Future of the GPEDC Monitoring Framework:
To Sink or to Sail?

by

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17 November 2017
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Acknowledgment

The author thankfully acknowledges the competent research support received from Mr Mishaal Masud Sinha, Research Associate, Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), Dhaka. The author is grateful to those experts who have generously shared with him their thoughts and views about the state of GPEDC and its future.
1. Introduction

As the implementation process of “2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” gathers momentum, issues related to its accountability mechanism are also gaining prominence. It is envisaged that the “follow-up and review” (FUR) of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), while introducing a number new elements (e.g. the Voluntary National Review, VNR), will essentially build on the existing mechanisms for promoting accountability in international development cooperation. In this connection, it has become a matter of great interest to explore to what extent the monitoring framework of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) is serviceable for keeping track of the progress achieved on the ground regarding the goals and targets of the new global agenda. The relevance of the GPEDC’s monitoring framework is also being revisited in the context of the renewed debate regarding search for new metrics of aid effectiveness (or development effectiveness). Adoption of Programme of Work by GPEDC for 2017-2018 has also provided some much needed boost to the partnership.

Admittedly, GPEDC is currently the only global mechanism available that seeks to instil mutual accountability in development cooperation in general and aid relationship in particular. From that perspective, the monitoring framework of the GPEDC, which is the “jewel in the crown” of the partnership, may be considered as an important instrument for following up and reviewing certain results of the SDG process as well as that of the Addis Ababa Agenda for Action (A4). A fuller comparative comparison between the SDG targets and indicators with those of the GPEDC’s monitoring indicators will reveal the scope of such possibility. Moreover, there may be other opportunities in the FUR process of the 2030 Agenda, for example in the VNRs process, where the results from GPEDC aid effectiveness surveys may be used fruitfully. Such broader use of the outputs of the GPEDC’s monitoring exercise could also find place in other international development cooperation mechanism, e.g. Development Cooperation Forum (DCF).

However, the international development cooperation landscape has changed structurally and significantly in the recent past. These new developments have given rise to issues fundamentally questioning suitability of GPEDC as a universal (beyond DAC/OECD countries) arrangement for promoting accountability of both aid providers
and aid recipients. For example, with the rise of the Global South (i.e. non-OECD countries) in the world economy, Southern aid providers are enhancing their contribution in the concessional financial flows to other developing countries. This emerging aid regime is giving rise to a set of framework issues which are essentially different from those of the traditional North-South as well as Triangular Cooperation (aid) relationship. The emerging aid regime is also underpinned by the changing numerical composition of the developing countries where the share of middle income countries (MICs) is expanding, while the low-income countries (LICs) is falling. Similarly, diversification of instruments (e.g. emergence of blended finance, result-based finance) and greater role of the non-state actors (particularly private philanthropy) in the aid-supported development programmes have also posited new demands on GPEDC. Indeed, paucity of data is also turning out to be a major constraint in addressing these new challenges regarding international development cooperation.

**Objective.** In this context, the core objective of the present paper is to assess the challenges and opportunities for repositioning the GPEDC monitoring framework, making it suitable for the evolving development landscape.

To this end, the paper pursues to address the following questions.

i. What should be the main function of the monitoring framework given the emerging global development landscape including emergence of new actors;

ii. How can the monitoring framework be linked to SDG and Addis Ababa Action Agenda (A4) related process; and

iii. What are the options for making GPEDC monitoring framework more relevant and effective?

**Information base and Methodology.** In preparing the paper, the author has (i) reviewed both official and analytical documents related to GPEDC; (ii) debriefed a number of experts from bilateral and international development agencies; and (iii) drawn on personal exposure and experience concerning the international development cooperation processes and the Monitoring Advisory Group (MAG) of the GPEDC.
The analytical approach deployed in the paper relates to process-based historical narrative, comparative assessment of frameworks and structured scrutiny of policies and decisions.

**Layout.** The paper has three core sections. *First,* it reviews the emergence and evolution of GPEDC and seeks to identify the strength, weakness, threat and opportunity (SWoT) of the monitoring framework (Section II). This section also reviews MAG’s approach and outputs regarding the monitoring framework. How can the framework complement the existing monitoring processes in the UN System, particularly that related to SDG and A4 have been explored in Section III. An indicator-based comparative analysis (SDGs and GPEDC) has been included in this section. Section IV puts forward the options available in the present scenario for making the GPEDC more relevant and effective. A number of concrete proposal in this regard has been articulated in this section.
2. Evolution of GPEDC Monitoring Mechanism and Current Challenges

2.1 Emergence and Evolution of GPEDC

Although GPEDC was established in Busan in 2011, its origin may be traced back to the UN’s Financing for Development Conference (FfD) held in Monterrey in 2002. Between 2002 and 2011, three High Level Forums (HLF) on Aid Effectiveness – held in Rome (2003), Paris (2005) and Accra (2008) – provided the necessary platform for international dialogue regarding how to address the obvious structural shortcomings of the existing North-South development cooperation regime (see Figure 2.1). One of the high points of this process was adoption of the “Paris Principles” in 2005, viz. (i) ownership of development priorities by developing countries, (ii) focus on results, (iii) inclusive partnership, and (iv) transparency and mutual accountability – for promoting aid effectiveness.

Figure 2.1: GPEDC Milestones

Source: Based on various GPEDC-related documents.
The post-Busan dialogue was carried forward through two High Level Meetings (HLMs) that took place in Mexico City (2014) and Nairobi (2016). These HLFs and HLMs gave rise to a series of agreements that increasingly aspired to expand donor commitments to better activities, focus on nationally determined priorities, and enhance efforts to monitor and assure results. In conjunction, developing countries committed to taking stronger leadership to guide donor efforts and facilitate approaches to development (Keijzer & Lundsgaarde, 2016).

Currently, 161 countries, 56 organisations have endorsed the core principles of GPEDC.\(^1\) The highest policy making body of GPEDC is the ministerial level meeting which usually takes place every three year. In between, GPEDC is led by a Steering Committee. The Steering Committee of GPEDC currently has twenty-one members (including both recipient and provider countries of development cooperation), international financial institutions, UN System, business sector, public representatives and civil society. The Steering Committee has three Co-Chairs – one each from OECD member country, aid recipient developing country and South-South Cooperation provider country. Most recently a non-executive Co-Chair has been appointed representing non-government stakeholders (e.g. NGOs and CSOs, parliamentarians and philanthropy, private sector and trade unions). However, it remains to be seen how non-government stakeholders plan to work in collaboration other Co-Chairs to increase the impact of GPEDC (Bena & Tomlinson, 2017). The technical and administrative backup of GPEDC is provided by a Joint Support Team (JST) located in OECD (Paris) and UNDP (New York) (see Figure 2.2).

As has been mentioned earlier, GPEDC adopted a monitoring framework in 2012 following Busan Partnership Agreement, to track progress towards more effective development cooperation. The framework was developed by the Post-Busan Interim Group and comprised of ten indicators.

The intentions behind the creation of the set of indicators (at the Busan HLM in 2011) was being able to monitor progress against the commitments agreed to in Busan

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alongside those set out in Paris (2005) and in Accra (2008). The monitoring was to be coordinated by the OECD-UNDP Joint Support Team of the newly established GPEDC. In other words, the purpose of the framework was to essentially capture behaviour change, i.e. how stakeholders (provider and recipients) were engaging in development cooperation, and how effective they were in their tasks of improving effectiveness of aid flow.

**Figure 2.2: GPEDC Governance Structure**

The monitoring approach recognised country leadership in operationalising the Global Monitoring Framework. The former involved data collection and validation led by the developing country governments themselves, in consultation with development partners (providers, CSOs, private sector), and was to be grounded within existing national processes, when possible. The OECD-UNDP JST is to take responsibility to coordinate the aggregation of existing data, produce global Progress Reports to inform ministerial-level meetings on a biennial basis. Till date two rounds of survey has been
managed by the OECD/UNDP JST. A total number of 46 countries\(^2\) participated in the Survey for 2013-14 and the corresponding number for 2015-16 was 81\(^3\). Preparation is being undertaken for the next round of Survey in 2018.

It is to be noted that, in pursuing its mandate, GPEDC encountered a number of challenges including limited data availability and tight timeframe for broad stakeholder consultation. While all the indicators have evolved since their inception about six years back, there still remain avenues to strengthen them even further.

**Evolution of the framework.** Following the framework’s inception in 2012, at the third Global Partnership Steering Committee Meeting (July 2013) at Addis Ababa, the consultative process lead to finalisation of the country monitoring guidance paper. The meeting produced the outcome document titled “Overview and status of global monitoring efforts”\(^4\). The document aimed to provide an overview of the scope of the monitoring process, and steps envisaged to collect, analyse, and disseminate the findings. The document was essentially reinforcing the political mandate for global monitoring as well as supporting country-led data collection and dialogue. It also provided a brief description on the status of “new” indicators that did not draw on the previous framework of the Paris Declaration.

The first monitoring round of the Global Partnership resulted in the 2014 Progress Report\(^5\). Drawing on the lessons learned from implementing the first monitoring round, the report supported a common understanding regarding the necessity of further strengthening the monitoring framework – both for the upcoming second Global Partnership monitoring round as well as in the context of the post-2015 implementation and accountability efforts. The first monitoring round created optimism

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regarding the possibility of having a country-led approach concerning global accountability of international development cooperation. It engaged 46 developing countries and over 70 providers of development cooperation as well as provided a global snapshot of the state of implementation on the six indicators that were established already during earlier global monitoring processes.

