

Monitoring effective development cooperation in fragile and conflict-affected situations

Part 2 of 2: Emerging critical actions to guide the development of a tailored monitoring approach for fragile and conflict affected situations

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Abbreviations

BMZ	Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (Germany)
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
CSPPS	Civil Society Platform for Peace-building and State-building
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia)
EU	European Union
IDA	International Development Association
IDPS	International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding
INCAF	International Network on Conflict and Fragility
ISE	Institute for State Effectiveness
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PEFA	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
PFM	Public Financial Management
PSGs	Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WB	World Bank
WP-EFF	Working Party on Aid Effectiveness and Donor Practices

A. Introduction

This paper builds on the discussions of the open working group ('working group'), convened to help guide the development of a tailored approach to monitor the effectiveness of development co-operation in fragile and conflict-affected situations ('fragile contexts'). The working group was convened under the auspices of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation ('Global Partnership').

Where current monitoring efforts do not suffice and more relevant data are needed to inform more effective development co-operation in fragile contexts, the inputs provided by the working group are intended to guide adaptation of the current Global Partnership monitoring approach in order to:

- 1) provide more relevant and useful data on effective development co-operation in fragile and conflict affected situations;
- 2) provide a timely feedback loop to stakeholders on where progress is being made; and
- 3) spur dialogue and action where the bottlenecks lie to implementing existing international commitments on delivering effectively in fragile contexts.

Final approval of any monitoring methodology to feature in the GPEDC monitoring framework rests with the Global Partnership Steering Committee. This tailored approach is planned to be shared with the international community at the Global Partnership's Senior Level Meeting in July 2019, with a view to roll it out in the Global Partnership's 2020 monitoring round.

Part 1 of this paper was distributed to the working group on 8 October 2018. It mapped key international commitments for effective development cooperation and summarised key issues and challenges to making progress against these commitments that were discussed by the working group. **This second part of this paper builds on Part 1 and will discuss critical action areas identified by the working group** that can address key challenges to delivering on the existing international commitments set out in Part 1.

In doing so, **this paper sets out a menu of possible options that could be drawn on to develop a tailored monitoring approach** for fragile and conflict affected situations. These critical actions do not represent the scope of what would be monitored, but rather provide a basis for consultation with engaged stakeholders, further discussion and feedback from the working group, and a point of reference for the Steering Committee for strategic guidance, in order to assess which areas and actions could be prioritised and subsequently developed into a tailored monitoring approach.

This paper draws on three key sources: a body of international commitments on effective development cooperation and engagement in fragile contexts; inputs received from working group members (consisting of written contributions, meetings held in Paris on 10 September and virtually on 16 October 2018, and bilateral interviews); and a panel discussion on delivering effectively in fragile contexts held during the Global Partnership event *Reinvigorating Effectiveness for the 2030 Agenda* on 12 September 2018.

The critical action areas set out in this paper will be further developed, informed and narrowed down to a smaller set of actions that could be monitored, by: (a) light country testing during the 2018 Global Partnership monitoring round, which will include stakeholder interviews with a selection of countries that have both participated in the Global Partnership monitoring exercise in the past and identify as being in a fragile and/or conflict affected situation, (b) consultation with engaged stakeholders through targeted online discussions and international fora, (c) feedback from open working group members, and (d) strategic direction from the Global Partnership Steering Committee. This Paper and its other half (Part 1) are co-authored by the OECD-UNDP Joint Support Team of the Global Partnership and the Institute for State Effectiveness.

B. Critical action areas to improving effective development cooperation in fragile contexts

Global Partnership monitoring provides evidence on country-level progress in implementing internationally-agreed effective development co-operation principles, namely: country ownership, a focus on results, inclusive partnerships and transparency and mutual accountability to one another. Feedback from stakeholders in both the 2016 and the current 2018 monitoring rounds indicate that Global Partnership monitoring does not adequately reflect the challenges and constraints faced in fragile contexts. It is in recognition of this, and the renewed mandate of the Global Partnership¹, that this process to develop a tailored monitoring approach was initiated.

