It will not be feasible to add a comprehensive assessment on the existence and strength of such systems. However, a complementary question will be added which asks whether the country has in place similar systems [to those in place focused on allocations for women and girls] to track and make public budget allocations for other segments of the population, including but not limited to youth and children.

- Consider adding a data point on the percentage of women in national parliaments under indicator 8 (1 NE).

It would be duplicative for the GPEDC monitoring to collect this information from participating countries as this specific data point is already collected elsewhere: SDG indicator 5.5.1 “Proportion of seats held by women in (a) national parliaments and (b) local governments”. The share of women in national parliaments is also monitored monthly by the Inter-Parliamentary Union. The feasibility of including this as secondary data in the country results brief, in connection with the results of the 5.c.1 assessment, will be explored.

5. Transparency:

Support expressed:

- **Transparency remains important** in the context of effective development co-operation and as such should remain in the monitoring framework (1 PC).

Suggestions provided:

- Reformulate the information collected on AIMS to **focus on government making the information publicly available** rather than focusing on having a system (1 PC).

During consultations stakeholders called for more focus on transparency, and particularly country-level transparency, in the framework, as also indicated in this feedback point. In the revised monitoring proposal there is indeed more emphasis on partner country governments making development co-operation information publicly available. At the same time, there will continue to be a focus on the importance of strengthening the associated partner country systems. This recognises that governments cannot make such information public unless they have a system in place to collect the information. It also recalls the commitment made in Busan (§23b) to establish transparent aid information management systems.

- Capture data on whether partner country governments make publically available supreme auditors' reports (or equivalent) (indicator 1b) (1 NE).

As the PEFA assessment looks into the independence of supreme audit institutions in a country, as well as whether the government's external audits and/or annual financial statements are regularly submitted to the legislature, it will be duplicative to include this as well in the GPEDC monitoring.

- Suggest to further specify whether **AIMS in partner countries are compatible** with the IATI standard (1 DP).

There is no explicit, agreed commitment that holds partner countries to account for ensuring their AIMS are compatible with the IATI standard. As such, it would not be appropriate to include it in the framework. However, in the country-level dialogue which is to take place based on the monitoring results, this could be a point of discussion between DPs and the partner country, as both parties could share their views and experiences on the benefits and trade-offs of adapting AIMS to be compatible with the IATI standard.

- Propose **changes to the OECD/FSS methodology** to improve predictability and better align with the Busan commitments (1 DP).

The FSS methodology is under custodianship and control of the OECD DAC Working Party on Development Finance Statistics (WP-STAT), and therefore changes to it are beyond the scope of the GPEDC monitoring reform. Members of WP-STAT could provide suggestions for improvement directly to the Working Party.

6. Country results frameworks (CRF):

Perceived risks:

- National co-ordinators may **not have enough expertise and knowledge to inform** which among the 17 SDGs are included in their National Development Strategies/CRF at goal, target and indicator level (1 NE).

Noting this risk, the idea (which was tested in the draft monitoring proposal) of asking national co-ordinators to report on the inclusion of individual SDGs has not been retained in the revised monitoring proposal.

- **Important elements may be lost with the removal of the fourth 1a sub-indicator.** An alternative could be to ask development partners for the number of evaluations carried out in the reporting year (as a total), and how many are carried out together with country level actors and/or shared with the government, other development partners and/or country level stakeholders (1 NE).

The data collected through this fourth sub-indicator on evaluations was not well-used in the past. Furthermore, for some projects, it may not be relevant or appropriate for the government to be involved in the final evaluation. In order not to increase the complexity of the framework, there has been an attempt to identify assessment questions/data points which could be removed. This is to use that "space" to add data points which respond to the expectations of multiple stakeholders, gathered through consultations, of areas where the GPEDC should enhance its focus and/or begin to collect evidence. This point of feedback, expressing hesitation about removing the sub-indicator on evaluations, was standalone (one stakeholder).