The next milestone in the evolution of the GPEDC monitoring framework had been the fifth Global Partnership Steering Committee Meeting (February 2014), held in Abuja. This was the final preparatory meeting before the High Level Meeting in Mexico City (2014). The outcome document of Mexico HLM titled “Outline of key findings emerging from the monitoring evidence: Global Partnership Monitoring Framework”. The document notes that 43 developing countries had submitted their data and completed the monitoring exercise – two years after Busan. The document also suggested that for a more comprehensive review of the global arrangements (planned for 2015) demands much more progress in the area of data availability and data collection methods.

At the seventh Global Partnership Steering Committee Meeting (January 2015) held at The Hague, ways and means towards further strengthening of the monitoring framework was endorsed. The output document captioned “Strengthening the Global Partnership Monitoring Framework” provided an update, along with recommendations to Steering Committee members, on advancing the process forward. Furthermore, it provided an analysis of the piloting of the set of four new indicators – specifically focusing on approaches to further develop them, and the ways forward for meeting the identified challenges.

The Steering Committee members at its seventh meeting (January 2015) also expressed their broad support for improving both the framework as well as the monitoring process through enhanced stakeholder consultations and the establishment of a

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6 Ibid.


technical advisory group. This decision formed the basis for the creation of the Monitoring Advisory Group (MAG)\(^9\). Later, MAG met for the first time in May 2015 in New York. We address the recommendations of the MAG in detail in Section 2.3.

In view of the Nairobi HLM (2016) and taking note of MAG’s recommendation, at the fourteenth Steering Committee Meeting of the Global Partnership (April 2017), in Dhaka the concept note on “The Global Partnership Monitoring Framework for 2030” was unveiled. It emphasised the need to re-examine measuring the effectiveness of development cooperation in the context of three interrelated pillars of the 2030 Agenda, i.e. the economic, social and environmental dimensions. Moreover, it highlighted the current shortcomings and proposed improvements for the four *effectiveness* indicators, which included improving the guidance and validation processes, accessing data on tied aid levels, and simplifying reporting, among others.

As the foregoing longitudinal account suggests, the GPEDC monitoring framework has been a product of a series of deliberations, pilot projects, sequential expansion and refinements. All these have shaped the framework as it stands today.

### 2.2 A SWOT Analysis of the Monitoring Framework

Over the last 15 years, the GPEDC monitoring framework has undergone a number of changes. With a view to pursue a country-driven process, these changes were geared to support accountability for the delivery of development cooperation commitments. In order to seek ways and means to make GPEDC exercise more relevant and effective, one would need to have a proper understanding of its strength, weakness, opportunities and threats (SWOT) characterising the framework at this point of time.

**Strength.** GPEDC currently provides a monitoring framework that is inclusive of diverse stakeholders and instils a degree of mutual accountability among major actors involved in international development cooperation. Even in the absence of an enforcement mechanism, the exercise exerts peer pressure on these actors. The outputs of the monitoring exercise supplies a large volume of empirical material in order to have

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evidence-based dialogue among the stakeholders. The exercise promotes the pursuit of policy coherence for development in the provider countries. The implementation of two rounds of surveys have also encouraged development partners to follow a common methodology and standards, as well as make disclosure of those information. The recent endorsement of the “2017 and 2018 Programme of Work” and budget for its implementation has energised the GPEDC process. The Dhaka meeting of the Steering Committee (October 2017) has further consolidated that process.

Weakness. One of the major weaknesses of GPEDC monitoring framework is that it enjoys limited attention from the emerging economies. Indeed, it is widely held that GPEDC is a DAC/OECD-led process which lacks popular legitimacy (Abdel-Malek, 2015; Li, 2017). Limited engagement of the private (for profit) sector, NGOs/CSOs and private philanthropy have further fuelled this adverse perception. Ambiguity in engagement with other international processes has also created confusion regarding its universal nature. Critics also point out that OECD countries themselves lack coordination and cooperation between the headquarter and country office as well as between different associated department at the headquarter.

It has been maintained that GPEDC has limited impact to foster meaningful dialogue among the partners (Chandran & Cooper, 2015). Conventional political and technical language still dominates the entire agenda (Li, 2017) and this could be one of the constraints for having meaningful dialogues. The Busan indicators focussed on the process and practice of how development cooperation should be done, but lacks clear and concise number of measurable targets. A large number of distractors point out that absence of follow-up commitments regarding the findings (not to mention its non-binding nature) is a significant structural weaknesses of the GPEDC monitoring framework (Abdel-Malek, 2015; Besharati, 2013).

Opportunities. It is reckoned that GPEDC is well positioned to make a contribution to post-2015 Agenda because of the way development cooperation is changing

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11 It has been, conversely, also argued that the sheer plethora of partners and stakeholders gathered around the GPEDC umbrella has broadened the agenda, but has also diluted it (Besharati, 2013).
Bhattacharya, Rashmi, & Mahfuze (2016) have argued that 2030 Agenda presents a unique opportunity to GPEDC framework to reinvent itself by substantially contributing to the FUR process of SDGs and A4. Thus, there are opportunities for GPEDC, for example, to channel its monitoring related outputs to the VNR process at the High Level Political Framework (HLPF).

Beyond the “core” function of norm-setting and monitoring, GPEDC can continually deepen and update evidence about what makes development cooperation more effective (Carter, 2016). One may cite in this regard the possibility of aligning provider’s budget cycle to country, budget cycle – now that “aid in budget” has been defined “as reviewed by the parliament”. Similarly, there are other opportunities to streamline project financing and disbursement.

The level of dynamism that the GPEDC framework demonstrates has been often defined by the political traction it enjoys among the lead countries from DAC/OECD. In this connection, election of Germany as a Co-chair is being considered to be an opportunity to consolidate and improve the relevance and efficiency of the framework.

**Threats.** The major threat to GPEDC framework possibly emanates from the DAC/OECD countries themselves. Enthusiasm about the monitoring framework in particular and GPEDC platform in general is not shared equally by these countries. Given the voluntary nature of the original commitments, traditional providers have often shied away from the exercise and demonstrated lack of consequential attention to the results. Absence of key new development actors, such as China and India, have relaxed the pressure on the traditional providers to stick to their commitments. Similarly, lack of coordination between the aid officials and trade/economic officials of the Foreign Ministry of the OECD countries is also considered to be a threat to proper functioning of the GPEDC framework (Constantine, Shakland, & Gu, 2015). Reticence of the OECD providers to live up to their ODA/GNI commitments (0.7% of ODA/GNI target) may also undercut the authority of the GPEDC. It has also been pointed out that absence of a provision for

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parallel (mirror) exercise in the provider country has left the GPEDC monitoring framework unbalanced in terms of rights and obligations between the two sets of major partners (Shankland & Constantine, 2014).

The inability of the monitoring exercise to link up to other global development processes, SDG and A4 in particular, may fundamentally diminish the relevance of the framework.

2.3 Recommendations of the Monitoring Advisory Group (MAG)

The Monitoring Advisory Group (MAG), a body of twelve experts was mandated in 2015 by the GPEDC Co-Chairs and Steering Committee to review, refine, and advice on the continued relevance of the Global Partnership’s “Theory of Change” (ToC), as well as on the 10 indicators of its global monitoring framework. Although some work on elaborating on a ToC for the GPEDC had been undertaken by the founding stakeholders, the process pursued rigorously in 2015-2016 by the GPEDC MAG.

In all, the MAG met for four meetings (see Table 3.1) during the period 2015-16 and provided an assessment of the ten indicators in the document title “A GPEDC Monitoring Framework Fit for Purpose: Delivering effective development cooperation in support of Agenda 2030.” The document was presented to the Steering Committee, along with the Co-chairs at the Nairobi HLM (2016).

GPEDC efforts to track progress in the effectiveness and the quality of development cooperation are guided by the approach to monitor behaviour change of the concerned actors. The following four yardsticks are applied in this regard for assessing the performance of the development cooperation actors:

i. Strengthening country ownership
ii. Focuses on results
iii. Promoting inclusive development
iv. Operating in a transparent manner

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15 Ibid.
The monitoring framework attempts to assess the quality of development partnerships, which in turn is expected to contribute to the achievement of development results. It is complementary to other accountability frameworks which monitor development results and outcomes (e.g. the MDGs and SDGs monitoring). In undertaking the review and revision of the indicators, the MAG decided to assess them against three parameters:

i. Relevance
ii. Efficiency
iii. Usefulness

The MAG pursued this line of enquiry in a three track work stream. These were the following:

*Track One.* Methodology for new indicators.
*Track Two.* Strengthening the second monitoring round.
*Track Three.* To ensure relevance in post-2015 development context.

**MAG Approach towards a Theory of Change.** The purpose of a Theory of Change is to facilitate the progression from agreements and commitments to behaviour and institutional change, and set out a common set of assumptions about how this change might occur (Davis, 2016). This theory can further help identify the externalities that lie beyond the control of the actors, but nonetheless influence the achievement of outcomes.