In order to deliver more relevant and useful data through a monitoring approach that is tailored to fragile contexts, the right issues and actions need to be tracked. To drill down on what the critical actions are, the working group first looked at the challenges and bottlenecks to implementing interational commitments on effective development co-operation in fragile contexts. This methodology, to start with the challenges and then look at the critical actions before developing a tailored monitoring approach, ensures that the tailored approach, once developed, will accurately capture and address ‘what’ needs to be monitored in addition to ‘how’ the monitoring is carried out in these contexts.

In meetings of the working group on 10 September and 16 October 2018, and via bilateral consultations with working group members, working group stakeholders discussed critical actions required to address the four challenges to effective development co-operation in fragile contexts that were identified in Part 1 of this paper. These challenges are: lack of trust, fragmentation, weak humanitarian-development coherence, and weak country ownership. The critical actions discussed to address these challenges have been grouped into six themes: (i) setting national priorities, (ii) dialogue and mutual accountability, (iii) government legitimacy, (iv) use of country systems, (v) capacity building, and (vi) humanitarian, development and peace building coherence. It should be noted that interlinkages exist between these six broad themes. As such, while the action areas are listed by theme there are linkages and overlaps where certain actions speak to several themes.

The purpose of setting out these critical action areas below, as defined by experts and practitioners who operate in fragile and conflict-affected settings, is to present a menu of possible options that could be drawn on to develop a tailored monitoring approach for fragile and conflict affected situations to monitor progress toward effective development co-operation and generate more relevant evidence to inform ongoing efforts, reinforce mutual accountability of all partners, and enable the right decisions at the right time.

The actions discussed below do not represent the scope of what will be monitored, but rather provide a basis for further discussion and consultation.

1. Inclusive processes to strengthen government legitimacy

Critical actions to improve government legitimacy will help tackle challenges around citizen-state and government-partner trust, in turn allowing for stronger country ownership and reduced fragmentation. ‘Legitimate politics’ as termed in the New Deal², calls for fostering inclusive political settlements and

¹ The Second High Level Meeting of the Global Partnership (Nairobi 2016) reaffirmed the relevance of existing effectiveness principles, but stressed the need to “update the existing monitoring framework to reflect the challenges of the 2030 Agenda, including the pledge to leave no-one behind”.

² 2011 New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States

conflict resolution. Governments, through effective, inclusive and transparent institutions and processes, can strengthen trust with the public and develop whole of society ownership for national development priorities. This source of legitimacy with society is a building block for country ownership, and also builds trust with development partners. Strengthening government legitimacy is also a preventative mechanism against deterioration into fragility, particularly with regard to reinforcing social cohesion. The working group identified the following action areas where development cooperation can support government legitimacy.

- a) **Foster legitimate politics through regular political dialogue.** Development co-operation is inevitably political. This can be more pronounced in fragile contexts that are transitioning out of conflict. While challenging among other priorities, government and development partner representatives require ample space to regularly engage honestly on the risks, challenges, and opportunities related to development co-operation partnerships and activities. Working group representatives from both government and development partners noted that unease at openly discussing risks, results and challenges was an obstacle to trust. However, this kind of frank discussion has heightened value in fragile contexts where conditions borne by decades of conflict and instability have produced additional capacity constraints and challenges which must be brought to the fore.
- b) **Ensure inclusive national processes.** For example, inclusivity of national priority setting processes and processes related to mutual accountability frameworks. Country-led development does not only mean government-led. Instead, it requires providing all stakeholders, specifically sub-national government, parliament and civil society, with the opportunity to actively engage in the planning, implementation and monitoring progress toward national development priorities.
 - i. **Inclusive consultation with community, civil society, and other subnational groups** is essential. Several working group members stated that it is important to recognize that country ownership needs to be interpreted as a process that is broader than the sitting government. As such, inclusive consultation is key to legitimate country ownership. This is particularly pressing in fragile states, where there can be subnational tensions or opposition movements, or where development partners may have reservations about being perceived to take political stances. There is also a need to ensure continuity in the development efforts and investments across successive governments, particularly given that in fragile states, electoral cycles can be shortened artificially and longer-term continuity is critical to programming, monitoring and achieving development results. Working group members stated that bodies such as Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS) have already done a great deal to help secure civil society engagement, but more is needed to ensure it is not tokenistic, but rather deeply participatory – and productive – involvement. This can include capacity building resources for civil society, preventing partners from pitting government and civil society against one another for funding, and finding productive ways to work together.
 - ii. **All regions/provinces and sectors need to be engaged.** Particularly in fragile contexts where peace agreements may be quite delicate, it is especially important to minimize risks of national priorities being captured solely by central government, the ‘capital’, or particular departments/ministries. After the 2004 tsunami, development partners carefully navigated the tensions between separatist Aceh and the central Indonesia government authority in Jakarta. By establishing an agreement between the province and central government, the parties managed a successful political settlement and were able to build a