Suggestions provided:

- When removing complementary questions that do not produce relevant evidence, **retain the question that asks how the 2030 Agenda and SDGs are referenced in the development strategies or plans** (at strategic, goal, target or indicator level) (1 NE).

This suggestion has been taken into account and the question is proposed to be retained.

7. Quality and Use of country systems (UCS):

Support expressed:

- It is good to **continue promoting the strengthening of partner country systems** (1 DP).
- The proposed **emphasis on data and statistics is welcome** as they are essential to all four effectiveness principles and constitute an important part of country systems (1 DP, 1 NE).

Perceived risks:

- UCS has been **limited to the quantification of use of public financial management systems**, which does not capture different realities and contexts (1 DP).
- **Measure beyond public financial management systems** and "accept" use of other country systems for planning, auditing, program planning (2 DPs); include budget support (1 DP).

[In response to the above two feedback points] The use of PFM systems is an important and long-standing indicator; it was included in the original Paris indicator framework. The importance and relevance of this commitment made by DPs has been emphasised by partner countries, including as part of the 'unfinished business' agenda. Diluting it (for example, by making a composite of UCS by having an index based on a DP's performance on use of various national systems) cannot happen at technical level as it would require re-opening negotiation of the commitments, which is beyond the scope of the reform. However, it is very relevant that a DP's performance on use of PFM systems is often inaccurately communicated in short hand as being equated with performance on country systems [more broadly]. In the future, it will be made clearer in the results presentation and communications, that the score for this indicator is limited to the use of PFM country systems. To measure beyond public financial management systems, a DP's results related to use of other systems (including CRFs, data and statistics, for which evidence is gathered through the monitoring) will be highlighted as well, so as to provide a more accurate representation of the fact that use of PFM systems cannot be understood to mean overall use of country systems. As concerns the inclusion of data on share of budget support, this can be provided as secondary data in the DPs' profiles.

Suggestions provided:

- More clearly **define the assessment criteria for "quality"** of national systems, as it is considered too ambiguous currently (2 PCs).

In the revised framework, as presented in the revised proposal, there will be more emphasis on the “state” of systems rather than the “quality”, as the extent to which the assessments fully assess quality is uneven across the different national systems that the GPEDC looks at. Attendant guidance and methodologies will define the criteria against which measures of the state and/or quality are assessed.

- Capture **development partners’ support towards enhanced national systems** (e.g. support to co-ordination/information management systems) rather than only the use of country systems (1 DP).

This suggestion has been taken into account. It is proposed (see details in the revised monitoring proposal) to provide the opportunity for DPs to report on their support to strengthen several country systems of the partner country government in the revised monitoring. This will be captured as complementary data, and can be an input to the Action Dialogues.

8. Untied aid:

Support expressed:

- The review of the framework offers an opportunity to **capture the increasing role of the private sector** in development effectiveness and expand its reach on untying ODA with a view to capturing more data on both formal and informal tying. This enhanced indicator should draw both from DAC members’ data on contract awards and from the experience of governments in the global south (1 NE).

Suggestions provided :

- The monitoring framework could capture the extent to which information on the largest procurement bids and contracts are publically available at country level and shared with national parliaments (1 NE).

In the draft monitoring proposal, it was suggested that a question be added under Indicator 4 (at country-level, not the global level transparency indicator) on the extent to which the executive branch of the government is sharing information on all development co-operation resources with the parliament to aid their oversight role. Transparency concerning of development co-operation finance flows is captured under the new country-level transparency component, however this does not include specific types of partnerships, as would be the case when looking at contracts or companies that governments enter into contracts with. A separate question dedicated to this would require inclusion of much wider and more specific types of partnership contracts that partner country governments enter into in their co-operation with private sector actors.

9. South-South Co-operation (SSC):

Suggestions provided:

- Develop **specific SSC indicators** and ensure that middle-income countries and those with a dual role **are adequately reflected in the revised framework** (2 PCs).

Colombia, as lead of [Action Area 2.3](#), is leading work to develop and pilot an assessment of the effectiveness of SSC. More information on the outcomes of this work will be made available by Colombia, in due course.