**Figure 2.3:** MAG’s Implementation of GPEDC’s Implicit Theory of Change
The outcome document, titled ‘The GPEDC ‘theory of change’: An exposition and critique’ (published December 2015) sought to identify an implied theory of change, derived from the Busan and Mexico outcome documents. This was followed by, ‘GPEDC Theory of Change: Issues for Discussion’, which sought to elaborate on it further (Davis, 2015). The crux of the documents lie in highlighting the absence of an explicit, stated theory of change for the Global Partnership. This is due to the political and voluntary nature of the Partnership, where each stakeholder brings in their own understanding and interpretation of the Busan principles – including the implementation of their respective commitments. Nonetheless, as asserted in the latter document, MAG identifies an implied theory of change, derived from the Busan and Mexico outcome documents, along with actions to encourage implementation including GPIs and monitoring as well as Steering Committee discussions on ways to move forward.

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In its assessment of the 10 indicators, the MAG established three key criteria which were briefly mentioned earlier. These are detailed in the MAG’s Final Report captioned “A GPEDC Monitoring Framework Fit for Purpose: Delivering effective development co-operation in support of Agenda 2030,” (hereafter referred to as the MAG report), presented to the Steering Committee and Co-Chairs of the GPEDC in September 2016. The criteria focuses on:

i. The continued relevance of the indicator (in light of the SDGs and Agenda 2030);
ii. The effectiveness and efficiency of the methodology at a practical level in gathering data; and
iii. The usefulness of the indicator for on-going engagement of GPEDC stakeholders.

The MAG also examined possible new indicators and issues related to the overall structure of the monitoring framework. MAG’s and other related recommendations were at the framework meeting of the Steering Committee held in Dhaka (October 2017). The Dhaka meeting also adopted a concept note, “The Global Partnership Monitoring Framework for 2030”, (hereafter referred to as the 2017 Concept Note). The document highlighted current shortcoming of the framework, as well as proposed means of improvement.

A Review of MAG Recommendations

*Alignment with country-led results framework (Indicator One).* The MAG notes that despite its relevancy in the current development landscape, this indicator's methodology remains “fraught with complexity,” and becomes difficult to relate to the idiosyncratic realities of different countries. It suggests the JST to review early country experiences in the development of national SDG implementation strategies, and their

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18 Ibid.

specific country results frameworks for SDG targets. Additionally, the MAG recommends including systematically country-led results frameworks into development providers’ projects to help improve this indicator’s efficiency. Nonetheless, the 2017 Concept Note proposes that solely assessing the existence of the framework would not suffice by itself, and that there remains a need to assess its quality, also. Additionally, the Concept Note points out the insufficiency of assessing the alignment of frameworks solely at project level, and proposes assessing partner’s alignment at country strategy level, instead.

Furthermore, the MAG report recommends conceptually strengthening links between development cooperation, country development priorities, and democratic ownership—all the while focusing on country strategies to realise the SDGs. This was a further point noted in the 2017 Concept Note, which additionally proposes measuring SDG uptake.

Finally, the MAG report notes that paying greater attention to issues of inclusion in processes related to country results framework (CRFs), and an examination of the degree of institutionalisation of country-driven evaluations, could provide useful data on country-managed processes.

Civil Society Enabling Environment (Indicator 2). The MAG finds this indicator to be highly relevant, especially in terms of its relevance to the principles of effective development cooperation as well as to the role of CSOs in the implementation of the SDGs.

Moreover, the MAG recommends the JST to consider enabling a systematic assessment of the actual experience of this indicator’s monitoring methodology from the perspective of the participating countries. It further suggests extending this indicator beyond the monitoring process in order to better understand the contributions of an (inclusive) monitoring process in stimulating future multi-stakeholder dialogues, that focus on improving conditions for CSOs (at country, regional and global levels).
Moving forward, MAG suggests enhancing the methodology via a survey aimed at capturing the diversity of the CSOs; revising and clarifying the current questionnaire, as well as retaining options for data contributions by GPEDC stakeholders. Notably, this was also highlighted in the 2017 Concept Note, which points out the excessive complexity of the survey questionnaire, as it stands today, and proposes streamlining it for the future.

**Engagement and contribution of the private sector to development (Indicator 3).** The MAG recommends exploring alternative options to include revisions to this indicator, including considering blended finance as an alternative entry point. In moving forward, the MAG recommends examining inclusivity within the private sector through a survey looking at the participants in public-private partnership (PPPs), while placing a greater emphasis on assessing transparency of the PPP process, and improving the methodology to identify not only actor motivations, but also the expectations of PPPs for development outcomes. This was also reflected in the 2017 Concept Note, which indicates that the current survey questionnaire provides insufficient information on related changes, and emphasized the need to refine it in order to address critical issues pertaining to private sector engagement via development cooperation.

**Transparency (Indicator 4).** The MAG recommends deepening the scope of this indicator in order to improve the relevance of its methodology, at the country level. It also points to the need to derive methodologies that capture the demand side for data use at the country level as—on both the part of governments, as well as other aid actors. It further suggests developing a methodology that would not only be technically sound, but also make it easy to communicate findings. This was reaffirmed in the 2017 Concept Note that echoes the difficulty in interpreting the transparency assessments, and records its constriction to solely global-level transparency. Additionally, it proposes simplifying the process of reporting progress, as well as assessing country-level transparency.

**Development cooperation is more predictable (Indicator 5).** The MAG report recommends an improved understanding of the possible challenges faced by providers in forward aid projections, by complementing them via dialogue between providers and developing
countries. In moving forward, it recommends clarifying the rationale and the inter-relationship of separate transparency and predictability indicators. Yet, the 2017 Concept Note brings forth additional areas of focus. Namely, the absence of information about donor policy driving predictability in the current framework that consequently, leads to a lack of actionable findings. It thus proposes including a qualitative question about donor practice.

**Aid on budget (Indicator 6).** The MAG report points out to the need to improve budget transparency given its relevance to accountability. Furthermore, MAG notes the importance of ensuring that developing countries capture all forms of development cooperation through a transparent aid management system. It emphasises the need to measure the degree to which parliaments have oversight on development intervention as well as the level of support from aid providers for strengthening these parliamentary processes. This was a point further asserted in the 2017 Concept Note that underscored the lack of assessment pertaining to the quality of parliament oversight, and pointed out frequent reporting inconsistencies. It proposes using secondary data to assess the quality of parliamentary oversight, and improving reporting guidance.

**Mutual Accountability (Indicator 7).** The MAG acknowledges mutual accountability to be an overarching indicator, central to the process for achieving behaviour change pertaining to the GPEDC’s Theory of Change (ToC). In proposing steps forward, MAG suggests providing avenues to assess the quality of mutual assessments, coupled with issuing direct questions on the framework and practices relating to mutual accountability – not only to developing country governments (as in the current methodology), but also to providers. Furthermore, it recommends reviewing the methodology in relation to its applicability to other aid modalities, such as multi-stakeholder partnerships or blended finance. The 2017 Concept Note echoed these recommendations. It identifies the current, mutual accountability structure (traditional bilateral) to be outdated, and proposes reflecting collective accountability at country levels, also. An additional point highlighted in the 2017 Concept Note highlights, but not the MAG report, pertains to focusing and reflecting these efforts towards SDGs’ implementation.
Gender equality and women’s empowerment (Indicator 8). MAG finds this indicator to be highly relevant owing to the centrality of gender equality and women’s empowerment to development, as well as its importance to Agenda 2030 (SDG 5). It notes that the focus on budgetary allocations relating to gender equality complements the broader scope of objectives covered by SDG 5. It has been advised that the analysis of progress for this indicator needs to be situated in the context of the various objectives set out in SDG 5. Additionally, it suggests boosting the rigor of the current methodology by increasing the number of criteria to be met in order to affirm that a country system for tracking gender allocations is in place. It further recommends assessing contribution of aid providers’ disbursements towards gender equality. Supplementing these, the 2017 Concept Note adds that the criteria to have systems track public expenditure for gender equality fails to reflect current practice, and points to weaknesses in the survey questionnaire. Consequently, it proposes strengthening the criteria, and refining the questionnaire.

Effective Institutions (Indicator 9). The MAG recommends the JST to work with a multi-stakeholder reference group from the Steering Committee, to review the strengths of alternative proposals regarding Indicator 9a – in measuring the quality of financial institutions, in relation to issues raised with respect to the World Bank’s CPIA. In proposing steps forward, indicator 9a, it has been suggested inclusion of measurements of open and transparent budgets. It revising the methodology, it is recommended to take into account the work of the Effective Institutions Platform as an alternative for the use of CPIA. Moreover, it is recommended that questions for providers on their actual procurement practices related to contracts awarded in donor and recipient countries be included in the upcoming survey. Finally, a methodology for assessing partner country monitoring and evaluation systems is recommended to be developed. These recommendations were reflected in the 2017 Concept Note as well, which assesses the current CPIA indicator to be limited in offering country coverage, coupled with the lack of disaggregated information. As a proposed revision, it recommends using selected PEFA indicators to provide an objective, recognized measure of quality of country systems, in addition to echoing the inclusion of a qualitative question relating to donor policy.
Untying Aid (Indicator 10). From a relevance point of view, MAG finds untying aid to remain an important indication of developing country ownership over the allocation of aid resources. However, it notes the room for improvement for relevant indicator methodologies, so as to more accurately reflect the realities of the tying-status of aid to provider interests and entities. Indeed, an accurate measure of goods and services procured in recipient countries has been advised to be developed, along with an assessment of informal tying practices of DAC/OECD members. Nevertheless, the 2017 Concept Note points out an additional avenue for revision. It notes that the current focus is on formal tied aid, and recommends complementing the data with de facto tied aid levels.