strong development strategy as a result. That balance – as well as the peace process – was crucial to the success of the development and reconstruction programming and its monitoring.

- c) **Reduce redundancy and overlap of actors to reinforce government leadership and legitimacy.** One effect of fragmentation that the working group highlighted is the overcrowding and duplication by actors in some sectors or regions. This often occurs because many development partners have domestic political imperatives they are responding to. However, it creates operational confusion and service gaps in overlooked areas. It also reduces the space for government to effectively intervene and lead, and be recognized by its citizens as a source of development. All these results can undermine the government's legitimacy on the ground, despite determined efforts to help establish coherence around national priorities across a country. Reducing the number of actors in one space automatically reduces the number of parallel systems and eases the effort to streamline or redirect assistance so that partners are working to their comparative advantage. Efforts have been made to address this, including coordination through multidonor trust funds, compacts, and donor conferences, but this remains an ongoing problem that working group members highlight as requiring attention.

2. Setting and aligning with national priorities

The working group emphasized the need to respect and use national priorities as the basis to address the continuing challenges of effective development co-operation in fragile contexts. Legitimate processes for setting national priorities, strengthened alignment with these priorities by all stakeholders, and greater use of unified country results frameworks are key to tracking and promoting effective development practice. They help to build government legitimacy, improve trust between government and citizenry as well as development partners, and reduce the extent and consequences of fragmented development efforts. This applies across country contexts and is even more imperative in fragile contexts. Indeed, among the 33 countries in fragile situations that participated in the exit survey for the 2016 Global Partnership monitoring round, measuring alignment with national priorities through country results frameworks and other planning tools was identified as the highest priority indicator.³ The following critical actions were identified by the working group in the area of setting and coordinating around national priorities.

- a) **Use existing and agreed upon tools and frameworks** designed for fragile contexts to inform the planning and priority-setting process. These tools, including the New Deal's FOCUS framework, fragility and post-conflict needs assessments, compacts, and aid coordination frameworks, have been specifically developed to appreciate and address the challenges and conditions in fragile contexts.⁴ In fragile contexts, with multiple competing needs and constrained capacities, partners should avoid the tendency to run separate and disparate capacity/needs assessments and priority-setting mechanisms which may more easily align with their own domestic processes rather than national priorities. Preventing such duplication of frameworks is crucial to ensure more coherent diagnosis, consensus, and understanding of the priorities, and strengthen country leadership of oversight. Existing frameworks, that build

³ GPEDC 2016 Monitoring Round Exit Survey Results. See link to Technical Note 4, accessed at <http://effectivecooperation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Concept-note-Global-Partnership-Monitoring-Framework-2030.pdf>

⁴ These tools can be found at the g7+ website: <http://g7plus.org/resources/>.

on joint assessments where possible, help to enable prioritization and implementation processes while also helping to identify and prevent the regeneration of conflict drivers. They also help address some of the risks that are more prevalent in contested or institutionally weak environments.

- b) **Allow for flexibility and adaptation in the planning and accountability tools** when applied at the country level. The existing development co-operation frameworks and tools have broad consensus and have been developed with significant expertise and experience. However, flexibility to tailor these planning tools to their specific priorities and constraints, both initially and over time as conditions change, is essential. Creating space for adaptation can help facilitate productive dialogue between partners. This has been the experience in Somalia, where the Federal Government and its partners have used globally-endorsed tools to inform and guide rather than prescribe policies and practices. For example, the Mutual Accountability Partnership Framework in Somalia, has been adapted to place appropriate emphasis on intergovernmental dialogue and shared accountability between federal and regional government. This flexibility to the context also allows for important continued policy-learning. The new set of development indicators for Somalia's next National Development Plan incorporate lessons learned from the first Mutual Accountability Partnership Framework and National Development Plan, which are being fed back into the country's planning and monitoring processes.
- c) **Ensure alignment with national priorities.** To reduce fragmentation and strengthen country ownership, alignment of development co-operation to national priorities is imperative. The extent to which development partners guide their development efforts in line with country-defined priorities and development results is also a critical aspect of maintaining a focus on results, which is key to achieving long lasting development gains. This alignment is critical at both the strategic and programmatic level. One way that partner countries can facilitate better alignment is by developing umbrella national programs that are structured around 'umbrella' priorities and led by appropriate government ministries to ensure that development co-operation activities are consistent with country priorities and objectives. Examples of these priority-coordinating programs include Somalia's nine national development pillars and Afghanistan's national priority programs under the Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework.⁵
- d) **Develop mechanisms to acknowledge attribution of development results** that are tied to national priorities. Attribution of development results is critical for governments in building trust and accountability with the public. It is also vital for development partners to convince domestic constituents and political actors to invest in fragile situations. Attribution helps to ensure value for money and readjust when programming approaches are not working. However, common practice, i.e. discrete activities with isolated funding and results frameworks, typically creates a difficult tension with the need to work collectively, use country systems, and reduce duplication. The working group suggested looking to the monitoring and evaluation community for solutions.

⁵ The Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework can be found at the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations Website: <http://afghanistan-un.org/2016/10/the-afghanistan-national-peace-and-development-framework-anpdf-2017-to-2021/>.

3. Mutual accountability

Improving dialogue and mutual accountability at country level were recognized by the working group as vital for building trust, reducing fragmentation, and addressing the humanitarian-development coordination gap. In the Global Partnership's 2016 monitoring round, increasing transparency and mutual accountability was identified as a high priority by countries in fragile situations. Drawing from the working group meetings and bilateral consultations, the following actions were raised.

- a) **Establish a mutual accountability framework** to enable both government and development partners to hold one another to account on commitments in a more accessible and transparent manner. This can help communicate and assure legitimacy of both government and partner practices. In Somalia, a mutual accountability scorecard is used to measure progress on commitments by both sides. This helps to instill confidence and encourages frank and relevant dialogue in response. Mutual accountability should not only be assessed between central government and donor partners, but also be applied to subnational governments. The working group raised the importance of engaging subnational governments in national priority setting and dialogue for legitimate outcomes in contexts of political contestation – and so too is it important to engage them in mutual accountability exercises.
- b) **Send appropriate counterparts** to engage with the government on development co-operation implementation and review. Many donors send inappropriate level staff to coordination mechanisms, either too junior to action decisions or too senior to attend regularly and engage meaningfully. Without the right counterpart, government is more likely to be sidestepped, which can lead to fragmentation, reduced country ownership, and parallel systems. A shift in participation may be one action for partners to signal and support the counter-government's legitimacy and authority, and prevent duplication, saving time and funds in many contexts.
- c) **Share and consolidate existing data and information** between governments and development partners. Existing architecture for effective development cooperation includes shared digital platforms where government and partners can upload and access data. These are meant to amplify available information and in turn, results. However, there remains a wealth of information that partners hold but is not being shared. Data platforms are not regularly updated or maintained. Instead there continue to be duplicative systems of data collection and storage, and repetitive conversations. This lack of sharing and transparency was a challenge consistently raised in the 2016 monitoring round – and by the working group. There are new and determined attempts to change this, however, and bring together disparate sources of data. As raised in Part I of this paper, Australia, for example, is attempting to consolidate data and bridge gaps in the Pacific region by taking stock of data that has already been gathered through multiple channels and mechanisms, including by CSOs, and build baseline metrics where there might otherwise be none. More efforts such as this one to bring coherence to the kinds of monitoring and data collection development partners do in fragile and non-fragile countries can also help prevent duplication.