The 2017 Concept Note echoes many of the recommendations made by the MAG in its September 2016, “A GPEDC Monitoring Framework Fit for Purpose” output document. It also points out additional revisions to the indicators, to supplement the recommendations made by the MAG. For instance, for Indicator 1, the MAG recommends including country-led results frameworks into development providers’ projects. The 2017 Concept Note proposes that addressing the existence of the framework would not suffice by itself, and that there remains a need to additionally assess its quality. Moreover, the Concept Note points out the insufficiency of assessing the alignment of frameworks only at project level, and proposes assessing partner’s alignment at country strategy level, instead.

For Indicator 7, the 2017 Concept Note brings forward additional areas of assessment. For example, it highlights the importance of focusing and reflecting development efforts aligned with the SDGs – an addition to the recommendations made by MAG. And finally, for indicator 10, the 2017 Concept Note finds an additional avenue for revision by moving the focus from formal tied aid to de facto-tied aid.

The preceding paragraphs reveal that in the recent past, along with the GPEDC platform, its monitoring framework has been subjected to serious scrutiny. However, the monitoring framework had been relatively slow in implementing (having accepted these in principle) the suggestions put forward by a number of its internal processes (including those from the MAG). It is to be seen whether GPEDC, in response to the
changing development cooperation environment, energetically operationalise some of these sound advices.
3. Positioning GPEDC Framework for SDG Monitoring

Adoption of SDGs calls for some significant behavioural changes, among others, in the way the global development cooperation is conducted currently. Global Partnership for Effective Co-operation (GPEDC) can potentially become an important element of the Means of Implementation (MoI) of the global partnership envisaged by the 2030 Agenda. The question is whether the GPEDC monitoring framework position itself suitably so as to play a role in triggering and/or promoting anticipated behavioural changes.

3.1 Relevance of GPEDC in the Context of 2030 Agenda

Although GPEDC is not explicitly mentioned anywhere in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) outcome document, the objectives of both the SDGs and GPEDC overlap in certain areas that may observed from the details of Agenda 2030.

- Article 60 under “Means of Implementation and the Global Partnership” reads as follows: “We reaffirm our strong commitment to the full implementation of this new Agenda. We recognize that we will not be able to achieve our ambitious Goals and Targets without a revitalized and enhanced Global Partnership (italics added) and comparably ambitious means of implementation. The revitalised Global Partnership will facilitate an intensive global engagement in support of implementation of all the Goals and targets, bringing together Governments, civil society, the private sector, the United Nations system and other actors and mobilizing all available resources.

- Similarly, Article 61 mentions that “The Agenda’s Goals and targets deal with the means required to realize our collective ambitions. We shall accord them equal priority in our implementation efforts and in the global indicator framework for monitoring our progress (italics added) will give equal priority to all goals and targets.”

- Further, Article 63 emphasises the need for “cohesive nationally-owned sustainable development strategies, supported by integrated national financing frameworks, will be at the heart of our efforts.” It added that “national development efforts need to be supported by an enabling international economic environment (italics added), including coherent and mutually supporting world
trade, monetary and financial systems, and strengthened and enhanced global economic governance.”

In fine, SDG document without referring specifically to GPEDC, has captured many of the features of the latter. SDGs do recognise the need for a reinvigorated global development partnership that, on the one hand, will allow necessary space for national development policies and strategies. On the other, such partnership has to be supported by an enabling global economic policies and structures. One may observe that the SDG implementation strategy emphasise an international development cooperation modality, underpinned by certain anticipated behavioural changes on the part of different segments and actors.

Although there is significant overlap of the objectives of both GPEDC and the SDGs, some vital issues have not found necessary mention in the SDG document. Indeed, there is no mention of the term “mutual accountability” anywhere in the 2030 Agenda outcome document. Arguably, the conduct of international development cooperation in general, and that of the aid providers have not been adequately underscored in the SDG document. The GPEDC Monitoring Framework, therefore can effectively contribute to the effective implementation as well as “Review and Follow-up” of the SDGs by substantively complementing (if not by addressing a serious fault line of) the SDG framework. By focusing on the effectiveness and behavioural change of the parties in international development cooperation, the GPEDC monitoring framework will act as a complementary, but autonomous mechanism for enhancing effectiveness of the MoIs and monitoring the SDG progress.

The GPEDC indicators are well placed to facilitate behavioural changes that are required by stakeholders/actors by focusing on mostly process indicator, and sometimes input indicators. In simple terms, ensuring these process (input) indicators may ensure that envisaged changes in the system. The SDGs, on the other hand, focus on quantitative development outcomes (what needs to change). Therefore, these two are very much linked. Without inputs channelled through a proper process, one cannot achieve targeted outcomes, and the effectiveness of the inputs and the processes will determine the amount of development outcomes. However, one will have to develop a system of
analysis looking these two global agendas and a monitoring framework for development cooperation.

Thus, GPEDC reports (which would remain autonomous) may be considered in parallel with SDG Global Review Reports at the HLPF/ECOSOC. Indeed, GPEDC indicators may be also traced while undertaking the country-level monitoring of SDG progress. Alignment of GPEDC monitoring outcomes at SDG-related global, (regional) and national level has become quite imperative. This will also provide the opportunity to subject these GPEDC documents to closer scrutiny by wider stakeholders, enhancing the possibility of further improving the GPEDC framework.

3.2 The Anticipated Behavioural Changes

The two main actors of the GPEDC are the providers (developed countries) and recipients (developing countries) of international development cooperation. For successful delivery of the SDGs, there has to be a change in behaviour of both the concerned parties, and the GPEDC indicators are supposed to bring more transparency in this behavioural change. The anticipated changes on the part of the provider would entail the following (with the GPEDC indicators indicated in the parentheses):

- Better alignment with national development practices (Indicator 1)
- Increased transparency (Indicator 4)
- Increased predictability of development cooperation both in the short and medium-term (Indicator 5)
- Using country systems as the default approach for development cooperation in support of activities managed by the public sector (Indicator 9b)
- Untying of Aid by donors (Indicator 10)
- Improved dialogue amongst providers and better coordination amongst providers, especially donor (No direct link to any GPEDC Indicator)
- Commitment from donors to report regularly on their activities in the aid information platform (No direct link to any GPEDC Indicator)
Table 3.1: The Primary and Secondary Actors Involved in GPEDC Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Primary and Secondary Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Extent of use of country-owned results frameworks by providers of development cooperation</td>
<td>DC Providers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>CSO Enabling Environment Assessment</td>
<td>DC Recipient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Quality of public-private dialogue index</td>
<td>DC Recipient, Private Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Information on development cooperation is publically available (Transparency)</td>
<td>DC Provider</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5a</td>
<td>Proportion of development cooperation funding disbursed within the fiscal year within which it was scheduled by providers of development cooperation (Annual Predictability)</td>
<td>DC Provider</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5b</td>
<td>Proportion of development co-operation funding covered by indicative forward spending plans provided at country level (Medium Term Predictability)</td>
<td>Primary: DC Recipient Secondary: DC Provider</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Percentage of development cooperation funding scheduled for disbursement that is recorded in the annual budgets approved by the legislatures of developing countries</td>
<td>Primary: DC Recipient Secondary: DC Provider</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Percentage of countries that undertake inclusive mutual assessments of progress in implementing agreed commitments</td>
<td>DC Recipient + DC Provider</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Percentage of countries with systems that track and make public allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment</td>
<td>DC Recipient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9a</td>
<td>Quality of developing country public financial management systems</td>
<td>DC Recipient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9b</td>
<td>Use of country-owned public financial management and procurement systems</td>
<td>Primary: DC Provider Secondary: DC Recipient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Untied aid</td>
<td>DC Provider</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on GPEDC-related documents.

On the part of the cooperation recipient, the required behavioural changes are the following:

- Improved information and reporting on development cooperation (Indicator 6)
- Enhanced consultation frameworks and processes, inclusive of civil society (Indicator 2)
- Enable the participation of the private sector in the design and implementation of development policies and strategies to foster sustainable growth and poverty reduction (Indicator 3)
- Increased public allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment (Indicator 8)
- Better quality of public financial management systems (Indicator 9a)
- Better coordination and synergies among government ministries (No direct link to any GPEDC Indicator)
- Increased political commitment to transparency and accountability (No direct link to any GPEDC Indicator)
- Government willingness to take ownership and leadership of development cooperation (No direct link to any GPEDC Indicator)
Admittedly, not all actors will play equal (and same) role in triggering and promoting the envisaged changes. Thus, the following Table seeks to identify the role of the providers and recipients in terms of their relative importance.

3.3 A Comparative Review of SDG and GPEDC Indicators

The GPEDC monitoring framework consists of 10 targets and corresponding indicators which may be mapped against the 232 SDG targets and corresponding indicators. The latest list of SDG indicators shows that there are 82 Tier I indicators, 61 Tier II indicators and 84 Tier III indicators. There are 5 more indicators that have multiple tiers (as of 20 April 2017)\(^\text{20}\). Tier I indicators are conceptually clear, have an internationally established methodology and standards are available. Tier II is also conceptually clear, have an internationally established methodology and standards, but data are not regularly produced by countries. No internationally established methodology and standards are yet available for Tier III indicators, but methodology/standards are being developed or tested. In this backdrop, Table 3.2 and 3.3 consist of a comparison of the GPEDC and SDG targets and indicators on the basis of complete, partial and no overlap among them.