4. Use of country systems

A primary component of effective development co-operation commitments – and enshrined in indicator 9b of the Global Partnership Monitoring Framework – is the increased use of country systems to help

strengthen internal capacities and reinforce country ownership. However, as was identified in Part I of this paper, a lack of trust, weak institutional checks, and concerns about fiduciary risks and public perception make this one of the most difficult commitments for development partners to fulfil. Working around country systems, however, is a driver of fragmentation, insufficient country ownership, and exacerbates trust gaps between governments and donors. For these well acknowledged reasons, the working group identified use of country systems as a crucial area to improve practices in order to deliver on effective development promises. Discussions in the working group highlighted that, whilst the ambition to use and strengthen country systems is shared amongst partners, the existing approaches to measuring use of country systems is not conducive to incentivise or track progress. As such, several actions were identified by the working group to better track progress on use of country systems.

- a) **Acknowledge and measure incremental use of country systems** to track progress toward more comprehensive use of country systems. Conflict, corruption, legitimacy, and/or weak institutional capacities can lead development partners to not use country systems. However, there are a great deal of examples of partial use of country systems. Part 1 of this paper describes that “[t]he complexities of trust and risk in fragile contexts often calls for innovative and tailored ways of using country systems, including, for example finding ways to strengthen government and national institutions without wholly putting money on budget or on treasury”. DFAT, for example, mobilizes in-line advisers in key positions within government ministries, notably in the Pacific, in order to “use government PFM systems while managing its concerns about fiduciary risk.” Another illustration of partial use of country systems, is maintaining government’s oversight and planning role even if development partners must work with third parties as implementers (such as NGOs or managing contractors). Rather than employing a stringent definition of use of country system, this kind of programming could be better identified, acknowledged, and measured as a form of use of country systems, helping to strengthen institutional capacity and incrementally deepen the scope. Working group members also raised the need to take a broader approach to ‘country systems’ to include non-governmental institutions when it may not be possible to use government systems.
- b) **Recognize that baselines will vary across contexts.** Baselines for institutional capacity and delivery metrics used for decision-making on use of country systems may be lower in fragile countries, but they are not uniform. Indeed, the 2017 *g7+ Policy Note on the Use of Country Systems in Development Assistance* noted that the necessary target established by the Busan Partnership agreement to reduce “the proportion of aid not using country systems by one-third” was a score of 3.5 on the World Bank CPIA Indicator 13 on quality of budgetary and financial management. Only two of the g7+ countries – Afghanistan and Sierra Leone – were able to reach that, despite there being marked progress in countries with very low initial scores.⁶ In response, the Global Partnership has since revised its indicator that measures the quality of country systems from the World Bank CPIA to the World Bank’s Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) standards, which provides consistent and comparable baselines to track progress but does not rely on a predefined benchmark to measure progress (i.e. progress is measured irrespective of the starting point).

⁶ Policy Note on The Use of Country Systems in Development Assistance: the g7+ Perspective, July 2017.

- c) **Evaluate the risk of alternative delivery mechanisms.** The status quo has been to consider the risks of working through country systems almost in isolation, which is a short sighted and fallible equation, especially in fragile and conflict-affected contexts where any delivery mechanism comes with risks. The reality of country engagements is that the alternative to working through country systems is rarely ‘not giving money’. In fragile environments, where development partners’ and donor governments’ on the ground presence is often constrained, the alternative is frequently working through third- or fourth-party implementers. This layering decreases value for money and makes oversight even more removed, increasing fiduciary risk. Several bodies have been doing work to highlight the contradictions and need to balance fiduciary and development risks including the *Somalia Working Group on Use of Country Systems* and ISE, with the publication *Who Cares about Development Risk*.⁷

5. Strengthening national capacity

Effective support for state and institutional capacity building, particularly in management capacities such as procurement and administration, is central to reducing fragmentation and unlocking country ownership over planning and implementation processes. In the group discussions and bilateral consultations, the following action areas to better build capacity in fragile contexts were raised.