### Table 3.2: Comparing Fully Overlapping Indicator and Targets in the GPEDC and SDG Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GPEDC Target</th>
<th>SDG Target</th>
<th>Corresponding GPEDC Indicator</th>
<th>Corresponding SDG Indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 8:</strong> Gender equality and women’s empowerment</td>
<td><strong>Target 5.c:</strong> Adopt and strengthen sound policies and enforceable legislation for the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls at all levels</td>
<td>Percentage of countries with systems that track and make public allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment</td>
<td>5.c.1 Percentage of countries with systems to track and make public allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment Tier III</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Based on GPEDC and SDG related documents.

**Fully overlapping indicator:** Linking GPEDC indicators to that of SDGs has been a tricky task. GPEDC is strongly linked to making the process of delivering into development cooperation more transparent, accountable and effective. SDGs, on the other hand,

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\(^{20}\) Source: UNSTATS (2017): “Tier Classification for Global SDG Indicators.”
emphasise on comprehensive elevation of development progress with particular importance to the MoI. A close observation of the two monitoring frameworks reveals that only one exactly overlapping indicator and somewhat similar target, as shown in Table 3.2. The indicator draws attention to the proportion of countries that allocates and track public finance for gender equality and women’s empowerment. However the concerned indicator does not say anything about the level of allocation as well as the tracking outcomes. Moreover, we are only concerned with the only gender-sensitive financial flow (possibly including ODA), but not other (may be more important dimensions) of women’s empowerment. Importantly, the data for this indicator belong to Tier III, i.e. not available as yet.

Table 3.3: Partially Linked GPEDC and SDG Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GPEDC Targets</th>
<th>SDG Targets</th>
<th>Corresponding GPEDC Indicator</th>
<th>Corresponding SDG Indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 1:</strong> Development cooperation is focused on results that meet developing countries’ priorities</td>
<td><strong>Target 10.b</strong> Encourage official development assistance and financial flows, including foreign direct investment, to states where the need is greatest, in particular least developed countries, African countries, small island developing states and landlocked developing countries, in accordance with their national plans and programmes</td>
<td>Extent of use of country-results frameworks by cooperation providers</td>
<td>10.b.1 Total resource flows for development, disaggregated by recipient and donor countries and type of flow (e.g. official development assistance, foreign direct investment and other flows) Tier I (ODA)/Tier II (FDI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target:</strong> All providers of development cooperation use country results frameworks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 2:</strong> Civil society operates within an environment which maximises its engagement in and contribution to development</td>
<td><strong>Target 17.17</strong> Encourage and promote effective public, public-private and civil society partnerships, building on the experience and resourcing strategies of partnerships</td>
<td>A preliminary assessment of CSO Enabling Environment building on qualitative, multi-stakeholder information</td>
<td>17.17.1 Amount of United States dollars committed to public-private and civil society partnerships Tier III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target:</strong> Continued progress over time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 3:</strong> Engagement and contribution of the private sector to development</td>
<td><strong>Target 17.17</strong> Encourage and promote effective public, public-private and civil society partnerships, building on the experience and resourcing strategies of partnerships</td>
<td>A three-dimension index providing a measure of the quality of public-private dialogue</td>
<td>17.17.1 Amount of United States dollars committed to public-private and civil society partnerships Tier III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target:</strong> Continued progress over time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 4:</strong> Transparency:</td>
<td><strong>Target 17.19</strong> By 2030, build on</td>
<td>Measure of state of implementation of the</td>
<td>17.19.1 Dollar value of all resources made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPEDC Targets</td>
<td>SDG Targets</td>
<td>Corresponding GPEDC Indicator</td>
<td>Corresponding SDG Indicator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information on development cooperation is publicly available</td>
<td>Existing initiatives to develop measurements of progress on sustainable development that complement gross domestic product, and support statistical capacity-building in developing countries</td>
<td>Common standard by cooperation providers</td>
<td>Available to strengthen statistical capacity in developing countries Tier I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target:</strong> Implement the common standard – All development cooperation providers are on track to implement a common, open standard for electronic publication of timely, comprehensive and forward-looking information on development cooperation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>17.19.2</strong> Inclusive Wealth Index Tier I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 5:</strong> Development cooperation is more predictable</td>
<td><strong>Target 17.2</strong> Developed countries to implement fully their official development assistance commitments, including the commitment by many developed countries to achieve the target of 0.7 per cent ODA/GNI to developing countries and 0.15 to 0.20 per cent of ODA/GNI to least developed countries; ODA providers are encouraged to consider setting a target to provide at least 0.20 per cent of ODA/GNI to least developed countries</td>
<td>(a) <strong>Annual:</strong> proportion of development cooperation funding disbursed within the fiscal year within which it was scheduled by cooperation providers; and (b) <strong>Medium-term:</strong> proportion of development cooperation funding covered by indicative forward spending plans provided at country level</td>
<td><strong>17.2.1</strong> Net official development assistance, total and to least developed countries, as a percentage of OECD/Development Assistance Committee donors’ gross national income Tier I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Halve the gap</strong> – halve the proportion of development cooperation funding not covered by indicative forward spending plans provided at country level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target 17.3</strong> Mobilize additional financial resources for developing countries from multiple sources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>17.3.1</strong> Foreign direct investments as a percentage of total FDI and official development assistance Tier I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPEDC Targets</td>
<td>SDG Targets</td>
<td>Corresponding GPEDC Indicator</td>
<td>Corresponding SDG Indicator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
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<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 9:</strong> Effective institutions: developing countries’ systems are strengthened and used</td>
<td><strong>Target 16.6</strong> Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels</td>
<td>(a) Quality of developing country Public Financial Management (PFM) systems; and (b) Use of country PFM and procurement systems</td>
<td><strong>16.6.1</strong> Primary government expenditures as a percentage of original approved budget, disaggregated by sector (or by budget codes or similar) Tier I <strong>16.6.2</strong> Proportion of the population satisfied with their last experience of public services Tier III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target:</strong> Half of developing countries move up at least one measure (i.e. 0.5 points) on the PFM/CPIA scale of performance (Baseline year 2010)</td>
<td><strong>Target 12.7</strong> Promote public procurement practices that are sustainable, in accordance with national policies and priorities</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>12.7.1</strong> Number of countries implementing sustainable public procurement policies and action plans Tier III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce the gap, [use the same logic as in Paris – close the gap by two-thirds where Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) score is &gt;=5; or by one-third when between 3.5 and 4.5] (Baseline year 2010)</td>
<td><strong>Target 1.a</strong> Ensure significant mobilization of resources from a variety of sources, including through enhanced development cooperation, in order to provide adequate and predictable means for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, to implement programmes and policies to end poverty in all its dimensions</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1.a.1</strong> Percentage of resources allocated by the government directly to poverty reduction programmes Tier III <strong>1.a.2</strong> Spending on essential services (education, health and social protection) as a percentage of total government spending Tier II</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3.3 reveals that out of 14 partially overlap indicators drawn from the two framework, they are readily available data for seven indicators, while data irregularly available for two and no data is available for five indicators.

**Partial link with Indicator 1.** The GPEDC monitoring framework refers to the use of country-results framework in indicator 1 to assess whether the development partners are addressing the recipient countries’ priority areas of development. While progress is
underway to construct country-level results framework, such a mechanism has not been mentioned in the SDG monitoring framework.

The GPEDC monitoring survey includes a comprehensive examination of allocation of development cooperation both from the provider and recipient government perspective for Indicator 1. Conversely, the SDG target acknowledges the importance of aligning external financial flows towards priority areas, however the SDG indicator would only give information on fund allocation and disbursement perhaps, but not on the utilisation and impact of those funds in the designated area. Besides, the SDG indicator is still under discussion in the consultation process. May be capacity to utilise these funds can be reflected by examining indicator 9 (effective institutions) in the GPEDC framework.

**Engaging civil society partnership.** Next, we can relate GPEDC indicator 2 to SDG target 17.17. As given in the monitoring survey guide, GPEDC incorporates three separate modules for monitoring CSO engagement country-level which encompasses the alignment of CSO activities with national development policies, accountability and transparency of CSO operations to the government as well as its engagement with development partners. Therefore in order to scale up CSO activities, the GPEDC aims to vigorously assess CSO engagement in terms of planning, implementation, monitoring and accountability of their activities. Information for monitoring is being collected from country-level monitoring survey from providers of development cooperation and recipient governments.

However, the SDG framework includes civil society partnerships only in its targets without any component for CSO in its corresponding indicator. The public-private partnership incorporated in the target has not been defined adequately to clarify if it includes CSO engagement. Also there is no clarification as of the source of data for commitment to these partnerships. Moreover, only data on commitment to partnerships does not adequately and comprehensively reflect information on CSO engagement in a country.