- a) **Assess which country capacities are the most important to build legitimacy and country ownership and strengthen national capacities in these areas.** The UN-WB Pathways for Peace report⁸ notes that one of the central ways for governments to build legitimacy with society - particularly in fragile contexts - is to develop and use country capacities for service delivery as this is how citizens primarily encounter and shape their perception of the government. Skilled and educated people are often the first to leave in a conflict situation given opportunities and networks abroad, depleting human capital for programming that starts in post-conflict transition phases. This makes it even more crucial for development partners to support capacity building and help stop the ‘brain drain’ in pursuit of retaining national capacities and strengthening country ownership. The working group noted that while lack of capacity, in both government and civil society, is often more prevalent in fragile contexts than in other countries, current monitoring (including Global Partnership monitoring) does not address this, and therefore does not serve to incentivize such assistance.
- b) **Consider adequate support for building key central administrative functions.** Strong central administrative mechanisms and functions, including around procurement, coordination, and investment management, are necessary to enable government oversight and leadership of programming, and to prevent parallel government functions. Development partners often face pressure to demonstrate that funding is dispersed and provides quantifiable outcomes quickly. Therefore, development partners’ support often focuses on service delivery. This renders significantly less support available to help boost capacity for administrative functions, and working group discussions surfaced the need to strike a strategic balance between strengthening national capacities to address citizens’ more immediate needs and building strong administrative

⁷ Institute for State Effectiveness (2017) “Who Cares About Development Risk?”, accessed: November 2018, <https://effectivestates.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Development-Risk.pdf>.

⁸ United Nations; World Bank. 2018. “Pathways for Peace : Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict.” Washington, DC: World Bank. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28337>

mechanisms for solid public sector performance in the longer term. A stable and coherent administration also provides legitimacy and capacity for government to engage with partners and the development process in the long-term, but that requires targeted support.

- c) **Strengthen statistical and data collection capacities.** Investment in strengthening internal government statistical capacity supports legitimacy and the ability to lead development coordination processes. Legible, accurate data on which development partners can base programming decisions is critical for countries to receive development assistance, demonstrate preparedness for use of country systems, and engage in dialogue. In sum, it is crucial for national oversight and delivery of the development agenda. As one working group member noted, however, in many fragile countries there is very limited capacity to collect, collate, and synthesize data.
- d) **Provide capacity building assistance for civil society** as well. Concern about closing space for civil society was raised as a key challenge of holistic country ownership for effective development cooperation. Working group members, including civil society representatives, remarked that support for capacity building of non-governmental actors is necessary to protect civil society engagement and ensure they have a substantive – rather than tokenistic – seat at the table. This is needed to help facilitate fruitful inputs and relationships with development partners, the public, and government in contexts where civil society can play a decisive role in citizen outreach and service delivery.
- e) **Investments in capacity building need to have long term horizons and clear exit strategies.** Pressures around short term risks, including publicity, and reputational risks, as well as domestic pressure for immediate results, mean technical assistance terms of reference to build partner capacity still too frequently feature short term indicators or outputs. Such ad hoc programming does not provide meaningful time to transfer skills and knowledge. At the same time, these same short-term roles then get renewed over and over to fill continued knowledge gaps, without a firm strategy to measure when capacity has been established and how advisors or consultants will leave. The short-term risks and costs need to be better viewed in relation to the longer-term risks of poorly delivered or patchy capacity building.

6. Humanitarian-development-peace coherence

There is increasing attention among stakeholders in fragile contexts to the imperative for better coordination and complementarity across humanitarian, peace, and development actors as these three processes increasingly overlap. As a result, there are a number of norm-setting initiatives currently underway to try to establish new rules of the game in these contexts, including by the OECD-DAC, United Nations and the World Bank. Discussion on the agreed actions to be taken under these initiatives is ongoing. Once agreed upon within their own political process and context, these actions could provide a suitable basis for developing a monitoring approach that would generate relevant data for tracking progress toward better humanitarian, development, peace coherence.