**Dual linkage of SDG target 17.17.** It has been observed that SDG target 17.17 can also be somewhat linked to GPEDC indicator 3 mainly because both indicators are aimed at
public-private ventures. However, there is no explicit linkage of GPEDC indicator 3 with any of the SDG targets because the technical aspects of the indicator are distinct. It is because the GPEDC indicator is aimed at assessing the quality of dialogue among public-private stakeholders, whereas the SDG indicator only measures the magnitude of investment in public-private partnership, which gives no insight into quality of implementation and impact of such partnership. Arguably, the SDG framework does not adequately mention investment mobilisation from private sector. This implies that the SDGs have inadequately reflected on the role of private sector firms in development. This is contradictory to global observation of the importance and relevance of private sector as a MoI for sustainable development. This argument was strongly emphasised in the AAAA that finance from the private sector plays an inevitably important role to mobilise domestic resources.

Notwithstanding that SDG indicator 17.17 aims to monitor the financial commitment to public-private partnerships, but it is unclear how these partnerships are being defined and where such data would be available. For example, the mentioned “private” sector implies possibly only its “for-profit” segment, not the “not for profit” segment. Also, the GPEDC monitoring guide does not provide details on what are the three dimensions in the index that will be used to assess the quality of public-private dialogue.

*Transparency and behavioural change.* Moving on we observe that GPEDC indicator 4 aims to define a common standard as a benchmark for assuring transparency of information on development cooperation. This GPEDC indicator is aligned with the Busan Partnership Agreement (§23c) and Paris Principles (§22). The assessment process of this indicator focuses on the three priority dimension: i) timeliness; ii) comprehensiveness; and iii) forward-looking nature. However the indicator does not incorporate certain other elements in the Paris principles such as public procurement, financial management and aid flows, which essentially requires transparency to allow effective monitoring. The SDG target 17.19 is linked with the GPEDC target because both wants to measure progress on development. However, in order to improve transparency the developing countries would also need to strengthen their statistical capacity, the importance of which is captured in the SDG target, but not explicitly mentioned in the GPEDC indicator. The GPEDC target can be implied as a means to begin, and the SDG target as a means to an end. Moreover it is these indicators (GPEDC 4
and SDG 17.19) that demand strong behavioural change particularly on the part of the donors to make any effective outcome.

Aid predictability. Next the GPEDC indicator 5a aims to identify the extent to which providers meet their commitment. The aim of this target is to examine the predictability of development cooperation in order to deter inconsistent implementation of project due to unpredictable disbursement of funds, hence making development cooperation more effective. This is in par with target 17.2 in the SDGs which is related to providers meeting their explicit commitments. It is implied that once providers are dedicated to meet their commitment, it could entail proper disbursement of funds. However disbursement is subjected to procedure and performance of recipient country and bottlenecks in the fund transmission mechanism.

Additionally, SDG target 17.3 could be linked with GPEDC indicator 5b. This target would be a burden on the recipient country to have a forward expenditure plan of the development assistance they receive. This plan can be used when devising mechanism to mobilise additional resources from multiple sources according to SDG target 17.3. The two targets do not have explicit linkage it can aid each other in the process.

Strengthening country systems. Finally, three indicators in the SDG framework were found to have some link with the GPEDC indicator 9. These are within targets 16.6, 12.7 and 1a in order of relevance to the GPEDC indicator. GPEDC indicator 9 is linked with Paris Declaration (§17-30) which was again invigorated in the Busan Outcome Document (§19) for strengthening respective countries’ public institutions and revitalise their function in effectively utilising public funds. Indicator 9a particularly looks into measuring the quality of a developing country’s budget and financial management systems, borrowed from the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment criterion. The main source of data for this indicator is World Bank. The remote link it has with the SDGs is with target 16.6 which measure the proportion of the originally approved budget that is used for primary government expenditures. According to the metadata compiled from different UN Agencies, this indicator can be based on Indicator PI-2 of the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) dataset: composition of expenditure outturn compared to original approved budget. This indicator would consider: (i) the variation between approved budget and final expenditure for the year for each major function (comparable to a sector); (ii) variation
in expenditure from the original budget by economic classification; and (iii) the average amount charged to the contingency reserve over the last three years.

Table 3.4: SDG and GPEDC Indicator that do not have any Direct Link but has Similar Key-Words

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GPEDC Targets</th>
<th>SDG Targets with matching key-words but no linkage in targets with GPEDC</th>
<th>Corresponding GPEDC Indicator</th>
<th>Corresponding SDG Indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 6:</strong> Aid is on budgets which are subject to parliamentary scrutiny</td>
<td>Target 5.5 Ensure women’s full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life.</td>
<td>% of development cooperation funding scheduled for disbursement that is recorded in the annual budgets approved by the legislatures of developing countries</td>
<td>5.5.1 Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments and local governments Tier I/Tier III 5.5.2 Proportion of women in managerial positions Tier I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target:</strong> Halve the gap—halve the proportion of development cooperation flows to the government sector not reported on government’s budget(s) (with at least 85% reported on budget) (Baseline year 2010)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 7:</strong> Mutual accountability among development co-operation actors is strengthened through inclusive reviews</td>
<td>Target 17.16 Enhance the global partnership for sustainable development, complemented by multi-stakeholder partnerships that mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources, to support the achievement of the sustainable development goals in all countries, in particular developing countries</td>
<td>% of countries that undertake inclusive mutual assessments of progress in implementing agreed commitments</td>
<td>17.16.1* Mutual accountability among development cooperation actors is strengthened through inclusive reviews Tier II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target:</strong> All developing countries have inclusive mutual assessment reviews in place (Baseline year 2010)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 10:</strong> Aid is untied</td>
<td></td>
<td>% of aid that is fully untied</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target:</strong> Continued progress over time (Baseline year 2010)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Where GPEDC and SDG indicators are not linked. Unlike the GPEDC framework, curiously the SDG framework has no indicator on parliamentary scrutiny of resource
allocation or use (although talks about role of the parliamentarians). On the other hand, the SDG framework borrowed GPEDC indicator 7 for target 17.16 but these targets are not aligned in the first place. Finally there was no hint of making aid or development cooperation unties in the SDG framework. So GPEDC indicator 10 is unique to the SDG framework.

3.4 Consistency with the Addis Ababa Action Agenda

The Addis Ababa Action Agenda emphasises a lot of the same objectives as the GPEDC. There is a specific mention of GPEDC in the AAAA document and the other objectives. It appears that about 8 of the GPEDC indicators have been covered by AAAA.

- The GPEDC indicators that are linked to the AAAA document are in parentheses. It is found that all of the indicators and targets are consistent with the objectives of the Financing for Development Agenda, except for Target 6 (Aid is on budgets which are subject to parliamentary scrutiny).
- In Para 58 of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, there is an explicit mention of Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. The participating countries at AAAA expressed that they will take into account the efforts of forums like GPEDC in “a complementary manner”.
- In Para 58, the participating states also seek to accelerate “untying of aid” (Indicator 10), promote “country ownership and results orientation” (Indicator 1) and “strengthen country systems” (Indicator 9a), increase “transparency” (Indicator 4), “mutual accountability” (Indicator 7), make development more effective and “predictable” (Indicator 5).
- In para 53, the participating countries at AAAA urged countries to “track and report resource allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment” (Indicator 8).
- In para 130 under Data, Monitoring and Follow up, there are explicit mentions of “civil society” (Indicator 2), academia and the “private sector” (Indicator 3) and their necessity in participation for follow up and review.
- In para 11, the AAAA mentions that the ambitious Post-2015 Development Agenda should be underpinned by effective, “accountable and inclusive institutions” (Indicator 9).

The indicator-based comparative analysis of GPEDC and SDG frameworks and comparison with A4 document reveals that there is ample scope for the partnership to contribute to the SDG/A4 follow-up and review process, although data gap is going to be a serious constraint in this regard.
4. Making GPEDC Fit for Purpose – Options and Outlook

The review and analysis presented in Sections 2 and 3 indicate that efforts have been made over the last one and a half decade to fine tune the GPEDC monitoring framework in response to the evolving development cooperation landscape. However, in view of the recent profound changes in horizontal (across actors) and vertical (across processes) directions GPEDC has arrived at an inflexion point. In certain ways, the emerging situation raising some existential questions for the partnership.

Three options for GPEDC. As has been mentioned earlier, the monitoring framework is the jewel in the crown of the GPEDC. So the relevance, efficiency, and usefulness of the partnership will be largely dictated by the performance of the monitoring framework. It seems that there are three broad options before GPEDC as it moves forward in 2018 and 2019.

First, the business-as-usual scenario where GPEDC continues to implement its endorsed work programme, while other actors (e.g. Southern providers) and other processes (e.g. SDG FUR) proceed in parallel. Under this scenario, GPEDC JST and others may continue to do the good technical work (as per the endorsed work programme), but may not enjoy necessary political traction on the part of the political masters, particularly from the OECD countries. Given the relative stagnation and substitution of the ODA flow, the OECD countries, who do not meet their international commitments, may not feel comfortable to discuss issues such “predictability of ODA flows” under the GPEDC monitoring exercise. Experience shows that the country offices of the bilateral providers did not feel enthusiastic about the survey because of a number of reasons including lack of capacity and staff time, non-availability of data and information in necessary format. And because of the lack of effective linkages to other multilateral processes (e.g. VNR/HLPF and DCF), political attention to GPEDC will stagnate, if not diminish.

Similarly, absence of the “new kids on the block” in the partnership, i.e. Southern providers and private philanthropy in the scope of GPEDC monitoring framework will make it increasingly less attractive. Moreover, the traditional discourse on aid effectiveness (as pursued by GPEDC) is now often considered redundant with the emergence of new instruments of public development finance (external). GPEDC in this
case will promote more emphasis on transparency and results indicators, while toot dragging on ownership and accountability related indicators.

The second option regarding future of GPEDC relates to its expansion of the scope and scale of the monitoring framework so as to bring in all the other relevant actors and processes. However, this “aspirational” scenario appears to be politically unfeasible. Being a DAC/OECD initiated process, GPEDC will continue to face strong resistance in its efforts to become “universal”. The major push back will continue to come from the advanced emerging countries who are already operating as a provider. The experience of Mexico HLM (2014) and Nairobi HLM (2016) testifies this point. The current methodology framework is also largely inadequate to respond to the attributes of the new actors of development cooperation as well as that of the new processes concerning the global development.

The third option for the GPEDC entails a move towards a “new platform” where both the DCA/OECD members and the Southern providers along with other relevant actors, processes and instrument may find space for comfortable coexistence. Such a converging approach will enjoy greater legitimacy if housed within the United Nations System with structured technical and political support from DAC/OECD as well as the Southern providers. Such a platform would adapt a common, but differentiated approach in assessing the relevance, efficiency and usefulness (development effectiveness?) of different actors and processes engaged in international (global?) development cooperation. The ongoing discussion on systemic reform of the United Nations may provide an entry point in this regard.

If Option Two is not politically (and technically) feasible, can Option One gradually evolve into Option Three? If the Monterrey process of aid effectiveness can evolve into GPEDC and HLFs can become HLMs, there is no reason why GPEDC cannot reincarnate itself as a new platform with a new mandate? GPEDC in that case has to devise a pathway for the inter-regenum.

a. During such an inter-regenum, instead of looking for consensus, GPEDC should create a safe space for mutual learning without any prejudice to other relevant commitments. Indeed, this approach may very well be accommodated under
GPEDC’s current stream on Knowledge Management Platform for Effective Development Cooperation.

b. An important aspect of the new pathway would be to hook up GPEDC output to various multilateral processes, particularly to the follow-up and review process of the SDGs and A4. Specifically, GPEDC has to pursue among others the following.

i. Interlocking GPEDC with the FUR process of 2030 Agenda. The VNRs of 2016 and 2017 show that not only the OECD countries, but also the developing countries hardly mentioned the results of GPEDC monitoring exercise while talking about global partnership. Whether there can be a creative way to ensure better and wider use of the GPEDC outputs needs to be thought through as the process of revision of the UN Secretary General’s guidelines for VNR preparation is underway. Similarly, UN-DESA can also be sensitised regarding the use of OECD/UNDP JST’s global report as the former prepares the annual SDG Progress Report. Indeed, GPEDC has to open up the HLPF space and make its monitoring report available as one of the resource documents. GPEDC will be also well advised to move vigorously in engaging with the Inter-Agency Task Force (IATF) for Financing for Development (FfD). To take this approach a step forward, one may suggest merging the GPEDC HLMs within the work flow of the HLPF.

ii. The technical work regarding the indicators may continue, particularly by keeping a tab at the evolution of thoughts within SSC paradigm. A large body of interesting works have been produced on the assessment framework of SSC by the Southern scholars. These resources may work as reference points for reflections by GPEDC. Open-ended evidence-based discussions, followed up by a couple of pilot projects, may be able to break new grounds in improving mutual understanding between Southern and OECD providers. However, in view of the fact that Global South is not a homogenous group of countries, there has to be a structured approach to include the perspectives of the Southern (low and low-middle income) recipient countries in this proposed process.

iii. GPEDC may engage in strongly on another major work stream that focuses on establishing data transparency and data comparability. Along with further technical work on indicators, GPEDC needs to make data fully available for its
current 10 indicators. As the "Monitoring Guide 2015-2016\textsuperscript{21}" shows, two out of these 10 do not have the means of data collection at the country level. These two are Indicator 4 (Transparency: information on development co-operation is publicly available) and Indicator 10 (Aid is untied – % of aid that is fully untied). For the only fully overlapping indicator of GPEDC and SDG (i.e. per cent of countries with system to track and make public allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment) has been marked Tier III, i.e. do not have necessary data available.

Southern providers would also need to create a comprehensive and real time data of their projects – simultaneously at the country level as well as a group. In order to move towards a common, but differentiated assessment framework for aid (development) effectiveness, one would need comparable data. Technical work on establishing data comparability concerning indicators of effective development cooperation, basing on the works of the Inter-agency Expert Group on data for SDG monitoring, needs to be intensified.

iv. The discussions on mutual learnings of the emerging multiple tracks and instruments of development cooperation may be built-up through a bottom-up approach, i.e. starting from the country level. This would be also in consonance with the spirit of Dhaka outcome document (2017) as well as demonstrate the country-ownership and allow unpacking of country-level evidence and experience. There may be a demand deficit on the part of recipient countries in this regard.

v. Efforts to measure effectiveness of private sector inputs mobilised through development cooperation needs to continue with a view to development effectiveness indicator in this area. Similarly, non-concessional official development cooperation (e.g. IBRD’s lending to MICs) needs to be also assessed against the principles of ownership, results, partnership, and transparency and accountability. Similar efforts have to be pursued for the private philanthropies.

\begin{footnote}
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vi. To make GPEDC monitoring framework more useful, there has to be a work programme focussing on the follow-ups of the results of the surveys. At this moment no work stream links up the survey finding to behaviour change of neither the providers nor the recipients. Such efforts may also contribute later in devising a common, but different framework for assessment of aid effectiveness.

vii. At the end of the day, for the GPEDC process to exploit its full potential, it would need a stronger political investment to this end. Canada, as the upcoming Chair of G7, may initiate a discussion in this regard. Argentina, as the upcoming Chair of G20; may also promote a discussion on comparative experience of measuring aid (development) effectiveness – as a follow-up to the Buenos Aires meeting on “South-South and Triangular Cooperation for Achieving the 2030 Agenda” (September 2017). Indeed, Germany as the sitting Co-chair of the GPEDC Steering Committee may also provided enlightened guidance regarding boosting the political momentum of GPEDC and building bridges among parallel (not necessarily competing thoughts).

It transpires that the GPEDC monitoring framework is not going to “sink” in the near future. But whether it is going to “sail” in full speed remains doubtful. The core mandate of the GPEDC will possibly more effectively services if it demonstrates its capacity to reinvent itself in response to the significant structural changes taking place in the global development cooperation regime, particularly in the post-2015 period.
## Annex: MAG’s Recommendations on GPEDC Indicators

### Indicator One: Alignment for country ownership and results

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<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Overview of Indicator</th>
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| Development co-operation is focused on results that meet developing countries’ priorities. | - The purpose of this indicator is to provide objective information on the extent to which existing country-led/level results frameworks are used by aid providers as a guiding tool to meet developing countries’ priorities.  
- It aims to map out providers’ behaviour at the country level and in different sectors. Its questions are directed at the provider and further validated by country governments.  
- In the MAG’s view, the qualitative information of CRFs should be able to provide a complete snapshot of the situation at the country level, and be able to inform policy discussions on how to strengthen collaboration between the country’s priority-setting institutions and providers of development co-operation. | **Relevance**  
1. This indicator is highly relevant, however, the assumptions behind the methodology are fraught with complexity and the methodology is difficult to relate to different country realities.  
2. The JST, post Nairobi, should review the early country experiences in developing national SDG implementation strategies, and their specific country results frameworks for SDG targets. Can this indicator be more closely linked with national SDG implementation strategies as the reference point for Country Results Frameworks (CRFs)?  
**Efficiency**  
3. Indicator One would benefit from a focus on the modalities by which country-led results frameworks are systematically included in development providers’ projects/programs.  
**Proposed Steps Forward**  
4. It is important to implement further conceptual work on links between development cooperation and country development priorities and democratic ownership, taking into account country strategies to realize the SDGs.  
5. Documentation of country experiences in CRFs through Round Two Monitoring should be collated in order to promote dialogue to enhance learning on the use of CRFs.  
6. More attention should be paid to issues of inclusion in processes related to CRFs.  
7. The development of a more balanced approach by focusing questions on provider behaviour change is important.  
8. An examination of the degree of institutionalization of country-driven evaluations would provide useful data on country-managed processes. |

### Indicator Two: Civil Society Enabling Environment

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| Civil society operates within an enabling environment, which maximizes its engagement and contributions to development. | - This indicator looks at the engagement of CSOs in development co-operation and seeks to examine the sum of conditions that affect the existence and capacity of CSOs to effectively carry out their development work and enhance their effectiveness. | **Relevance**  
1. This Indicator is highly relevant and consistent with the multi-stakeholder character of the Global Partnership, the implementation of the principles for effective development cooperation, and the role of CSOs in implementation of the SDGs.  
**Efficiency**  
2. The JST, in collaboration with the Civil Society Platform for Development Effectiveness (CPDE) and the Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment, should consider enabling a
systematic assessment of the actual experience of Indicator Two monitoring methodology from the 80 plus countries participating in Round Two Monitoring.

3. The JST should work to finalize a revised indicator methodology that takes into account the MAG principles, the MAG recommendations for Indicator Two, and the experiences of Round Two.