In the interim of agreed international actions around which to develop any monitoring approach, the working group highlighted co-ordination as a starting point, which many of the initiatives to work better across the three actors build on. Working group members noted that joint co-ordination needs to start in the initial phases of diagnosis, with carefully designed consultations. In Part 1 of this Paper, “[t]he EU

referenced post disaster needs assessments and recovery and peacebuilding assessments as focal means for co-ordinating actors with multiple and often divergent priorities and highlighted the Central African Republic and Nepal as examples.” Furthermore, co-ordination can be challenging even where national capacity is strong. Reference was made by one working group member to the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia where, despite robust capacity, the government had difficulty meeting the burden of coordinating and responding to multiple assessments and actors across the humanitarian and development spheres. This makes prioritizing and sequencing recovery, reconstruction, and development very difficult. In response, the urgency to begin sharing information and planning processes early was again raised by working group members in considering critical actions to address persistent challenges on the ground. Shared operational frameworks may help address stretched capacity and bring together diverging priorities between the different communities on timing and mandate noted in Part 1.

C. Adapting the process for monitoring to account for fragile contexts

In addition to addressing ‘what’ needs to be captured in a tailored monitoring approach for fragile and conflict affected situations to deliver more relevant and useful data (i.e. prospective indicators), working group members expressed the need to address ‘how’ the monitoring is conducted (i.e. the process). A clear message from the working group was that in order to better fit the conditions and dynamics of fragile contexts, an updated monitoring approach must be leaner than the current approach and remain balanced in tracking the responsibilities of different actors, as an alternative option that countries in fragile situations can choose to opt for in place of the full Global Partnership monitoring process. The constrained resources and multiple, often competing, priorities in fragile contexts mean that feasibility and selectivity to capture priorities in any monitoring approach need to be carefully considered.

Data collection constraints were emphasised in working group discussions. A leaner module should aim to reduce overlap with other required reporting so that country stakeholders do not have to repackage data already provided elsewhere. It should also build on existing data and frameworks wherever possible. In refining the monitoring process for fragile contexts, it will be important to balance the need for fast turnaround due to quickly changing dynamics on the ground that require swift feedback on what is working and what is not, together with the need to build on and strengthen existing national processes, which can often be lengthy. Questions were also raised in the working group around how a tailored monitoring process could cater to data generation and collection in contexts where the government’s capacity to lead the monitoring process is weak or non-existent.

Working group stakeholders raised the need for greater focus on monitoring planning processes as well as leveraging the results through dialogue and engagement. Ultimately, the working group highlighted that the adapted framework should not only better capture progress the key challenges in fragile contexts, but should also help accelerate progress by sparking dialogue on results, key bottlenecks and joint action.

Ensuring that the monitoring process is feasible, light and is an exercise in itself that supports effective development co-operation, is a critical aspect of developing a tailored monitoring approach for fragile contexts. The monitoring process, and how it can be adapted to fragile contexts, will be addressed as further consultation on the critical action areas provided above takes place.

D. Next Steps

The Global Partnership Steering Committee will meet in New York on 30 November. At this meeting, strategic direction from the Steering Committee will be important to guide next steps in the development of a tailored monitoring approach for fragile and conflict affected situations.

It is proposed that this work continue to build on the emerging themes listed above to further develop a tailored monitoring approach. To do so, consultation on the critical action areas is planned to take place in the coming months, including consultation with governments in fragile contexts, development partners, and civil society representatives that are engaged in the 2018 monitoring round. The open working group will review the feedback received during the consultations to shape the contours of developing an adapted monitoring approach around emerging priority action areas.

Following consultation with these key stakeholders, the emerging action areas would be further refined from which the open working group will recommend a measurement approach to monitoring effective development cooperation in fragile and conflict affected situations. This draft proposal would then be presented for approval to the Steering Committee in the spring of 2019.

Following endorsement from the Steering Committee, the newly developed tailored approach could be presented at the Global Partnership Senior Level Meeting in 2019, with the view to roll out this tailored approach in the 2020 monitoring round for those that choose to take it up in place of the full monitoring exercise.

Working Draft

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