Usefulness
4. Indicator Two should be extended beyond the monitoring process itself in order to better understand the contributions of an (inclusive) monitoring process in encouraging future multi-stakeholder dialogue on improving enabling conditions for CSOs (at country, regional and global levels).

Proposed Steps Forward
5. The inclusiveness of the methodology should be enhanced through a survey aimed at capturing the diversity of CSOs and their roles as development actors.
6. The current questionnaire and guidance should be reviewed to clarify meaning and to reduce the number of questions in the current module structure.
7. Options for data contributions by GPEDC stakeholders should be retained at various levels, including the global level.
8. Module three on official development cooperation and CSO enabling environment should be implemented at the headquarter level of aid providers.

## Indicator Three: Engagement and contribution of the private sector to development

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<td>Assess and measure the quality of public-private sector dialogue (PPD) at the country level</td>
<td>• This indicator focuses on the engagement and contribution of the private sector with the development process. It builds on tools that have been adjusted to reflect a country-led multi-stakeholder data gathering and verification process.</td>
<td><strong>Relevance</strong>&lt;br&gt;1. The GPEDC/JST should explore alternative options for this Indicator to include revisions to the current indicator focus on public/private dialogues (PPD). It should also consider blended finance as an alternative entry point, in the context of development cooperation.&lt;br&gt;<strong>Proposed Steps Forward</strong>&lt;br&gt;2. The methodology should examine inclusivity within the private sector through a survey on who participates in PPDs.&lt;br&gt;3. Different forms of dialogue should be taken into account, such as structured social dialogues, in assessing PPDs. A greater emphasis on assessing transparency of the PPD process.&lt;br&gt;4. The scope of data captured for Module 1 should give greater consideration to enabling conditions for PPD, particularly those that enable small and medium enterprises to engage.&lt;br&gt;5. The indicator methodology should be improved to clearly identify not only actor motivations, but also the expectations of PPDs for development outcomes.&lt;br&gt;6. The articulation of a clear methodology for...</td>
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Case studies (module three) is essential, with consideration of a requirement to develop a minimum number of cases across all the countries participating in the monitoring exercise.

**Indicator Four: Transparency**

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<td>Information on development co-operation is publicly available (implementation of the Common Standard)</td>
<td>• Aims to provide information on the implementation of a &quot;common open standard&quot; by aid providers for electronic publication of information on resources provided through development co-operation. However, as the methodologies for assessing transparency since Busan has diverged, a common standard has not been yet established. &lt;br&gt;• This indicator is implemented at a global level by the OECD/DAC and the International Transparency Initiative (ITI). Given the absence of a common standard, the methodology of this indicator was not approved by the Steering Committee at the February 2016 meeting.</td>
<td>Relevance 1. The scope of the transparency indicator must be deepened to improve the relevance of the current methodology at the country level. Proposed Steps Forward 2. Methodologies should be developed to capture the demand side for data use at the country level, on both the part of governments as well as other aid actors such as civil society, parliamentarians, local government and the private sector. 3. GPEDC stakeholders at the November 2016 High Level Meeting in Nairobi should develop specific commitments on data use related to the transparency indicator. 4. A methodology should be developed that is not only technically sound, but is also makes it easy to communicate the findings. 5. The transparency of Public Finance Management Systems (PFM) systems and Aid Information Management Systems (AIMS) should be monitored.</td>
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**Indicator Five: Development cooperation is more predictable**

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<td>Indicator 5a: Proportion of development cooperation funding disbursed within the fiscal year within which it was scheduled by providers of development cooperation resources.  &lt;br&gt;Indicator 5b: Proportion of development co-operation funding covered by indicative forward spending plans provided at country level.</td>
<td>1. Annual (Indicator 5a): Proportion of development co-operation funding disbursed within the fiscal year within which it was scheduled by co-operation providers, with a target of halving the proportion of aid not disbursed within the fiscal year for which it was scheduled (baseline year 2010)  &lt;br&gt;2. Medium-term (Indicator 5b): Proportion of development co-operation funding covered by indicative forward spending plans provided at a country level, with a target of halving the development co-operation funding not covered by indicative forward spending plans provided a country level</td>
<td>Relevance 1. Aid predictability has been an important goal for developing countries since its first articulation in the Paris Declaration. However, consideration should be given to improving its explanatory dimensions for the seeming lack of progress. Efficiency 2. Better understanding of the possible challenges for providers in forward aid projections should be complemented by dialogue between providers and developing countries on improving performance. Proposed Steps Forward 3. Indicator Five should be structured to reveal underlying reasons for failure to meet successive targets.</td>
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4. The rationale and the inter-relationship of separate transparency and predictability indicators should be clarified.

### Indicator Six: Aid on budget

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| Aid is on budget, which is subject to parliamentary scrutiny. | - Attempts to capture the extent to which developing country budgets, at the time of their first formation, include expected aid resources. It also seeks to recognize parliament’s legislative review and approval functions concerning resources being administered for public goods. | **Relevance**
1. Indicator Six continues to be a highly relevant indicator in terms of the Busan commitments to country ownership, use of country systems, and to transparency and accountability through parliamentary scrutiny, which are also reflected in commitments to implement the SDGs.

**Proposed Steps Forward**
2. The methodology should take account of measures to improve budget transparency, as the latter is the basis for accountability.
3. It is important to ensure that developing countries capture all forms of development cooperation through a transparent aid management system (see indicator 4).
4. There is a need to measure the degree to which parliaments have oversight on development intervention and the level of support from aid providers for strengthening these parliamentary processes. |

### Indicator Seven: Mutual Accountability

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| Mutual accountability among cooperation actors is strengthened through inclusive reviews. | - This indicator seeks to measure the progress of developing countries in undertaking mutual assessment reviews based on data from country surveys of progress in the implementation of agreed upon commitments. | **Relevance**
1. Mutual accountability should be considered an overarching indicator central to the process for achieving behaviour change in the MAG’s theory of change for the Monitoring Framework.

**Proposed Steps Forward**
2. This Indicator should provide space to assess the quality of mutual assessments.
3. Direct questions on the framework and practices in mutual accountability to not only developing country governments (in the current methodology), but also providers, while retaining country ownership of the indicator.
4. There should be a review of the methodology for this Indicator in relation to its applicability to other aid modalities such as multi-stakeholder partnerships or blended finance. |

### Indicator Eight: Gender equality and women’s empowerment
**Target**

Measure government efforts to allocate and track resources for gender equality.

**Overview of Indicator**

- Focuses on gender equality and women’s empowerment. More specifically, it aims to measure the percentage of countries with systems that track and make public allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment.

**MAG Recommendation**

- **Relevance**
  1. This indicator is highly relevant given the centrality of gender equality and women’s empowerment to development and its importance to Agenda 2030 (SDG 5). Its focus on budgetary allocations to gender equality complements the broader scope of objectives covered by SDG 5.

- **Proposed Steps Forward**
  2. The analysis of progress for this indicator should be situated in the context of indicators for the various objectives set out in SDG 5.
  3. The rigour of the current methodology for the indicator should be boosted by increasing the number of criteria that must be met to indicate that a country system for tracking gender allocations is in place.
  4. A more inclusive methodology should be created through dialogues with women’s rights organizations and other CSOs.
  5. Given the GPEDC focus on effective development cooperation, this indicator should also include an assessment of aid providers’ disbursements for gender equality.
  6. A methodology should be established that allows for the collection of data on gender equality focus for other development actors.

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**Indicator Nine: Effective institutions – Country systems are strengthened and used**

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| Indicator 9a: Quality of developing country public financial management systems | This indicator focuses on the strengthening and use of developing countries’ public financial management (PFM) and procurement systems when funding from providers is targeted to the government sector, without applying safeguard measures. | **Relevance**
1. This indicator is rooted in the Paris Declaration commitments, consistent with the Busan principle of country ownership for effective development cooperation, and with SDG goals and targets for effective institutions and public procurement standards.

**Efficiency**
2. The JST should work with a multi-stakeholder reference group from the steering committee to review the strengths of EIP/CABRI proposals as a possible alternative for Indicator Nine [a] for measuring the quality of financial institutions in relation to issues raised with respect to the World Bank’s CPIA.

**Proposed Steps Forward**
3. Indicator Nine [a] should include measurements of open and transparent budgets and reform of the methodology should take into account the work of the Effective Institutions Platform as an alternative for the use of CPIA.
4. Indicator Nine [b] should include questions for providers on their actual procurement practices related to contracts awarded in donor and recipient countries.
5. A provision to capture development cooperation flows that may not go through
country financial management systems should be included.
6. A methodology for assessing partner country monitoring and evaluation systems should be developed.

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| Percentage of aid that is fully untied.     | - This indicator is constructed as the percentage of untied Official Development Assistance (ODA) over total ODA. The source of the data is self-reported by OECD DAC members to the Reporting System. The OECD DAC calculates it each calendar year. The MAG notes that the reporting of the tying status of technical assistance and food between NGOs and Private Public Partnerships (PPP) is also voluntary, and is often excluded by DAC donors. | Relevance
1. Untying aid remains an important indication of developing country ownership over the allocation of aid resources to address their development priorities. However, relevant indicator methodological improvements are required to more accurately reflect the realities of the tying status of aid to provider interests and entities.

Proposed Steps Forward
2. An accurate measure of goods and services procured in recipient countries should be developed as well as an assessment of informal tying practices of OECD DAC members. |
References


